Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies
Volume 35

Article 10

2018

Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma
Part of the American Politics Commons, Gender and Sexuality Commons, International Relations
Commons, Migration Studies Commons, Other International and Area Studies Commons, Political
Economy Commons, and the Political Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
(2018) "Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies," Sigma: Journal of Political and International
Studies: Vol. 35 , Article 10.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma/vol35/iss1/10

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies by an authorized editor of BYU
ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Journal of Political and International Studies
VOLUME XXXV

BRIGHAM YOUNG
UNIVERSITY

2018

SIGMA
Journal of Political and
International Studies
VOLUME xxxv • 2018

CONTENTS

A Letter from the Editor.........................................................................................................1
Travis Birch

Popular: The Monopoly of Force and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units.............................3
Rachel Day and Adam Johnson

Religious Targets: Where 2016 Presidential Candidates Used Religious

Rhetoric................................................................................................................................21
Mandi Eatough

Congress and the Benefits of Social Media: A Low-Cost Investment in

Constituency Approval and Electoral Success....................................................................39
Savannah Henshaw, Lydia Estes, and Lauren Olsen

Inter-Female Hostility: Attractiveness and Femininity vs. Likeability..............................67
Alex Hoagland

Who is My Neighbor? Identifying Epistemic Peers among Polarized

Communities .......................................................................................................................83
Colton Keddington and Nichole Keddington

Women vs. Men—Who Makes Better Use of Financial Aid?.............................................95
Nicholas Moffitt

Improving the Bureaucracy: What Leads Government Officials to

Use Evidence-Based Reports?............................................................................................ 111
Reed Rasband

Religion, Nationality, and Empathetic Responses to Refugees.........................................145
Lincoln Wilcox

The Price of Scottish Independence: Why Remaining a Part of the UK

Still Makes Sense in the Wake of Brexit............................................................................177

A Letter From the Editor

Welcome to the 2018 edition of Sigma. This journal is the product of hours of intensive research, analysis, writing, reviewing, and rewriting by a dedicated team of student
authors, faculty advisors, and student editors. It represents some of the finest academic
research of Brigham Young University’s undergraduate scholars in political science and
international and area studies. As such, we invite you, our inquisitive reader, to closely
examine and carefully consider each paper.
At a time when civil discourse is fracturing and growing increasingly uncivil,
Sigma stands as a beacon of hope and a clear message to all who read it: Young adults
are interested and invested in answering the most pressing questions of our day, and
they are equipped to do so with the tools of meticulous analytical research. In this
volume, you will find new perspectives on timely issues, including the various—and
often subtle—influences of gender in society, the repercussions of recent nationalist
movements such as Brexit, and the nuances of engaging with those who have different views or experiences from our own. It is our hope that, as you peruse, you will
ponder these findings and uncover additional insights and implications.
I express immense gratitude to the diligent authors, editorial staff, and professors who have generously given their time and expertise to bring these perspectives
to light. I also thank you, our reader, for granting your consideration and intellectual
engagement to this new body of knowledge. I hope your study of Sigma yields fresh
understandings that will meaningfully contribute to the global conversation.
Sincerely,
Samantha Escamilla
Editor-in-Chief
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Popular: The Monopoly of Force and
Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units
Travis Birch

Introduction/Research Question

A monopoly on violence is often considered one of the key characteristics of a state,
if not the defining feature. The existence of government-supported militias worldwide
contradicts this view, leaving the question of why a state would choose to outsource
force to external groups. In Iraq, for example, the mostly-Shiite militias that make up alHashd al-Sha’abi, translated as the Popular Mobilization, operate with the support of the
state, which, until their legal incorporation into the Iraqi military structure in 2016, contradicted a constitutional prohibition against “the formation of military militia outside
the framework of the armed forces” (Washington Post 2015). Despite their current
status as part of the state security apparatus, questions about the allegiances of the
militias, many of whom have expressed loyalty to Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, show
the risks to state sovereignty that come with outsourcing the use of force.
The exact nature of the Hashd’s relationship to the Iraqi state has changed frequently during the lifetime of the component militias and of the Popular Mobilization
Units (PMUs) as an organization. Currently, the PMUs are legally affiliated with the
state as a distinct branch of the military under the Ministry of Defense. According to a
2016 law, they are under the control of the prime minister, and as such, the designation
of the Hashd as a nongovernment entity may seem incorrect (Iraqi Parliament 2016).
There are several reasons why the militias make for a good case study in this context.
First, PMUs only recently reached their current level of integration into the state
after years of independent operations—the Jaysh al-Mahdi, for example, fought against
the Iraqi state and U.S. forces in the early 2000s before its tenuous membership in the
PMUs. Second, there is reason to believe the Hashd’s pledges of loyalty to the state may
not be entirely sincere. Although some Iraqi political and religious figures have pushed
3
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for the PMUs to be dissolved and their members incorporated into existing military units,
the militias have preserved their leadership and organizational structures (Mansour and
Jaba 2017). As a result, the component militias of the Hashd have maintained independence to pursue their political objectives, some of which appear to be more in line with
Tehran than Baghdad (Ibid.). Third, although the 2016 law forbids Hashd leaders from
running for political office, several are expected to seek the position of prime minister in
next year’s elections by transitioning out of militia leadership and into linked political
parties. These issues highlight the risks pro-government militias pose to the state: They
may wield their violent power against the state, they may pursue objectives that are in
opposition to state policy, and their power may be leveraged to wrest political influence
from state leaders. For these reasons, the Iraqi government’s relationship with the Hashd
is helpful in understanding governments’ motivations for supporting paramilitaries.
Given these problems, why did the Iraqi state choose to support the PMUs, when
doing so meant weakening its control over a critical state function? Baghdad has chosen
to support the militias because of the weakness of the state military in the face of the
Islamic state, sectarianism, and the influence of Iran.

Literature Review

According to Max Weber (1965), a monopoly on the legitimate use of force is the
defining characteristic of a state, which uses violence to maintain its dominance over
sub-state interests. The existence of pro-government militias, which Carey and Mitchell
(2017) define as “armed groups that have a link to government but exist outside the
regular security apparatus, and have some level of organization,” defies the notion of
the monopoly on force and poses a difficult question for scholars. Many have argued that
militias are a cause, consequence, or indicator of failed states, but the presence of some
type of pro-government militia in approximately one-third of the world’s states defies
easy conclusions (Bates 2008; Klare 2004).
A growing body of scholarship refutes the notion that paramilitaries are correlated
with state weakness, arguing that states may authorize groups that are not part of the
traditional military structure. Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell (2016) use the “logic of delegation” to understand the relationship: Just as a state might delegate its authority to
private contractors to perform administrative tasks, it may delegate the use of force
to militias. Phelps (2014) agrees that the state can bestow legitimacy upon non-state
forces, such as security contractors.
Still, there are obvious risks to the state from allowing vigilante violence, including the possibility that militias could become competitors to the state and even replace
it. The attributes of pro-government militias and the nature of their relationship to the
state varies widely. At one extreme are groups like Hezbollah, which acts as a quasi-state
in Lebanon even as it participates in Lebanese political institutions. At the other end of
the continuum are local defense militias, which are organized ad hoc for the protection
of communities. Powerful militias threaten the state and pose a danger to the citizenry.
Koren (2014) claims that the existence of such groups is predictive of mass killings,
4
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while Ahram (2014) posits that nongovernment militias can be either an incentive or
a deterrent to genocides or other atrocities. Carey and Mitchell (2017) have developed a
typology of pro-government militias based on their relationship to the state and their
relationship to society, adding that certain types of militias are more or less dangerous
to the state or the populace. The nature of the Hashd, which includes groups with differing aims and identities, makes it difficult to classify, but most units would be classified as ethnoreligious militias, which pose a high risk to the state and a very high risk
to civilians.
Given the severity of those risks and the high incidence of pro-government militias, we can infer the existence of strong benefits that militias offer states. Perhaps the
most obvious benefit is that loyal paramilitaries outside of the military structure can
protect leaders from coups (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2016). Another benefit is progovernment militias may give states the option to use violence in otherwise unacceptable ways while maintaining plausible deniability (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015).
Carey and Mitchell (2016) add that pro-government militias are cheap force multipliers,
they provide local knowledge, and they grant the state legitimacy among the group
from which the militia is drawn.

Method and Data

In this paper, I will undertake a qualitative case study using Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units to demonstrate benefits that motivate a state to permit and support the
operations of pro-government militias. I derived possible reasons from the scholarly
literature and from expert analysis, then used primary documents, including Iraqi laws
and statements from influential figures, and secondary sources, including journalistic
reports and expert analysis, to evaluate them.

Historical Background

The stage for a Shiite paramilitary mobilization was set by the invasion and occupation of Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition in 2003. The coalition’s overthrow of Saddam Hussein
ushered in a period of violent chaos, compounded by the actions of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the group charged with building a democratic Iraqi state. After
the expulsion of Baath party members from the government, its second order was the
complete dissolution of the Iraqi security and intelligence apparatus, dominated by Sunnis under the Baathist regime.
Ambitious Shiite figures like Muqtada al-Sadr were poised to take advantage of
the resulting security vacuum. Sadr had inherited a dormant Shiite movement developed by his father Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr in the 1980s, and he moved quickly after
the invasion to mobilize his supporters and launch the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) to fight the
American occupiers. The Sadrist movement mostly consisted of undereducated slumdwellers, and the JAM, which was “nothing more than a lightly armed and disorganized
rabble,” quickly proved itself unable to wage an effective campaign (Rayburn 2014, p.
181). JAM leaders who were dissatisfied with the Army’s performance and disaffected
5
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with Sadr’s “erratic . . . dictatorial and mercurial” leadership decided to break away in
2004 to form a number of small, elite units to lead the insurgency (Ibid., pp. 180–88).
The founders of these “Special Groups,” as they became known, sought the help
of Qassem Soleimani, head of the Quds Force, a unit of the of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps, which has been described as a “cross between the CIA, Special Operations Command, and State Department.” Tehran, which wanted to expel the Americans
from Iraq and to develop influence in Baghdad, was happy to oblige, and the Quds Force
began sending weaponry and military advisors to Iraq and training Special Groups’
forces in Iran (Ibid., p. 185). Two Iraqi leaders emerged as the most influential of the
Special Groups. Qais al-Khazali, an acolyte of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr until the latter’s assassination in 1999, presided over the creation in 2006 of the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
(AAH) militia, a group that considered itself allied with Iran but not under its direct control (Ibid., p. 187). Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis’s Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), on the other hand,
was “controlled directly by the Quds Force and loyal to the Supreme Leader,” Ayatollah
Khamenei (Ibid.). Muhandis had a long history of Iran-sponsored paramilitary action,
having participated in attacks against U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait and an assassination attempt against the emir of Kuwait. He was elected a member of parliament in
2005 before being ousted for his past militancy (Ibid., p. 200).
In addition to AAH, KH, and JAM, which continued to operate as the Promised Day
Brigades after the breakoff of the Special Groups (Ibid., p. 197), the anarchic insurgency
included a group known as the Badr Brigades. Badr, led by Hadi al-Amiri, was created in Iran in 1982 as the military wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (SCIRI), a Shiite political group opposed to Saddam Hussein (Lake 2015). While
these four groups’ primary foe was the U.S. military, they also became involved in sectarian warfare against Iraqi Sunnis. The bombing of the Askari mosque in Samarra in 2006
by al-Qaeda escalated the conflict into a full sectarian war, and Shiite militias participated
in a campaign of ethnic cleansing that lead to the “balkanization of Baghdad.” (Marr and
al-Marashi 2014). They also fought amongst themselves: there was, for example, fighting
between the JAM and Badr in 2007 and between the JAM and the AAH after the U.S.
withdrawal in 2011 (Rayburn 2014, pp. 28–31, 205).
A decision in 2011 not to renew the agreement allowing U.S. forces to operate in
Iraq, made by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and U.S. President Barack Obama, moved
the burden of national security from the U.S. military to the reconstructed Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) (Karon 2011). Unfortunately, the ISF proved unable to bear that burden when
the Islamic State (IS) burst into Iraq from Syria and began capturing territory. In 2014,
a force of 1,500 IS fighters approached Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, where 30,000
ISF troops were garrisoned (Marr and al-Marashi 2014, pp. 289–90). Alarmingly, the ISF
fled the city without a fight, leaving their uniforms and a large cache of weapons behind
(Schmitt and Gordon 2014).
The rapid progress of the Islamic state united the Shiite militias, which viewed the
Sunni extremist group’s advance with alarm. Ayatollah Sistani, influential head of
6
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the Iraqi Shiite hierarchy, issued a fatwa, or religious ruling, in 2014, saying: “Citizens
who are able to bear arms and fight terrorists, defending their country and their people
and their holy places, should volunteer and join the security forces to achieve this holy
purpose” (BBC 2014). Instead of joining the ISF, though, Shiites responded by joining
militias, both pre-existing (JAM and AAH) and new.1 The Iraqi national government, led
by Maliki, subsequently formed the Commission for the Popular Mobilization to administer the militias and provide funding for their operations. The PMUs began participating
in the war against the Islamic state, fighting alongside the ISF and becoming de facto
allies of the U.S. military they had formed to defeat.2
The PMUs’ battlefield success was undermined, however, by accusations of sectarian abuses against Sunnis. According to Amnesty International,
PMU militias have extrajudicially executed or otherwise unlawfully killed, tortured
and abducted thousands of men and boys. Victims were picked up from their homes,
workplaces, camps for internally displaced persons, checkpoints or other public
places. Some were later found shot dead. Thousands more are still missing, weeks,
months and years after they were abducted. Amnesty International has documented
such violations by PMU militias in and around Baghdad, and in the Anbar, Salah alDin, Diyala and Kirkuk governorates. (2017)
Nevertheless, support for the militias in the highest levels of the Iraqi government
has continued, with Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who replaced Maliki in 2014,
calling the Hashd “the hope of country and the region” (Chmaytelli 2017). In late
2016, parliament passed a law moving the PMUs under the purview of the Ministry of
Defense, effectively making them a discrete branch of the military, though the component militias continued to operate according to their own wills (Iraqi Parliament 2016).

Military Weakness

The most obvious reason for the Iraqi government’s support for the PMUs is
the weakness of the state military. The government was compelled to support the
militias because their own military was incapable of policing the use of violence,
particularly by the Islamic state, and because a lack of confidence in the ISF made it
unlikely that Baghdad could have regained the monopoly on force through a conventional military buildup.
First, the Iraqi state military was unable to police the use of violence, the result
of a series of decisions stretching back to 2003. After disbanding the ISF, the CPA
had promised to “create in the near future a New Iraqi Corps, as the first step in
forming a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq.” The U.S. proceeded to
spend billions of dollars recruiting, outfitting, and training a new military to shore
up the authority of the state it was attempting to form. But, according to the International Crisis Group (2010), the rapidity with which Washington and Baghdad
were forced to rebuild the ISF, as they rushed to fill the security vacuum created by the
CPA decision, left a “legacy of expediency.” Troops were recruited “without sufficient
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regard to background or qualifications,” and units were created without due regard for
institutional structure, which resulted in political partisanship and fragmented ethnic
loyalties.
The fall of Mosul to the Islamic state in 2014, three years after the U.S. withdrawal,
proved the impotence of the ISF, but the Iraqi state’s inability to govern the use of force
was already evident before the extremist group’s rise to power. For example, several of
the militias now integrated into the PMUs were active years before the advent of the
Islamic state. In 2006, in response to Baghdad’s inability to “counter the insurgent groups
that were . . . effectively challenging the hegemony of the state,” the U.S. worked to form
a Sunni anti-insurgency movement known as the Sahwat, a collection of tribal units that
could be considered pro-government militias (though their support was later shown to
be exclusively from the U.S and not from Baghdad) (Stansfield 2016, pp. 198–202). Of
course, the U.S. military, rather than the ISF, was functioning as the protector and enforcer
of the Iraqi state until the expiration of the Status of Forces Agreement in 2011 mandated
the withdrawal of U.S. forces, marking the end of the ISF’s gestation period (Ibid., pp.
210–11). It faced the Islamic state, then, as a fully formed military, providing the best
example of its ineffectiveness.
Second, the Iraqi military’s failure to defeat ISIS was a blow to its prestige and created recruitment problems, eliminating the possibility of recapturing the monopoly on
force through a buildup of regular forces. Sistani’s 2014 fatwa explicitly called for Iraqis
to “volunteer and join the security forces” (BBC 2014). Later confirmed to refer to established, legal military units rather than militias (Sistani 2014), the statement was understood to represent his endorsement of the Shia militia movement. Mansour and Jafar,
citing an interview with a civil servant in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, claim that this
misunderstanding was orchestrated and enabled by public distrust of the ISF: “Using
the fatwa’s message, Maliki and his allies pursued a wide-ranging campaign to recruit
volunteers through hundreds of centers and offices. His recruitment was predicated on a
smear campaign against the very Iraqi army that they had created—the same army that
the fatwa had supposedly demanded the volunteers join” (Mansour and Jabar 2017, p. 7).
The rapid expansion of the Hashd, in contrast to the contraction of the ISF, which in 2014
went from seventeen to five–seven brigades (Galbraith 2015), implies Hashd recruits’
preference for the militias over the ISF. While this probably has something to do with
sectarianism, which will be discussed below, the fact that Maliki’s strategy focused on
disparaging the ISF hints that the military’s embarrassing defeat had diminished its reputation and made such a strategy effective.
The ISF weakness and Iraq’s inability to strengthen it made state support for
the Hashd a foregone conclusion. Not only would they have been unable to prevent the
mobilization’s formation if they had wanted, the state’s survival was at risk in the absence
of a capable military, and Baghdad had to take whatever help it could get. As will be
shown below, however, there were other factors at play that encouraged the government
to support the PMUs.
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Sectarianism

Sectarian tension between Shiites and Sunnis is another reason Baghdad has chosen to support the Hashd. The Iraqi government, which fears its Sunni constituents but
faces externally imposed quotas mandating sectarian balance in the military, supports
the majority-Shiite PMUs as a means of ensuring Shiite dominance and security. Also
it is a political move meant to maintain the support of a Shiite base among which the
Hashd is extremely popular.
The origins of ethno-sectarianism in Iraq can be traced to the formation of the
post–WWI order in the Middle East and the creation of the Iraqi state by Britain that
combined Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite-majority areas and established a Sunni monarchy.
Subsequently, sectarian competition largely was kept under control by authoritarian
rulers until the U.S. overthrew the Sunni establishment in its efforts to establish a liberal democracy in Iraq. The CPA, determined to block any group from dominating
Iraqi politics, oversaw the creation of a new Iraqi constitution that codified an ethnosectarian power-sharing system. Article 9 of the constitution, for example, dictated that
“the Iraqi Armed Forces and Security Services,” which had been predominantly Sunni
under Hussein, would “be composed of the components of the Iraqi people with due
consideration given to its balance and its similarity without discrimination or exclusion” (Washington Post 2015).
Such a system was understandably unpopular with Shiite politicians, as it prevented the majority group from dominating the country’s politics. In particular, Nouri
al-Maliki, a Shiite who became prime minister in 2006, “found the state’s large bureaucracy inefficient, given its mandate under a sectarian quota system (muhasasa ta’iya),
which included members from all major Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni political parties.
Having loyal Shia militias, rather than the shaky cross-ethnic makeup of the Iraqi army,
seemed a much more reliable way to secure a tighter command and control structure”
(Mansour and Jabar 2017, p. 6), leading Maliki to support the creation of the PMU
Commission in 2014.
Memories of Baathist brutality fed Shiite mistrust of Sunnis, which intensified with
the rise in sectarian violence in 2006 and the emergence of the Sunni Islamic state as a
dominant force in 2014. The perceived association between Sunnis and the Baath party,
which continued long after the party was disbanded in 2003, and the general resentment
of Sunnis by some Shiite politicians is evident in Maliki’s rejection of the Sahwat brigades
after the U.S. withdrawal in 2010. In response to escalating violence in 2006, coalition
leaders had worked diligently to secure the cooperation of Sunni Arab tribesmen in western Iraq against insurgent groups like al-Qaeda, and by 2010, those efforts had paid off.
In 2008, however, the Maliki government demanded that the U.S. turn over control of
the Sahwat militias with the promise that the fighters would be given positions in the
ISF (Oppel Jr. 2008). Instead, Baghdad disbanded the brigades and used the membership
records to “round up and target” Sunni leaders. Stansfield attributes the decision to turn
against the militias to a mixture of anti-Sunni sentiment and fears of a Ba’athist revival:
9
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There was a deep-rooted fear of the Ba’th and the return of elements of Saddam’s
regime. There was also, of course, an even deeper angst concerning the expansion
of Sunni jihadists and their visceral hatred of the adherents of Shi’ism. But, in effect,
these fears merged into one. It would be difficult to exaggerate the level of concern
that was felt among circles of Shi’i politicians in government of the possibility of the
Ba’th, which was not becoming conflated with ‘Sunnis,’ returning to power. Even
among Kurds, the leaderships in Erbil and Suleimani saw the hands of the Ba’th at
every political juncture and insurgent assault (Stansfield 2016, p. 202).
The disparity between Baghdad’s reaction to the Sunni Sahwat, which was to wrest
control and destroy it, and its reaction to the Hashd, which was to support and incorporate it, betrays the sectarian motivations of Maliki and other Shiite leaders. Fears of
Ba’athism became an avatar for anti-Sunni sectarianism, and a similar phenomenon
occurred with the expansion of the Islamic State, evident in stories of human rights
abuses committed by Shiite militias against local Sunnis, whom they accused of supporting the Islamic State (Human Rights Watch 2017).
Sectarianism drives the state’s support for the Hashd from below as well—Shiite
politicians are compelled to support the PMUs because of the militias’ popularity among
their voter base. According to Mansour and Jabar, 99 percent of respondents to an August
2015 poll supported the use of the Hashd to fight the Islamic State. Up to 75 percent of
men between eighteen and thirty years of age in Shia-majority areas had enlisted to fight
in the PMUs by spring 2016, though many are inactive because of funding restrictions
(Mansour and Jabar 2017, pp. 10–11). The popular interpretation of Sistani’s 2014 ruling inspired feelings of religious duty among Iraqi Shiites and gave the militias an air of
religious legitimacy. One Hashd fighter interviewed by PBS in 2016 remarked: “I came in
response to the fatwa, the doctrine to defend my country, my sacred places. My wish
in life is the end of Da’esh [a synonym for the Islamic State] in Iraq. . . . The fatwa opened
the door for us, so we volunteered with the Hashd militia. Ours is a belief and a will. We
came because of our belief, not for a salary or anything else. We came because of our belief
and our principles” (PBS NewsHour 2016). According to Renaud Mansour:
Inside Iraq, the popular perception of the PMU among Iraqis—and particularly the
Shia—is far more favorable than the group’s reputation among Western politicians,
analysts, and human rights groups.... Many Iraqis, and particularly the Shia, are convinced that had it not been for the PMU, ISIS would have taken over more territory
and seriously threatened Baghdad. . . . The PMU occupies a new space in the Iraqi
Shia imagination. As one fighter told the author, “you can criticize any politician or
even religious cleric, but you cannot speak against the PMU and its martyrs.” . . .
Iraqi society is now full of popular songs, commercials, and banners, which display
the leaders and martyrs of the different military groups. (2017)
Shiite politicians are constrained by the PMUs’ high levels of participation and popularity
among their base, especially with next year’s election looming over them.
10
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Support for the PMUs among Shiite political leaders has been motivated by sectarianism, including a desire to circumvent U.S.-imposed power-sharing rules and a desire
to please Shiite constituents who strongly support the militias.

Iranian Influence

Another reason for the state’s support of the Popular Mobilization Units is the influence of Iran, which has close connections with key politicians and militia leaders. Tehran’s regional interests, coupled with its influence over key figures in the state and its
willingness to provide support for Hashd, encouraged Iraq to support the militias.
According to scholars and commentators, Iran’s interests in Iraq are best understood in the context of a greater Middle Eastern “cold war” between Iran and its allies
on one side and Saudi Arabia and its allies on the other (Gause III 2014). More than a
sectarian conflict, it is a battle for geopolitical influence. Iran, for example, supports
Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Iran’s
interests in the Levant have been characterized as the creation of a political, ideological,
and physical “axis of resistance” to bolster its position against Saudi Arabia (and Israel),
including the creation of two corridors from Iran to the Mediterranean (Mohseni and
Kalout 2017). These land routes would be protected by Iranian proxy forces rather than
Iranian troops. Of course, the defeat of the anti-Shiite Islamic state, whose border-crossing
advance posed a threat to Iran, was also of grave importance to Tehran.
It is within this context that Iran has supported the growth of al-Hashd al-Sha’abi in
Iraq. According to a December 2014 Washington Post article, “Iran [had] sent more than
1,000 military advisers to Iraq, as well as elite units, and [had] conducted airstrikes and
spent more than $1 billion on military aid” in response to Islamic State gains that summer, a claim supported by Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri (Ryan and Morris 2014; Morris
2014). AAH, which is fighting in Syria as well as in Iraq, is said to receive $1.5–2 million
per month from Tehran, though the PMUs generally have received a greater proportion
of their funding from Baghdad, as they have developed a closer relationship with the
state (Stanford University 2017a; Eisenstadt and Knights 2017). Iranian leadership in Iraq
continues to be managed by Qassem Suleimani, who maintains close relationships with
Hashd militia leaders (Chulov 2014; Chulov 2010). According to Mansour and Jabar, the
PMUs play several roles in Iran’s larger Iraqi and regional strategy. Some of the smaller
pro-Iran militias are viewed by Tehran as border protection units, while larger ones are
being groomed to enter or expand their role in Iraqi politics as friends of Iran.
Their military resources—including heavy armor, drones, and military advisers—all
come from Tehran. Their cash and political legitimacy come from Baghdad. These
paramilitaries are either full-fledged political parties or in the process of establishing
political representation in the lead-up to Iraq’s planned 2018 provincial and parliamentary elections. (Mansour and Jabar 2017, p. 13)
The extent of Iranian influence in Middle Eastern conflicts may be generally overstated, but the case for Iranian power in Iraqi politics is strong, with abundant anecdotes
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of Tehran’s intrusion in Iraqi affairs (Kendall 2017). The circumstances of Nouri alMaliki’s appointment to a second term as prime minister offer one such case. In the
2011 election, Maliki’s Dawlat al-Qanun coalition was defeated by the Iraqiya party, led
by Ayad Allawi, after Maliki refused to join forces with the Iraqi National Alliance. The
surprise upset was followed by a vote recount and nearly five months of negotiations
that resulted in the Erbil Agreement, a compromise that gave Maliki the premiership in
exchange for some concessions. The reasoning behind the decision to let Maliki remain
in power is contested—Stansfield says that he had “managed to accrue significant
power in the period running up to the election and . . . used them to maintain his premiership” (Stansfield 2016, pp. 207–9). Stansfield portrays Iran as merely acquiescent:
The Iranian government, too, had little interest in encouraging Iraqi politicians
to respect the results of the elections. Not only was Iraqiyya seen as a haven for
Sunni voters; it was also seen as the new manifestation of the Ba’th. Furthermore, Allawi was not a man who Iran, even through the IRGC, could influence.
Throughout his period heading a leading opposition movement to Saddam,
the Iraqi National Accord (Al-Wifaq al-Watani al-Iraq), Allawi had been closer
to Western governments and intelligence agencies. This, combined with this
secularism and non-sectarian appeal, meant that the Iranian kingmakers would
follow their U.S. counterparts and simply let Maliki bully his way back to the
premiership. (Ibid., p. 209)
American official Ali Khedery, on the other hand, claims that Iran ordered the outcome. Speaking of debates among U.S. leadership over which candidate to support for
the position of prime minister, he writes:
Our debates mattered little, however, because the most powerful man in Iraq and
the Middle East, Gen. Qassim Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force unit of Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard Corps, was about to resolve the crisis for us. Within days of
Biden’s visit to Baghdad, Soleimani summoned Iraq’s leaders to Tehran. Beholden
to him after decades of receiving Iran’s cash and support, the Iraqis recognized that
U.S. influence in Iraq was waning as Iranian influence was surging. The Americans
will leave you one day, but we will always remain your neighbors, Soleimani said,
according to a former Iraqi official briefed on the meeting. After admonishing the
feuding Iraqis to work together, Soleimani dictated the outcome on behalf of Iran’s
supreme leader: Maliki would remain premier; Jalal Talabani, a legendary Kurdish
guerilla with decades-long ties to Iran, would remain president; and, most important, the American military would be made to leave at the end of 2011. Those Iraqi
leaders who cooperated, Soleimani said, would continue to benefit from Iran’s
political cover and cash payments, but those who defied the will of the Islamic
Republic would suffer the most dire of consequences. (Khedery 2014)
Marr and al-Marashi (p. 274) agree that Iran influenced the outcome by compelling
Sadr to support Maliki.
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Other instances of Iranian interference abound—a 2017 New York Times article, for
example, claims that Iraqi parliamentarian Hoshyar Zebari was ousted from his role as
finance minister at Iran’s insistence, after Tehran found him too friendly to the United
States,3 but Iran’s backing of Maliki has particular salience for the PMUs (Arango 2017;
Patoon 2017). Mansour and Jabar claim that Tehran’s support for Maliki was conditioned on his support for the Hashd, citing a pro-Iranian MP as saying that “[Iran] did
not have any faith in the Iraqi army and groomed armed groups in almost all border
provinces as a strategic asset to protect its national security” Mansour and Jabar 2017, p.
28). They argue that noticeable change occurred in Maliki’s stance on non-state militias
before and after 2010. He had, after all, attacked the Shiite Jaysh al-Mahdi, sending, in
the words of a Shiite MP, “the message to all the militias including the Awakening that
their days are numbered,” only to staunchly support the PMUs six years later (Oppel
Jr. 2008). This policy shift is consistent with the theory that the prime minister owed his
allegiance to Iran after they intervened on his behalf in 2010. Speaking more generally,
it indicates that Baghdad’s support for the Hashd was a result of Tehran’s interference
in Iraqi politics. Iraqi leaders feared that they would lose Iranian support if they did not
support the militias and therefore lose their positions.

Counter Arguments

Several other theories for state support of the Hashd exist that I find less compelling
than those I have listed above. They focus first on the PMUs as political leverage and
second on the state’s desire to order atrocities while maintaining plausible deniability.
Political Leverage
The political leverage theory attributes state support for the PMUs to the interests of
individual politicians, who see the militias as an opportunity to increase their power and
protect their position. Mansour and Jabar write:
Iraq is in the midst of an internal Shia political struggle over control of the state
between former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, who wants to return to power;
current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who is trying to maintain the power of
the state; and cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who is bent on ensuring that the Maliki
faction does not return to power. A crucial factor that will help determine who
gains an advantage in this struggle will be whether the PMF paramilitaries are
integrated into the state’s existing security apparatus and used to reinforce the
country’s political status quo, or if instead these paramilitary groups are retained
as a separate parallel and independent military force that can be used to reshape
Iraq’s current political and security landscape. (Mansour and Jabar 2017, p. 4)
Maliki was and may still be the politician most able to take advantage of the political
weight of the Hashd. Known as the “godfather” of the militias for his role in forming the
PMU Commission in 2014, his premiership was marked by authoritarian efforts to consolidate control over all aspects of Iraqi security (Ibid. 25; Dodge 2012, pp. 124–30). If the
Hashd militias were loyal to any one Iraqi leader, it would be Maliki, and taking advan13
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tage of the PMUs would not be out of character for him. Perhaps the aforementioned
change in Maliki’s policy preference toward support for the militias in 2010 was not
simply a product of Iranian pressure but an attempt to shore up his political position
after the electoral loss made clear his weakness.
However, there is little evidence that he tried to use the units for that purpose
when he lost the premiership in 2014. He had fared well in the elections, but the Shiite
political establishment was unwilling to support him for a third term. Instead, they
selected Haider al-Abadi as PM, infuriating Maliki, who adamantly opposed the decision (Stansfield 2016, pp. 238–40, 244). If he had intended to use his influence over the
Hashd or the ISF to hold on to power, this would have been the moment, and observers
feared he would do just that. Instead, although Maliki did “[deploy] security forces
to strategic points across the capital,” he “told security forces not to intervene in the
political crisis and to protect the nation. . . . He said that members of the security
forces had pulled back from the front lines of Iraq’s conflict zones upon hearing he
would be replaced but that he had ordered them to return to the fight” (Morris and
Sly 2014; Arango, Reuben, and Gordon 2014). Days later, Maliki peacefully relinquished the premiership.
It is possible that Maliki intended to turn the PMUs and ISF against the opposition
or that he expected to intimidate Abadi’s supporters. He did “issue veiled threats,”
saying that he “could not be held responsible for those who might wish to fight on his
behalf,” but the apparent lack of effort to leverage military force to hold his position
weakens the argument that support for the Hashd was intended as a kind of “coupproofing.” Another variant of the theory says that Maliki “will try and use the legitimacy of the PMU to regain power, himself, or via his protégés” in upcoming elections
(Mansour 2017a). However, the reported electoral hopes of PMU leaders indicate they
have accumulated their own political influence, effectively sidelining Maliki. Maliki’s
actions in the upcoming year should shed more light on this theory.
Plausible Deniability for Abuses
As mentioned above, scholars have found a strong correlation between the incidence of pro-government militias and human-rights abuses, leading to claims that
governments choose to support paramilitaries out of a desire to order atrocities while
keeping distance between themselves and the act (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015).
The Hashd has been accused of numerous human rights abuses, particularly in Sunni
areas liberated from the Islamic state, where they are said to have detained and tortured
innocent civilians whom they believed to be IS supporters (Frontline 2017).
These abuses, though tragic, only have relevance to the research question if it can
be shown that the government desired the abuses, that they were unwilling to execute them through conventional military action, and that they supported the militias
as a means of accomplishing them without direct responsibility. Given the sectarian
tensions mentioned above and the way that Sunnism, Ba’athism, and support for
the Islamic state became conflated in the eyes of the Shiite majority, it is possible
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that the state supported violence against Sunnis as Islamic state supporters, whether or
not the relationship truly existed. If the state wanted to distance itself from the Hashd’s
crimes, however, it would not have taken steps to incorporate them into the state military
apparatus, which they have repeatedly done, and indeed the Hashd has deflected allegations of abuses by playing up its connection with the state (Al-Hashed 2017). Furthermore, Abadi has acknowledged the PMUs misdeeds rather than ignore or disassociate
from them (Amnesty International 2017, p. 12). Although the human rights abuses are
significant as such, it is unlikely that they cause government support for the militias.

Conclusion

Although Iraq has made changes to its relationship with the Hashd, the independence, political aspirations, and divided loyalties of the militia leaders continue to pose
risks to Baghdad, threatening to sacrifice state sovereignty, alienate Sunni and Kurdish
minorities, and inject violence into the state’s politics (Sattar 2016). Despite the risks
associated with delegating the use of force to these non-state militias, Iraq has supported the Popular Mobilization Units because of the weakness of their own military,
the looming influence of Iran, and sectarian affiliation. With Iraq’s military successes
against the Islamic state, the apparent raison d’être of the Hashd, and the next year’s
elections, in which several PMU leaders are expected to participate, the true strength of
the militias may become more apparent (Gurbuz 2017).
NOTES
1. For a list of the most significant militias of the Hashd, see Aymen Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Hashd
Brigade Numbers Index,” Pundicity blog, October 31, 2017, accessed November 6, 2017, www.
aymennjawad.org/2017/10/Hashd-brigade-numbers-index or “Security and Politics Mix
Inseparably in Iraqi Politics,” Inside Iraqi Politics 111, July 20, 2015, accessed December 14, 2017,
www.insideiraqipolitics.com/Files/Inside%20Iraq%20No111.pdf.
2. It is worth mentioning that the Hashd also contains non-Shiite militias, and that the motivations
and loyalties of the component militias vary. I have included information about some of the
most influential groups here, as they pose the greatest threat to the state and are therefore most
relevant to the research question, but I have purposefully excluded many for simplicity.
3. The same article hints that Iran influenced the selection of former-Quds Force commander and
Badr militia fighter Qasim al-Araji as to head the Ministry of Interior, which oversees the Federal Police and, until the month before his appointment, the PMUs.
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Religious Targets: Where 2016
Presidential Candidates Used
Religious Rhetoric
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Introduction

The dynamics of elections have drastically changed over time. Elections in the past
have involved everything from smoke-filled-room nominations to riots. As the dynamics of elections have changed, so has the strategy to win elections. Media now makes
candidates’ words widely available.
Virtually every word a candidate says in public or writes on social media will be
heard or read by the people. A candidate’s word choice matters now more than ever. As a
result, candidates must be precise with the words they use. Political scientists have examined the strategy behind candidate language (Hart 2006; Chapp 2013). Others have written handbooks on how to effectively write speeches for them (Moffitt 1999; Trent 2000).
Researchers observe that a key component of any speech is creating an atmosphere where
audience members feel attached to the speaker. This attachment needs to build trust and
create a lasting candidate likeability.
Therefore, this study examines how religious rhetoric is used by presidential candidates to connect with Christian audiences specifically. Because roughly 78 percent
of Americans have faith in a religion, it is disappointing that religion and politics
have not been studied together more (Pew Research Center 2016). While a wealth of
research has been done on behalf of campaign talk and on the importance of using
religious rhetoric, not much research currently connects the two (Hart 2006).
This paper seeks to combine the literature from campaign talk and religious rhetoric
in order to examine current strategies that employ religious campaign talk in certain geographical areas. Rather than examining the how or the what of a speech, we are looking to
see trends in where Christian religious rhetoric is more likely to be used.
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Literature Review

One common concept in speech writing is that of stock speeches (also known as
module speeches). Candidates employ these speech templates of their main message
components while travelling around the country in order to maintain message purity.
The candidates then tailor them for every audience along the campaign trail (Trent
2000). This forms a foundation for our theory regarding regional variance, which candidates apply in their speeches while maintaining message purity.
We are interested in assessing whether presidential candidates add general
Christian rhetoric to their stock speeches in areas of higher Christian adherence rates.
We examine this theory by using a list of keywords that imply Christian beliefs. The
best way to describe this keyword idea comes from “Political Keywords: Using Language That Uses Us” by Hart (2006, p. 247):
Such a scenario puts special demands on keywords. Because they are only
words they must compete for attention in a world of sight and sound. . . . But
because they are keywords, because they are (1) repeated with special frequency
in (2) high- profile environments by (3) persons of considerable stature and,
especially, because (4) they are easily overlooked (being only words after all),
they can slowly, teasingly, affect our hearts and minds. Keywords are at their
most powerful when they are taken for granted.
Choosing appropriate keywords is vital in speech design because they can resonate with an individual for months after the speech. Moffitt (1999, p. 158) describes this
designing as a “deductive process,” which consists of creating messages thematically
and then choosing the ones that best fit the audience. From here, the speech authors
then attract specific audiences by choosing keywords that will resonate within them.
To test if candidates try to resonate with voters through specific language, we will
analyze words common in Christian rhetoric, such as “God” and “Jesus.” The importance of invoking spiritual feelings cannot be underestimated when studying religion
and campaign strategy. Religious rhetoric, when used by a candidate, can positively
influence an individual (Albertson 2010, p. 127). Albertson continues:
[O]verall, this study demonstrates that a politicians’ use of religious rhetoric
led to attitude change at an implicit level. . . . It is particularly impressive that
religious language shifted implicit attitudes for such well known figures, and
that attitudes shifted even for people who would prefer less religious expression in politics.
Albertson’s study provoked us to question whether presidential candidates implement religious vocabulary to appeal to a variety of regional audiences. Therefore, we
conclude that politicians may effectively target specific audiences by using religious
rhetoric in their speeches.
Although many candidates may invoke religious terms, McLaughlin and Wise
state that “the effectiveness of religious cues depends on a citizen’s level of religios22
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ity” (2014). Therefore, we seek to improve upon existing literature to discover if candidates use religious rhetoric in areas of higher Christian adherence rates.
H1: As the religious adherence of a geographic region increases, the candidates will use
more religious rhetoric when they address the people in the region.
The underlying assumption of this hypothesis is that some areas are perceived
to be more Christian than others. Consequently, a campaign attempts to capitalize
on this by including familiar Christian terminology in their speeches when in areas
highly populated with Christians.
We decided to use general Christian rhetoric for our keywords instead of rhetoric
specific to any particular religious tradition. According to Chapp, “The data indicate that, when candidates use religious language, voters respond in predictable and
politically powerful ways” (2013). It is essential for a candidate speaking to a regional
audience to connect with as many individuals as possible. Using general rather than
specific Christian rhetoric is a better measure because people notice overt clues more
than subtle ones (which are typically tradition-specific) (Karpowitz 2016). The use of
language is not an appeal to specific religions in regional speeches but an appeal to
all Christians. Chapp continues, “[L]anguage intended to excite religious predispositions in a nonsectarian manner affects candidate evaluations for those most committed to religion” (2013). Thus, for presidential candidates to influence the greatest
number of religious voters, they are better off using general Christian rhetoric instead
of tradition-specific rhetoric only.
Chapp also writes, “Candidates adopt different emotive styles to resonate with the
identities of the audience members and to accommodate existing partisan patterns
of voting behavior” (2013). Studies show that the right wing has a higher proportion of Christians than does the left wing (Maniam 2016), so we questioned if party
could affect regional Christian targeting. Previous research concludes that the politically right will mobilize the religious base more so than the politically left (Monson
and Oliphant 2007). Our study examines the truth in these findings, and based on this
literature, we are led to the following hypothesis:
H2: As the religious adherence of a geographic region increases, the Republican candidates will use more religious rhetoric when they address audiences than will their Democratic counterparts.
Our null hypothesis states that no relationship exists between the uses of religious rhetoric in presidential campaign speeches in different regions of the U.S., even
when accounting for party. It is possible that certain candidates are more likely to use
religious rhetoric than others simply due to their own personal religious behavior
and beliefs. However, we believe our analysis includes enough variables to come to a
preliminary conclusion and open the door for future research on the topic.
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Data

Much of the data comes from the specific language used in presidential campaign
speeches. The speeches used were given by Democratic and Republican candidates
during the 2016 presidential race. Included in this broad “speeches” category are press
releases and statements made by the candidates during the election season. The database
was created by hand for this project (Quinton 2017). The source web site for the speeches
does not contain every speech given by the candidates.
This limited collection disproportionally underrepresents private events, which
lack sufficient press coverage. However, because these events are intended for fundraising, the candidates’ language may be different than it would otherwise be in
more public venues. Since we are focusing on campaign language, the lack of private
speeches does not affect our theory. However, some private event speeches may be in
the database unknowingly.
Additionally, we dropped a few candidates from the analysis. These candidates
include Democrats Martin O’Malley, Lincoln Chafee, and Jim Webb, and Republicans
Carly Fiorina and George Pataki. Dropping them from the analysis appeared inconsequential, because we lacked confidence to include them due to their small number
of speeches combined with their short presidential campaigns. Overall, the source
web site does contain thousands of documented speeches, making the dataset reliable
for this research. With the available data, we measure the dependent variable by the
number of times a candidate uses a religious keyword in his or her remarks (making
our dependent variable continuous).
To make this dependent variable possible to analyze, we first needed to
operationalize terms. Initially, we searched for a list of Christian rhetorical terms
created by other scholars but to no avail. We then searched web sites to find common
words used among various dictionaries. These sources contained lists specific to
common Christian rhetoric. The following list contains the most common religious
keywords and constitutes the terms we used when analyzing the campaign texts:
baptism, Bible, born again, Christian, Christianity, faith, God, gospel, heaven, hell,
Jesus, pray, prayer, prophet, prophecy, redemption, religion, sacred, Satan, scripture,
testify, worship, yoked.
The Census Bureau provided the state boundary shapefile at the 5m level (Geographic Products Branch 2012). We manually entered our statistical and locational
data for mapmaking. The title of each speech provided the location data needed.
For purposes of basic analyses, we included non-geographic texts to determine
candidates’ religious rhetoric patterns in speeches intended for a more universal
audience. To see the difference, we compare text based on geographic locations to
those intended for a broader media audience.
To better analyze geographically based religious rhetoric, we included the religious
adherence of the geographic region (state). We measure a state’s religiosity based on the
rate of religious adherence per 1,000 people, using data provided by the American Reli24
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gion Data Archives (ARDA). All states’ religiosity index were coded as the difference of
the state’s religious adherence and the national mean’s religious adherence, going either
positive or negative (for example, if the national average was 400 per 1,000, then a state
with a religious adherence of 300 per 1,000 would have a score of -100 in our data). For
the non-geographic texts (such as statements made from the campaign office that were
intended for everyone and not just a specific region), we coded their religious adherence
rate with a 0 (representing the national mean), assuming that the remarks were nationally
intended. Although the measurement includes those of non-Christian religions, the U.S.
is a predominantly Christian nation (Gallup reported that roughly 75 percent of Americans identify with Christianity in 2015 (Newport 2015)). Thus, with the unit of analysis at
the state level, the percentage of those of other faiths is proportionally low and does not
affect our analysis.
To measure the seriousness of a candidate’s campaign, we created a few versions to
measure viability. The measure indicates whether a candidate’s ability to win the election
influences his or her willingness to use Christian religious rhetoric. The apparent weakness here is that we cannot measure how viable a candidate thinks he or she is, but this
is the best we can do with what is available. The Green Papers provided a popular vote
percentage from the primaries, and we ranked each candidate, beginning at 1, by who
had received the most votes.2
We included standard control variables to account for social differences that may
influence the candidates’ language. These candidate characteristics include age, education level (some college, bachelor’s degree, and graduate degree, on a continuous
scale), and the binary variables of gender (1 being male), political party (1 being Republican), and whether Christian or not (1 being Christian). We wanted to add a control for
religious activeness, but we did not have information to gather this data, so we added
the religious views of the candidate instead. Originally, it was unclear if the religious
views of the candidates themselves should be included, but we decided to include this
information due to the direction of Campbell, Green, and Layman, who state, “Here
we focus on candidate religion, not because it is more important than other social characteristics to partisan voting, but because it is especially illustrative” (2011). This quote
means that there is a possibility that a candidate’s religious affiliation may affect his or
her campaigning and thus must be included in the data.

Results

Table 1 shows the percentage of texts with at least one religious keyword for every
candidate, as well as the percentage of religious keywords used in all (including nongeographic, which applies to both percentages) texts. If a candidate used at least one religious
keyword in a speech (our list of religious keywords is found on the previous page), it was
coded on a binary scale as a 1. We then used the software R to determine the percentage of
texts with at least one religious keyword. We performed this analysis for each candidate.
To analyze the percentage of religious keywords used in all texts, we ran a different analysis in R to extract the number of keywords used throughout all the speeches and divided
25

SIGMA
it by the total word count of all the speeches. Again, we repeated the process for each
candidate. Those results are found in Table 1. (All tables and figures are in the Appendix.)
The data show that Republicans use more religious rhetoric than Democrats overall. Out
of all the texts from the Democratic Party, only 4 percent contained a religious keyword,
compared to 6 percent for the Republican Party.
Of the Republican candidates, Ted Cruz came in first for both the percentage of
texts containing at least one religious keyword and for the percentage of total religious rhetoric used. In other words, Ted Cruz used more religious rhetoric than any
other candidate in the race. Donald Trump ranked last among the Republicans for
percentage of texts with at least one religious keyword. Out of all his texts, only
3.3 percent contained a religious keyword. Rick Santorum came in second to last
with 7.3 percent of his text containing at least one religious keyword (still a much
higher percentage than Trump’s). Yet Trump ranked seventh out of fourteen among
the Republicans for the percentage of religious keywords used in total. From this preliminary analysis, it appears that Trump strategically used religious rhetoric, using
religious rhetoric in highly concentrated instances. While the number of his speeches
containing at least one keyword remained low, he used more religious keywords than
half of his competitors.
On the other side of the aisle, Hillary Clinton had a much larger percentage of
texts that used a religious keyword (4.5) compared to Bernie Sanders (2.5). Yet, it is
interesting to note that Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton are basically identical with
the percentage of total religious keywords spoken (Clinton at 0.21 percent and Sanders at 0.22 percent). Similar to Trump, Sanders might have strategically used religious
rhetoric based on his audience. It appears that both candidates might have reserved
the use of religious rhetoric for audiences with greater religiosity (see Table 1 Percentage of Religious Rhetoric during the Primaries).
Table 2 tests the usage of religious rhetoric by Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton
during the general election. We hypothesized that Clinton would use more religious
rhetoric during the general election than she did during the primaries to appeal more
to soft-leaning Republicans or Independent voters with religious affiliation. We predicted the opposite from Trump, as the Republican nominee, because he would want
to appeal to soft-leaning Democrats and Independent voters who tend to be more
secularist. Surprisingly, the exact opposite occurred. Clinton used less religious rhetoric than she did during the primaries. The percent of her texts containing at least one
religious keyword dropped from the primaries as well. Trump included more texts
during the general election with at least one religious keyword than he did during
the primaries, but the percentage of total religious keywords he used decreased from
.22 percent during the primaries to .05 percent during the general election. From these
results, we cannot draw any firm conclusions because there are many unknowns;
nonetheless, this table seems to have some exciting numbers (see Table 2 Percent of
Religious Rhetoric during the General Election).
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Column 2 of Table 1 shows that Trump used relatively few religious words, yet
in the general election he received 58 percent of the Protestant or other Christian vote
and 52 percent of the Catholic vote (Kent 2016). During the primaries, “two-thirds
of regular churchgoing Republicans were not supporting Trump for the GOP nomination even in April” (Smith 2016). This study does not determine the effects that
religious rhetoric has on voting, but it is interesting to see the actual abundance of
a candidate’s religious rhetoric and compare that to the preferences of churchgoers.
There are many reasons why churchgoers might be swayed to a candidate, but that is
a topic for another paper.
After reviewing these numbers, we performed some qualitative analysis of the
speeches and found examples of the religious rhetoric used. Even with this qualitative
measure, it appears that candidates use religious rhetoric with more religious audiences. For example, when Bernie Sanders visited Salt Lake City, Utah, a state known for
its LDS population, he gave a speech addressing the issues of immigration, in which he
used a fair amount of religious rhetoric. In one remark he said, “We have seen too many
wars, too much killing, too much suffering. And let us all together—people of good
faith—do everything we can to finally, finally bring peace and stability to that region”
(2016). In another speech, with a higher than normal religious audience at Liberty University, Sanders said, “I am not a theologian or an expert on the Bible or a Catholic,
but I agree with Pope Francis when he says: “The current financial crisis . . . originated
in a profound human crisis: the denial of the primacy of the human person! We have
created new idols. The worship of the ancient golden calf has returned in a new and
ruthless guise in the idolatry of money and the dictatorship of an impersonal economy
lacking a truly human purpose” (2016). In two speeches of religiously strong audiences,
Sanders uses religious rhetoric to appeal to the people—even though he is not a Christian himself. Most interestingly, he quoted the pope. It could be that he was attempting
to establish credibility by aligning his views with those of the pope because Catholics
view the pope as an authority figure. Just as Catholics follow the pope, research suggests that Latter-day Saints are more willing to change their views to follow what their
prophet says (Campbell, Monson, and Green; 2014). If Catholics view the pope in the
same manner that the average Latter-day Saint views the prophet of their church, then
Sanders might be trying to demonstrate his agreeability with their religious leaders.
Clinton provided us with other interesting cases of attempting to connect with religious audiences. In a speech in North Carolina and two speeches in Ohio, she emphasized her passion to help children “live up to their God-given potential” (2016). In another
speech given at the University of North Carolina–Greensboro, she talked about how her
family and her Methodist faith have taught her the importance of helping children live
up to their God-given potential (2016). We also found at least two speeches Clinton gave
in Iowa where she used similar religious rhetoric. It appears she focused on the family
(especially children), and relates love for family back to devotion to God. We do not know
the exact effects this religious language has on voters, but, noting studies from Albertson
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and from other scholars, we would not be surprised to see voters be more inclined to
support a candidate who cares for children and God.
From the Republicans, we will analyze the two main front-runners: Ted Cruz and
Donald Trump. Comparing them provides insight into two candidates who used religious rhetoric to very different degrees.
Cruz opened his presidential bid with a speech given at Liberty University.
In that speech, he used the word “God” nine times, the word “Jesus” three times,
and the word “faith” three times. In the speech, Cruz used religion to talk about his
upbringing and how religion shaped his life. He commonly used such phrases as
“our God-given rights” and “God bless” in many other speeches as well. From this
brief qualitative analysis, it seems he might be using religion to establish his background and to convey to others why he holds the ideological beliefs he does.
Trump used religious rhetoric in a totally different manner than Ted Cruz.
When Trump declared his candidacy, he only used one religious keyword. He said,
“I will be the greatest jobs president that God ever created. I tell you that” (2015).
Cruz used religious language in his opening speech to build his background and his
viability, whereas Trump used religious rhetoric in his opening speech to say that God
had created him superior to others. In one speech at a rally in North Carolina, Trump
said the following: “Let me quote the same passage from the Bible I read on Saturday, from 1 John 4: ‘No one has ever seen God; but, if we love one another, God lives
in us and his love is made complete in us.’ . . . Imagine what we our country could
accomplish if we started working together as One People, under One God, saluting
One Flag” (2016). In a separate speech in North Carolina, Trump talked about what
we could accomplish if we started working as one people under God (2016).
After running a simple test to measure percentages and after analyzing speeches
qualitatively, we decided to follow-up with quantitative measures. We ran three OLS
models, one for all observations, one for just the primaries, and one for just the general election. We also ran a probit model based on a binary variable of whether or not
a speech contained at least one religious keyword. Our OLS model came back with
statistically significant results. We used the percentage of religious keywords as the
dependent variable, with the key independent variable as the difference of religious
adherence rates for the states from the national mean. We have multiple observations for various states, so we decided to run the regression by clustering the states
together. We broke down the analysis even further by analyzing the percentage of
religious rhetoric during both the primaries and the general election (Model 1), the
primaries only (Model 2), and the general election only (Model 3).
We can see in Table 3 that there is statistical significance for the use of religious
rhetoric on religious adherence. Although statistically significant, the substantive significance proves difficult to measure. For one, this paper is not concerned with the
effect of religious rhetoric on the voters; it is merely concerned with testing the usage
of religious rhetoric according to geography. Second, it should not be of any great sur28
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prise that the coefficients are small; if anything, it should be a surprise that we found
significance in all three models. Considering that Cruz used the most religious rhetoric
out of all the candidates, and only 1.64 percent of his words were religious key words,
we expected to receive small numbers from our regression. We are working with a
dataset we assembled ourselves and with a dependent variable that is small in nature
(a percentage of religious keywords the candidates used). Additionally, although
Model 1 has an increase of just 0.000372 percent per one unit of religious adherence,
the case of Utah is a multiplier of 306.
We also analyzed the effect in battleground states and found it to be statistically
significant. We defined battleground states by using measures from FiveThirtyEight as
competitive states that could have gone either way in the election (FiveThirtyEight 2016).
In total, there were fourteen battleground states (see Appendix for list of states). These
states were coded as a binary variable, with 1 indicating a battleground state.
A predictive measure for our OLS model produces nothing truly significant at the
95 percent confidence interval. It was close, but the confidence intervals overlap slightly.
Although, the means of the religious rhetoric do increase with the religious adherence rate. It is still a mystery how the confidence intervals for the religious adherence
rates of -200 and -150 fall below zero (as explained on page 5, a state’s religious adherence is the difference between a state’s religious adherence rate per 1,000 and the
national average religious adherence rate per 1,000). It is impossible for a candidate to
use negative religious talk (see Table 3 Predicted Percent of Religious Rhetoric (OLS
model), as well as Figure 1 Predictive Margins for Model 1 of Table 3).
We then decided to run a probit test, using a binary variable of whether or not a
text had at least one religious keyword. If a speech contained any religious keyword,
then the variable was coded as a 1, and if there were no religious keywords, the variable
was coded as a 0. The numbers are still small, but again, they are statistically significant
in indicating that states with a religious adherence rate above the national mean are
more likely to use religious rhetoric than states with adherence rates below the mean.
Table 4 show the probit model with a predictive margins plot (Probit Model).
The probit model is statistically significant, but it is hard to interpret the significance of a probit model. In order to better analyze the model, we ran a predictive
margins command (see Figure 2 Predictive Margins for Table 4). This model shows
a statistical significance between states with a negative religious rate and states with a
positive religious rate from the baseline. There is not a strong statistical significance
between states that have religious adherence above the national mean, but this model,
just like the OLS model, supports our hypothesis that candidates will use more religious rhetoric in states with higher religious adherence rates.
While small, the statistically significant percentages are exciting in demonstrating the difference between the states with a negative adherence rate below the baseline and states with a positive adherence rate above the baseline. The fact that there
is a statistically significant difference between the states with negative and positive
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adherence rates supports our hypothesis that candidates will use more religious rhetoric in more religious states.

Conclusion

Our results suggest that candidates are predicted to use more Christian religious
rhetoric as the religiosity of the state increases (see Figure 3 Statistical Significance in
the Geographic Dispersion of Religious Rhetoric Use by Presidential Candidates for
a visual representation of the results). We also found that party matters. Republican
candidates are more likely to use religious rhetoric than Democratic candidates. The
substantive significance is much harder to assess than the statistical significance. Further study on the effect of Christian religious rhetoric on voters, especially compared
to tradition-specific targeting, would help to interpret the substantive significance.
The 2016 presidential election was not a common election. An outsider to Washington, Donald Trump won the election, contrary to many predictions. He also stood
out by using less religious rhetoric than his competitors. This could imply that the
stereotypically religious right no longer places as much value on the role of religion
in politics. For this reason, further research should be performed on the effect of religious rhetoric on citizens’ voting habits. Research in the past on the effect of religious
rhetoric (Albertson 2010; Djupe and Calfano 2014) primarily deals with individuals’
perceptions of public office-holders who use religious rhetoric. The research does not
gauge the effect of religious rhetoric in an election. Thus, our research contributes by
suggesting that candidates target religious individuals in predominantly religious
areas. Does this strategy actually help the candidates win the presidency? Questions
like this one could be answered by further researching and analyzing content of the
speeches given by presidential candidates.
NOTES
1. We would like to thank Professor Gubler, Devon Tenney, and James from the statistics
lab for helping us with some of our questions about R. Their help was instrumental for
our project.
2. We created a few versions of the viability measure and determined that this one was
the simplest, but it also provided similar results as the others. Due to multi-collinearity,
we had to choose only one version. The simplest measure consisted of ranking all the
candidates of each party by the end date of his or her campaign We assumed that the
closer the campaign was to the general election, the more viable the candidate was.
This consisted of ranking Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton as 1, then proceeding up
in value until the first candidate who exited the primaries. A similar method of ranking records the date each candidate announced his or her candidacy in the primaries.
A second variable takes the percentage of delegate votes each candidate received from
their respective national conventions. Many candidates were not viable at this point,
and consequently received zero percent. However, nearly every candidate was on the
ballot (in at least some states) and received part of the popular vote. We included all of
the previously mentioned candidates that we had dropped in these measures to include
their effect in the race on other candidates.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Percentage of Religious Rhetoric During the Primaries
Candidates

Percentage of Texts with at
least one
Religous Keyword

Candidates

Percentage of
Religious Keywords

Democratic

4.0

Democratic
Candidates

0.49

Candidates

Hillary Clinton

(1) 4.5

Hillary Clinton

(1) 0.21

Bernie Sanders

(2) 2.5

Bernie Sanders

(2) 0.20

Republican

Republican
Candidates

6.0

Candidates

1.71

Ted Cruz

(1) 33.5

Ted Cruz

(1) 1.64

Mike Huckabee

(2) 31.7

Marco Rubio

(2) 0.45

Ben Carson

(3) 31.0

Ben Carson

(3) 0.41

Lindsey Graham

(4) 28.1

Mike Huckabee

(4) 0.38

Rand Paul

(5) 18.5

Jeb Bush

(5) 0.35

Rick Perry

(6) 17.0

Lindsey Graham

(6) 0.24

Bobby Jindal

(7) 16.4

Donald Trump

(7) 0.22

Chris Christie

(8) 16.1

John Kasich

(8) 0.21

Jeb Bush

(9) 13.4

Bobby Jindal

(9) 0.14

Scott Walker

(10) 13.0

Rick Santorum

(10) 0.09

Marco Rubio

(11) 9.2

Rand Paul

(11) 0.05

John Kasich

(12) 7.63

Rick Perry

(12) 0.05

Rick Santorum

(13) 7.3

Scott Walker

(13) 0.05

Donald Trump

(14) 3.3

Chris Christie

(14) 0.04

*Candidates listed in descending order of religious rhetoric use. A definition of these percentages can be
found on page 7.

Table 2: Percentage of Religious Rhetoric During the General Election
Candidate

Percentage of texts
with at least one
religious keyword

Percentage of
religious keywords
used in all texts

Number of Texts (n)

Hillary Clinton

3.3

0.17

1734

Donald Trump

6.5

0.05

764
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Table 3: Predicted Percentage of Religious Rhetoric (OLS model)
Model 1
percentage

Variables

Model 2
Percentage

Model 3
Percentage

State Religious

3.72e-04*

7.84e-04**

2.71e-04*

Adherence

(1.96e-04)

(3.68e-04)

(1.52e-04)

Popular Vote

-3.52e-03*

-3.47e-03*

-0.0281**

Ranking

(2.01e-03)

(2.00e-03)

(0.0135)

Battle Ground

0.0388*

0.103**

-0.0117

State

(0.0226)

(0.0395)

(0.0293)

State

3.17e-03
(2.12e-03)

7.28e-03
(4.42e-03)

-8.51e-04
(1.19e-03)

Candidate Gender

0.0348***
(9.90e-03)

0.0492***
(0.0107)

---

Candidate

0.0340***
(4.66e-05)

0.0492***
0.0339***

---

Popular Vote

1.81e-04

3.04e-04

-5.79e-03**

Ranking

(1.77e-04)

(1.88e-04)

(2.36e-03)

Party

0.0745***
(8.11e-03)

0.0786***
(5.39e-03)

0.0564*
(0.0331)

Constant

-0.0995
(0.0590)

-0.193*
(0.100)

0.502***
(0.155)

Observations

4,084

3,859

225

R-Squared

0.019

0.021

0.023

Education Level

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 1 is for all observations. Model 2 is for the primaries. Model 3 is for the general election.
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Linear Prediction

Figure 1: Predictive Margins for Model 1 of Table 3

Figure 2: State Religious
Adherence

Margins

P-Value

Confidence Intervals

-200

0.029

0.509

-0.048

0.108

-150

0.049

0.101

-0.01

0.106

-100

0.067

0.001

0.028

0.105

-50

0.085

0

0.067

0.104

0

0.104

0

0.1

0.107

50

0.123

0

0.101

0.144

100

0.141

0

0.099

0.183

150

0.16

0

0.098

0.221

200

0.178

0

0.097

0.26

250

0.197

0

0.096

0.298

300

0.215

0.001

0.094

0.337
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Table 4: Probit Mode
VARIABLES

Texts with at least one religious keyword

State Religious Adherence

0.00545** (0.00217)

Population Rating

0.00930 (0.0114)

Battle Ground State

2.122*** (0.198)

State

-0.0193 (0.0139)

Candidate Gender

-0.323** (0.144)

Candidate Education Level

0.149*** (0.0419)

Popular Vote Rating

(0.00313 (0.00213)

Party

0.518*** (0.0953)

Constant

-1.162*** (0.352)

Observations

4,088
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Pseudo – R2 0.0880
Figure 3: Predictive Margins for Table 4
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Table 5: *Percentage on the Y- axis Religious
Adherence

Margins P-Value

Confidence Intervals

-200

0.034

0.021

0.006

0.07

-150

0.058

0.002

0.022

0.094

-100

0.089

0

0.053

0.124

-50

0.133

0

0.106

0.158

0

0.192

0

0.18

0.202

50

0.266

0

0.223

0.308

100

0.355

0

0.261

0.447

150

0.453

0

0.303

0.6

200

0.554

0

0.359

0.752

250

0.653

0

0.42

0.885

300

0.742

0

0.497

0.986

*Data of the margins plot in a table

Figure 4: Statistical Significance in the Geographic Dispersion of
Religious Rhetoric Use by President Candidates

This is the predictive margins plot for our second OLS model, which is analyzing texts only from the primaries. As one can see, the religious adherence rates for -200, -150, and -100 all have confidence intervals below
zero. This does not make sense since it is impossible for a candidate to use negative religious rhetoric.
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Figure 5

Table 6
Religious Adherence

Margins

P-Value

Confidence Intervals

-200

-0.053

0.471

-0.203

0.097

-150

-0.014

0.797

-0.126

0.098

-100

0.025

0.496

-0.049

0.099

-50

0.064

0.001

0.028

0.101

0

0.103

0

0.101

0.107

50

0.143

0

0.103

0.182

100

0.182

0

0.105

0.259

150

0.221

0.001

0.106

0.336

200

0.26

0.002

0.107

0.413

250

0.23

0.003

0.109

0.49

300

0.339

0.005

0.11

0.567

*Data of the margins plot in a table
The battleground states include Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia, Colorado, Ohio,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, New Hampshire, and Georgia.

36

DAY AND JOHNSON
REFERENCES
Albertson, Bethany L. 2011. “Religious Appeals and Implicit Attitudes.” Political Psychology 32, no. 1
(February): 109–30.
Campbell, David E., John C. Green, and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2011. “The Party Faithful: Partisan
Images, Candidate Religion, and the Electoral Impact of Party Identification.” American Journal
of Political Science 55, no. 1 (January): 42–58.
Chapp, Christopher B. 2012. Religious Rhetoric and American Politics: The Endurance of Civil Religion in
Electoral Campaigns. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Clinton, Hillary. 2016. “Remarks at Goodyear Hall and Theater in Akron, Ohio.” The American
Presidency Project, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 3. Accessed December 7, 2017.
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=119153.
Clinton, Hillary. 2016. “Remarks at Martin Luther King, Jr., Plaza in Toledo, Ohio,” The American
Presidency Project, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 3. Accessed December 7, 2017.
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=119154.
Clinton, Hillary. 2016. “Remarks at Wake Technical Community College in Raleigh, North Carolina.”
The American Presidency Project, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 27. Accessed
December 7, 2017. www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=119163.
Clinton, Hillary. 2016. “Remarks at the University of North Carolina in Greensboro.” The American
Presidency Project, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 15. Accessed December 7,
2017. www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=119158.
Cruz, Ted. 2015. “Remarks Announcing Candidacy for President at Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia.” The American Presidency Project, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March
23. Accessed December 7, 2017. www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=109774.
Djupe, Paul A. and Brian R. Calfano. 2013. God Talk: Experimenting with the Religious Causes of Public
Opinion. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
FiveThirtyEight. 2016. “Who Will Win the Presidency?” 2016 Election Forecast, November 8.
Accessed April 21, 2017. https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-election-forecast/.
Geographic Products Branch. 2012. “Cartographic Boundary Shapefiles - States.” United States Census Bureau, September 1. Last modified April 6, 2017. Accessed April 7, 2017. www.census.
gov/geo/maps-data/data/cbf/cbf_state.html.
Hart, Roderick P., Sharon E. Jarvis, William P. Jennings, and Deborah Smith-Howell. 2006. Political
Keywords: Using Language that Uses Us. New York: Oxford University Press.
Karpowitz, Christopher F., J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson. 2016. “Who’s In and Who’s Out:
The Politics of Religious Norms.” Politics and Religions 9, no. 3 (September): 508–36.
Kent, David. 2016. “Presidential Vote by Religious Affiliation and Race.” Pew Research Center,
November 9. www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/how-the- faithfulvoted-a-preliminary-2016-analysis/ft_16-11-09_relig_exitpoll_religrace/.
McLaughlin, Bryan and David Wise. 2014. “Cueing God: Religious Cues and Voter Support.” Politics
and Religion 7, no. 2 (June): 366–94.
Moffitt, Mary Anne. 1999. Campaign Strategies and Message Design: A Practitioner’s Guide from Start to
Finish. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Monson, J. Quin and J. Baxter Oliphant. 2007. “Microtargeting and the Instrumental Mobilization of
Religious Conservatives.” In A Matter of Faith: Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election, edited by
David E. Campbell, 95-119. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Newport, Frank. 2015. “Percentage of Christians in U.S. Drifting Down, but Still High.” Gallup, December 24. http://news.gallup.com/poll/187955/percentage-christians-driftingdown-high.aspx.
Pew Research Center. 2016. “The Changing Composition of the Political Parties.” In The Parties on the
Eve of the 2016 Election: Two Coalitions, Moving Further Apart. September 13. Accessed March 1,
2017. www.people-press.org/2016/09/13/1-the-changing-composition-of-the-political-parties/.
37

SIGMA
Quinton, Adam. Database of Presidential Campaign Speeches. Created for and provided to the students of this project. Licensed. https://github.com/zvakanaka/candidate-speeches.
Sanders, Bernie. 2015. “Remarks at the Liberty University Convocation in Lynchburg, Virginia.” The
American Presidency Project, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 14. www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=114488.

Sanders, Bernie. 2016. “Remarks on Policy in the Middle East in Salt Lake City, Utah.” The American
Presidency Project, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 21. www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=116694.
Smith, Gregory A. 2016. “Churchgoing Republicans, Once Skeptical of Trump, Now Support Him.”
Pew Research Center, July 21. www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/21/churchgoingrepublicans-once-skeptical-of-trump-now-support-him/.
The Association of Religion Data Archives. Accessed February 03, 2017. www.thearda.com.

The Green Papers. 2016. Election 2016: Presidential Primaries, Caucuses, and Conventions. Last modified
March 4, 2018. Accessed March 7, 2018. www.thegreenpapers.com/P16/.
Trent, Judith S. and Robert V. Friedenberg. 2000. Political Campaign Communication: Principles and
Practices. 4th ed. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Trump, Donald J. 2015. “Remarks Announcing Candidacy for President in New York City.” The
American Presidency Project, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 16. www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/?pid=110306.
Trump, Donald J. 2016. “Remarks at a Rally at the Greenville Convention Center in Greenville, North
Carolina.” The American Presidency Project, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 6.
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=119197.
Trump, Donald J. 2016. “Remarks at High Point University in High Point, North Carolina.” The
American Presidency Project, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 20. www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=119192.

Woolley, John and Gerhard Peters. 2017. “Election of 2016.” The American Presidency Project. Last
modified February 16. Accessed February 3, 2017. www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.
php?year=2016.

38

Congress and the Benefits of Social
Media: A Low-Cost Investment
in Constituency Approval and
Electoral Success
Mandi Eatough

Media in the U.S. has experienced rapid changes since the introduction of the Internet to mainstream society. Since the 1990s, the population of the world that is active on
the Internet has grown from millions to billions. Worldwide, people began to want more
information, and they wanted to have access to the information instantly. While newspapers, news-based radio stations, and television news providers have tried to keep up with
the continuously evolving media outlets, a different media form has emerged to fill the
gap (Shirkey 2011). Social media web sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have
become simple ways for individuals to obtain news with minimal effort on their part. As
social media has integrated into the lives of the American public, it has also integrated
into American politics.
As early as the 2008 election cycle, the presence of social media in politics has
been considered an important part of political news. Local and federal legislators and
legislative candidates alike have taken to social media as a way of creating a pseudopersonal relationship with their constituents or voters. While commonly acknowledged that many legislators have jumped on the social media bandwagon, what has
not been examined is the benefits legislators or candidates may receive from social
media presence and activity. This research aims to answer what benefits senators and
Senate candidates see from investment in social media, as well as what differences are
seen in these benefits based on gender. This research also takes into account existing
theories about media coverage and gender for legislators and legislative candidates
in the U.S. that suggest men often benefit more from personalized media messaging.
Using pre-existing data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study
(CCES) and original data collected about social media sites belonging to sitting senators, as well as Senate candidates, this research will examine a three-part hypothesis.
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First, sitting senators who have higher levels of social media presence and activity
will experience higher rates of name-recognition and approval among their constituents than members with lower levels of social media presence. Second, Senate
candidates who have higher levels of social media presence and activity will see an
increase in vote share, meaning they will be more likely to be re-elected. Finally, this
paper will examine differences in the benefits of social media presence and activity
for both senators and Senate candidates based on gender, with the expectation that
male candidates will receive greater benefits from social media investment.
This paper aims to provide sufficient background about the theories behind
the research performed, as well as detailed information about the studies and their
results. It will begin with an overview of the existing literature regarding the behaviors of legislators on social media and the existing theories of how social media influences politics in the U.S., with a specific focus on differences in senator and Senate
candidate gender. Next will be a detailed outline of the research question, as well as
the hypotheses. The paper will then provide a detailed explanation of how the data
from 2012, 2014, and 2016 CCES datasets and the collected original data have combined to create a model to address my hypotheses. Finally, the models and results
will be presented with concluding comments about the implications of the results and
suggestions for further research on this topic.

Theoretical Background

Social Media and Politics
Since the introduction of social media in the early 2000s, political scientists
have identified that the media platform has political uses. The study of the influence of social media on legislators and constituents alike has led to several theories
about how social media is political. Several studies have identified social media as an
important way for politicians to interact with their constituencies while in Washington (Watall et al. 2010; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Fitch and Goldschmidt 2014), while
others have focused on the political usage of social media by constituents (Hand and
Ching 2011; Shirkey 2011; Carlisle and Patton 2013). Each study has come to the same
conclusion: Social media matters in politics.
Social media is the most likely outlet for constituents of any age to invest themselves in the political process (Carlisle and Patton 2013). In recent years, the accessibility of social media for most citizens in the U.S. has increased while more “traditional”
news methods (newspapers, news-based radio, news television outlets) have become
less accessible. Social media has easily become more convenient than more traditional
news outlets for many citizens as computers, smartphones, and wireless hotspots
have increased in popularity throughout the country. In addition to convenience,
social media is primarily available at no cost to users. While it is free to sign up for an
account on most social media sites (this is true for Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube),
newspapers and television often cost money to access some or all of their content.
This makes social media a monetarily advantageous news outlet for both legislators,
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who may disseminate news from their office for incredibly low cost, and constituents, who may receive news from their legislators at little to no additional cost.
It is important to note that while social media is the most convenient news outlet
regardless of age, many political scientists have identified that younger citizens in
the U.S. (those born after 1980) are the most likely to be influenced by politicians
on social media (Samuels 2011; Kahne and Middaugh 2012; Norval 2012). Younger
citizens use social media as a news outlet for both political and non-political information and are much less likely to seek out news from more traditional news outlets
than older citizens (Kahne and Middaugh 2012). This same demographic of young
citizens uses social media to maintain their own political behavior as well as influence
the behavior of others. Social media is used by younger citizens to organize protests
and to engage in political discussions with those they have connected with on social
media outlets. Political interactions on Facebook have been shown to be as effective for
political socialization among the younger generation as political interactions that occur
in person (Norval 2012). Interactions online are considered just as valuable by these
citizens as those they have in person, making social media a particularly advantageous
outlet for politicians to connect with younger constituents.
The Costs and Benefits of Social Media for Legislators
Social media is unique as a media form in the fact that, at a basic level, it is available to everyone at little or no additional cost. As discussed previously, social media
has become increasingly popular in the U.S., particularly when compared to “traditional” forms of media predominantly because of differences in cost. Given the low
cost levels associated with using social media for both legislators and constituents,
it is expected that legislators believe that investment in this media platform will be
beneficial. What is less clear is where these benefits actually are seen for legislators.
Existing research has suggested two main theoretical benefits of digital connections made
between legislators and their constituents who connect with them on social media: 1)
potential benefits that legislators who are currently in office receive from using social
media to interact directly with their constituency and 2) potential benefits of social media
usage in elections.
For sitting senators, media use is an important tool to connect with their constituencies. While it has not been examined on the congressional level, a study by
Hand and Ching showed that the presence of government-centric Facebook pages
provides a way for citizens to directly engage with their local political leaders (2011).
Their research showed that when local government officials maintained Facebook
pages that were regularly updated with information about local politics, there was an
increase in the approval of local legislative bodies. Several studies have suggested that
the more time a legislator spends interacting directly with their constituents, the more
likely they are to be approved of by those same constituents (Fenno 1975; Yiannakis
1982; DiGrazia et al. 2013; Fitch and Goldschmidt 2014; Sulkin, Testa, and Usry 2015).
If we assume that in the modern world individuals value interactions through social
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media at least partially as much as they value in-person interactions, there should be
a direct correlation between the social media presence of a legislator and approval of
the legislator similarly to the correlation seen on the local government level.
However, many political scientists suggest that the greatest benefit politicians
can gain from using social media is by using it as a tool during an election. In recent
years, our social and political lives have become increasingly based on personal attributes as they are presented online (Bennett 2012; Jacobs and Spierings 2014). Elections
are not exclusively about who will do the best job but who resonates the most with
the voters. As previously discussed, social media is one of the easiest ways for a legislator to interact with their constituents. Existing research suggests that social media
activity by legislators creates a sense of transparency and accountability between legislators and their constituents that more traditional news outlets do not (Fitch and
Goldschmidt 2014). This leads to a consistently high level of social media presence
among legislators, particularly when leading up to elections, so we should expect a
similar effect on candidates running for these offices.
In a study about the 2008 presidential election cycle and social media, it showed that
Facebook users interact with more posts about politics during an election cycle than at
any other time (Carlisle and Patton 2013). This suggests that politicians are likely to get
the most interaction with constituents on social media during an election. Many political
scientists agree that political campaigns worldwide have been moving toward Internetbased media outlets (Williamson 2010; Obar et al. 2012; Jacobs and Spierings 2014). Social
media is providing a new way for legislators to organize and fund-raise for their campaigns (Siegel 2012). Candidates no longer have to focus their media efforts exclusively
on who can get the most time with local and national media outlets, because social media
is always available to them.
A comparative study of voting in 2010 elections in the Netherlands guides a significant portion of this research (Jacobs and Spierings 2014). Using information about
presence and activity on Twitter for 493 candidates, their study evaluated the impact
of differences in presence and activity on the platform on vote share. They found
that when a candidate has a high number of Twitter followers and actively uses the
social media platform, they are likely to see an increase in vote share. Their work
emphasizes the importance of active use of the platform, indicating that candidates
who maintained a profile on Twitter but did not regularly post saw no increase in
vote share based on their number of followers. This study gives an indication of what
expectations we should have when considering similar elements of social media presence and activity in U.S. congressional elections.
It is uncontested among political scientists that social media is having an influence on politics in the United States. What has remained unclear is the extent to which
investment in social media as a political tool leads to direct benefits for legislators
and candidates. As outlined above, current theory regarding social media and politics suggests there are two main areas where legislators may see direct benefits from
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social media: increased levels of recognition and favorability among constituents for
sitting legislators and increased favorability in elections for candidates. This research
uses an original observational measure of the social media presence and activity of
senators and Senate candidates to further examine the theorized benefits of social
media for legislators in the U.S. beyond what has been studied previously.
The Gendered Expectations of the Effect of Social Media in Politics
This research also takes into account existing theories about media coverage and
gender for legislators and legislative candidates in the United States. Historically, male
and female senators have differed in the way they have chosen to communicate with
their constituents (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Kahn 1992; Kahn 1994; Fridkin and
Kenney 2014). Generally, senators tend to play toward stereotypical strengths based on
gender when interacting with their constituents, and the media tends to follow this lead.
Male senators are often covered for their legislative accomplishments on high saliency
issues particularly those that are related to economic or international issues. Comparatively, female senators are often covered for work on “women’s issues”—issues where
women traditionally bear more of the associated costs with the legislation, such as abortion or childcare (Rosenwasser and Dean 1989).
Given the historical differences of media messaging among U.S. senators based
on gender, we may expect that senators present themselves in similar ways on social
media. However, recent studies on differences in social media activity of candidates in
the U.S. suggest candidates engage in distinct ways with voters on social media based
on their gender in a way that differs from traditional media coverage (McGregor et al.
2016; Meeks 2017). These studies have found that while both male and female candidates seem to be using social media at similar levels during campaigns, the content of
their engagement and the potential benefit of this engagement differs based on gender.
They find that while male candidates benefit from social media personalization (maintaining personality through their social media pages by discussing hobbies, family, or
non-campaign related topics on their pages), female candidates are often disadvantaged by this behavior. While this helps men to be seen as personable, women are more
likely to be seen as unfocused in their careers. This means that, instead of increased
favorability among voters, this personalization forms a perception of incompetency
among female legislators and candidates.
To win an election, a candidate must be perceived as both likable and competent
by voters. This, of course, requires a balance for all candidates, but women face specific
challenges in maintaining this balance. Research on gender representation has suggested
there is a “double-bind” that prevents women from winning elected offices. The expected
behaviors of women in society often are in direct conflict with the expected behaviors of
elected leaders creating a scenario in which women often are perceived as likable but
incompetent or competent but unlikable by voters (Gimenez et al. 2017).
Given these outlined differences in political media engagement based on gender, it is reasonable to expect differences in the benefits that senators and Senate
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candidates received based on their gender. Since social media has been identified
as the platform for candidate personalization by a significant amount of the existing
research, we should expect that male candidates, and potentially male senators, will
be more likely to experience the theorized benefits of investment in social media than
their female counterparts.

Research Question and Hypotheses

This research aims to answer the following questions:
Do senators and/or Senate candidates see benefits in constituency recognition/
approval or vote share when they increase their investment in social media?
Assuming there are benefits to social media investment, do male and female
senators and Senate candidate experience these benefits equally?

This project uses a combination of existing survey data and original observational data to evaluate changes in these potential benefits based on social media presence and activity as well as potential differences in these benefits based on gender.
The hypothesized outcomes are as follows:
H1: Sitting senators with higher levels of social media presence and activity will experience greater constituency recognition and approval.
1. The effect of social media activity on constituency recognition and approval
will be greater than the effect of social media presence.
2. Male senators will experience higher levels of constituency recognition and
approval based on social media investment than their female counterparts.
H2: Senate candidates with higher levels of social media presence and activity will receive
a greater amount of the vote share.
1. The effect of social media activity on vote share will be greater than the effect
of social media presence.
2. Male Senate candidates will receive a greater increase in vote share based on
social media investment than their female counterparts.
H3: Controlling for partisanship and other demographic factors, citizens in the 2016 election cycle with higher levels of political social media engagement will be more likely to
vote for candidates with higher levels of social media presence and activity.
1. The effect of social media activity on vote choice will be greater than the effect
of social media presence.
2. Male Senate candidates will be favored more highly for social media investment by citizens with high levels of political social media engagement than
their female counterparts.
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Data and Methodology

This study uses a combination of existing survey data and original observational
data. The existing survey datasets this study uses are from the 2012, 2014, and 2016
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).1 Each CCES dataset includes
information for over 50,000 individuals throughout the United States. This research
specifically uses information about constituency approval and name recollection for
the senators of each respondent, as well as their senator vote choice, when applicable,
from all three datasets. This research also uses additional data from the 2016 CCES
about media engagement and political social media behaviors of respondents. For a
complete list of CCES questions used from each year see Appendix.
The original data collected about the social media presence and activity of senators and Senate candidates was compiled using The Wayback Machine, a digital
archive of web sites created by the Internet Archive. This tool allows archived web
sites to be viewed as they were presented on specific dates that provides a way to
accurately measure the previous social media presence and activity of both senators
and Senate candidates across several years. In the case of senators, social media presence and activity were measured based on archives of social media pages in January of the first year of each congressional session. In the case of Senate candidates,
social media presence and activity were measured based on archives of social media
pages before, but as close as possible,2 to Election Day of each election year. The social
media pages for Senate candidates were only measured based on pre-Election Day
dates because of anticipated changes in follower counts and social media activity that
are associated with winning or losing elections. Information regarding social media
presence and activity were collected based on the archived pages of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube profiles for senators of the 112th–114th Congresses, as well as candidates in the 2012, 2014, and 2016 senatorial elections.
Social media presence is defined in this study based solely on whether or not the
senator or candidate has a profile on a social media platform. If a senator or candidate
does not have a profile on a platform, they do not have a presence on that platform.
Differences in social media presence among senators and candidates have decreased
significantly over time. In 2012, several senators and candidates had a singular social
media presence and a few had no social media presence. Comparatively, in 2016
every senator had a social media presence on each platform with the single exception of Senator Risch from Idaho who did not join Facebook until mid-2017. A similar
change was seen among Senate candidates in 2016 with nearly all candidates having
a presence on Facebook and Twitter and over half of the candidates with a presence
on YouTube. Percentages of social media presence by year for both senators and Senate candidates is shown in Table 1 (p. 50). Social media activity is defined by how
frequently a legislator uses a social media platform to interact with their constituents.
The information collected on activity varies slightly based on what information can
be collected about the profile from each social media site.
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For each platform that a senator or Senate candidate maintained a social media
presence on, information was collected about how long they had maintained that presence, as well as how many followers they had on that site. The way this was determined
varies slightly between the three sites. Below is a brief explanation of the differences in
data collection between Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (A breakdown of what data
was collected from each site is found in Table 2 on p. 55):
Facebook: The amount of time a senator or candidate maintained a presence
on Facebook was coded as the year of the first post available on their Facebook page.
Twitter: The amount of time a senator or candidate maintained a presence on Twitter
was coded as the year they joined as provided by Twitter. Follower count was coded
as the rounded value provided on the profile by Twitter (generally rounded to the
nearest thousand). The number of Tweets was coded as the exact value provided on
each profile by Twitter.
YouTube: The amount of time a senator or candidate maintained a presence on YouTube was coded as the year they joined as provided by YouTube. Follower count
was coded as the exact follower value provided on the page by YouTube. Number
of views is coded as the exact value provided on the information page for each YouTube account.
Using a combination of these two data sources this research will conduct two studies. The first is an analysis of how the social media presence and activity of senators influences their name recognition and favorability among their constituents. This analysis will
be conducted using logistic regression models of name recognition and favorability for
members of the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses. The second study is an analysis of
how the social media presence and activity of Senate candidates influences their vote
share. This analysis will be conducted using OLS regression models of total vote share, as
well as a mixture of OLS and logistic regression models of individual constituency vote
choice and overall election results in the 2012, 2014, and 2016 senatorial elections.

Analyses and Results

Analysis 1: The Effect of the Social Media Presence and Activity of Senators on Constituency
Recognition and Approval
Existing theory suggests that Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are the most influential social media platforms in terms of political impact. Senators, more so than Senate
candidates as discussed in the following section, are overwhelmingly present on all three
of these platforms and have been since at least 2012 (see Figure 1). Twitter has been identified as a particularly important platform for political figures, with most research about
the influence of social media on politics focusing on Twitter behavior. The data collected
for this research allowed for a comparison of the effect of presence and activity on each
social media platform. Given the information collectible from these platforms (see Table
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2), the best measure for a comparison across all three platforms was a measure of constituency engagement (see Figure 2).

Figure 1: Social Media Presence of Senators

Figure 2

This measure was created by dividing the number of followers on the platform by the number of months the senator had been on the platform. While
imperfect, this gives a rough estimate of the level of constituency engagement
that occurred on each platform for each senator. Twitter shows the highest level of
constituency engagement across nearly all senators. Given the high level of constituency engagement on Twitter, this analysis, as well as the following analysis of
Senate candidates, will focus on the social media activity of senators on Twitter.3
The following logistic regression model was used to evaluate the effects of both
social media presence and activity on senator name recall, party identification,
and approval:
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Pr (dependent variable=1 |X=1,2…)
=F(primary independent variable (social media presence or activity) + respondent social media use
+ respondent political social media use + senator partisanship + respondent partisanship
+ partisanship match + senator gender + respondent gender + gender match + respondent race
+ respondent age + respondent income + state fixed effects)

Using this model, six logistic regressions were conducted to evaluate the effects of
both social media presence and activity on the recognition and approval of senators by
their constituents. First, analyzing the social media presence of senators, logistic models
were used to evaluate the effect of social media presence on constituency recognition and
approval. Based on existing theory, it is hypothesized that an increase in social media
presence should lead to increases in recognition and approval among constituents. The
results of these models (see Appendix 1, Table 3) were mostly statistically and substantively insignificant. In one case, the predicted probability of a constituent being able to
recall the name of their senators is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence
level, with a predicted negative effect on name recall as the social media presence of a senator increases. The predicted probability of a constituent correctly recalling the name of a
senator based on the senator’s social media presence is shown in Figure 3. When comparing a senator with no social media presence, to a senator who is present on all three social
media platforms, it is predicted that there will be a ten percentage point decrease in the
probability of a constituent recalling their senator’s name. It is important to recognize a
limitation of this model in the discussion of the results, because, in the 114th Congress,4
the only variation in social media presence is between senators with and without Facebook as all senators were present on both Twitter and YouTube. Given the high social
media presence of senators across all three years, it is unlikely that there will be particularly large differences in recognition or approval based on social media presence, and
much of the variation is based in predicted values rather than observations, giving much
larger standard errors.

Figure 3: Effect of Senator Social Media Presence on Name Recall
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While senator social media presence showed little effect on constituency recognition and approval, logistic models of senator social media activity showed consistent
positive and statistically significant effects on these factors (see Table 1). The predicted probabilities of a constituent recalling the senator’s name, correctly identifying
the senator’s political party affiliation, and approving of the senator based on the
Twitter activity of their senator are shown in Figure 4. The effect of senator Twitter
activity is the smallest on the probability of constituent approval of their senator, with
about a one percentage point increase if a senator were to go from not tweeting at all
to tweeting about 200 times per month. However, the effect of senator Twitter activity
has a much larger effect on the probability of a constituent recalling the name of their
senator or correctly identifying the partisanship of their senator.

Figure 4: Effect of Senator Social Media Activity on Recognition
and Approval

In the case of name recall, if a senator were to go from not tweeting at all to tweeting
about 200 times per month, their constituents would have a ten percentage point increase
in the probability of a constituent remembering their name. In the case of partisan identification, the same shift in Twitter activity would have an eight percentage point increase
in the probability of a correct partisan identification by a constituent. Since these are logistic models there is inconsistency in the amount of change predicted in the probability of a
positive outcome across increases in senator Twitter activity. However, in the case of senator name recall, it takes an increase of about twenty tweets per month by the senator for
an approximate one percent increase in the probability of a positive outcome. In the case
of senator party identification, it takes an increase of about twenty-five tweets per month
to see an approximate one percent increase in the probability of a positive outcome. While
these predicted effects are not particularly large, the results suggest that increased Twitter activity by senators does positively influence the probability of constituents having
greater recognition of them. It is also important to note that these effects are seen while
controlling for factors that have a much larger effect on constituent recognition of senators, including matching partisanship between constituents and senators.
49

SIGMA

Table 1: Logistic Regressions of the Effect of Senator
Social Media Activity
VARIABLES

Senator Name
Recall

Senator Party
Identification

Senator Approval

Senator Twitter

0.00264***

0.00227***

0.000445**

Res. Social

-0.418***

-0.309***

-0.118***

Activity

Media Use
Res. Political

(0.000222)
(0.0229)

0.306***

(0.000204)
(0.0207)

0.246***

(0.000190)
(0.0203)

0.0811***

Social Media Use

(0.00717)

(0.00624)

(0.00555)

Senator

0.370***

0.352***

-0.281***

Respondent

-0.0538**

-0.0933***

-0.555***

Partisan Match

-

2.042***

2.247***

-0.213***

-0.290***

-0.166***

0.629***

0.517***

0.184***

0.0450**

0.0684***

0.0755***

0.129***

0.195***

0.150***

Republican
Republican

Senator Male
Respondent
Male

Gender Match
Respondent
White

Respondent Age
Respondent
Income

State Fixed
Effects?

Constant
Observations

(0.0190)

(0.0225)

(0.0169)

(0.0193)

(0.0244)

(0.0214)

(0.0203)

(0.0201)

(0.0192)

-0.0409***

(0.000577)
0.115***

(0.0188)

(0.0179)

(0.0177)

(0.0173)

-0.0420***

(0.000520)
0.108***

(0.0162)

(0.0185)

(0.0171)
(0.0179)

(0.0169)

(0.0166)

(0.0175)

-0.0129***

(0.000472)
0.0311***

(0.00292)

(0.00260)

(0.00212)

YES

YES

YES

79.92***

81.79***

24.27***

73,292

101,298

101,298

(1.136)

(1.022)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(0.929)

Analysis 2: The Effect of the Social Media Presence and Activity of Senate Candidates on
Voter Support

As discussed in the first analysis, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are the most

influential social media platforms in terms of political impact. The variation in social
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media presence on these platforms is much larger among Senate candidates than it
is among senators as shown in Figure 5 (Senator social media presence distribution
from Analysis 1 is shown in Figure 1). As discussed in analysis 1, the constituency
engagement measures for Senate candidates look essentially identical to those of senators, indicating once again that Twitter activity is likely the best platform for social
media activity to have an influence on constituent behavior.

Figure 5: Social Media Presence of Senate Candidates over Time

The analysis of the effect of Senate candidate social media presence and activity has
been conducted in two parts: first, an analysis of the effect of Senate candidate social
media presence and activity on election results, measured with OLS regressions of the
effects on vote share and logistic.
Predicted Candidate Vote Share=β0 + β1 primary independent variable (social media presence or activity)
+β2 candidate partisanship + β3 candidate gender + β4 state fixed effects + δ
Pr(candidate winning election=1 |X=1,2…)
=F(primary independent variable (social media presence or activity) + candidate partisanship
+ candidate gender + state fixed effects)

Second, an analysis of the effect of Senate candidate social media presence and activity on individual constituency vote choice using the following logistic regression model:
Pr(vote choice=1 |X=1,2…)
=F(primary independent variable (social media presence or activity) + respondent social media use
+ respondent political social media use + candidate partisanship + respondent partisanship
+ partisanship match + candidate gender + respondent gender + gender match + respondent race
+ respondent age + respondent income + state fixed effects)
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These analyses allow for a consideration of the effect of social media presence
and activity on senator election outcomes in terms of both the overall election result
as well as individual vote choice. The evaluation of both election results and individual vote choice allows for the consideration of benefits in terms of general electoral
success. With this evaluation, we can also consider which voters are most responsive
to social media activity, giving us a greater understanding of where any differences
in electoral success may be coming from based on social media presence or activity.
Data was collected about the social media presence and activity of Senate candidates in the 2012, 2014, and 2016 congressional elections. However, an effect of
social media on vote choice or electoral outcomes does not appear in analyses until
the 2016 congressional elections. Figure six shows a comparison of the relationship
between Senate candidate social media activity and expected vote share in 2012,
2014, and 2016 Senate elections based on the results of the OLS model outlined for
each year. These results clearly indicate that the benefit of social media activity on
vote share for Senate candidates is unique to the 2016 Senate elections.5 Given the
unique importance of social media in the 2016 election, this analysis will focus on
the effects of Senate candidate social media presence and activity on election outcomes and individual vote choice in 2016.

Figure 6: The Effect of Social Media Activity
of Senate Candidates over Time

The Effect of Senate Candidate Social Media Presence and Activity on Election Outcomes
As outlined earlier in this section, the effect of Senate candidate social media presence and activity on election outcomes was measured using OLS regressions of these
factors on candidate vote share and logistic regressions of these factors on the final electoral outcome (see Appendix Table 4). In each of these models, increases in social media
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investment by Senate candidates leads to statistically and substantively significant positive changes in election outcomes. The predicted effects of social media investment by
Senate candidates on both vote share and the result of their electoral race are shown in
Figure 7 and Figure 8.

Figure 7

Figure 8

If a Senate candidate were to go from not being present on any social media platforms to being present on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, all else remaining the same,
the predicted vote share would increase from just under 10 percent to just over 50 percent. Even if a Senate candidate were to increase their social media presence by a single
platform, they would experience a vote share increase of around 15 percent. Similarly,
in the consideration of race outcome, if a Senate candidate were to go from having
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no social media presence to being present on all three platforms, their predicted probability of winning their election would increase by over sixty percentage points from
essentially no chance of winning initially.
Evaluating Senate candidate social media activity (in the form of Twitter activity as
outlined previously), we again see significant positive increases in vote share and probability of winning an election as the candidate increases their investment in social media
presence. For each five-tweet increase per month by a Senate candidate, the candidate
experiences a one percentage point increase in vote share. This means that if a candidate
were to increase their Twitter activity by at least one tweet per day, they would receive
approximately a six percentage point increase in vote share. Senate candidates also see
significant benefits in their probability of winning an election as their Twitter activity
increases. Candidates who tweeted at least fifty Tweets per month on average were
pushed above the .5 probability of winning their election. In comparison, if a candidate
were to not tweet at all, they have a .30 probability of winning their election. For candidates with the highest levels of Twitter activity, around 200 tweets per month, their
predicted probability of winning their election is .98.
The Effect of Senate Candidate Social Media Presence and Activity on Individual Vote Choice
The effect of Senate candidate social media presence and activity on individual vote
choice was measured using logistic regressions as outlined previously (see Table 2). In
both models, the effect of social media investment by a Senate candidate leads to statistically and substantively significant positive increases in the probability of an individual
voting for the candidate. The predicted probability of individual vote choice based on a
Senate candidate’s social media investment is shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9

Senate candidates with no social media presence have a predicted probability of
gaining an individual vote, all else including partisanship held equal, of just above .2.
If a Senate candidate has a social media presence on at least one social media platform,
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Table 2: Logistic Regressions of the Effect of Candidate Social Media
Presence and Activity on Individual Vote Choice
VARIABLES

(1)
Vote Choice

(2)
Vote Choice

Candidate Social Media Presence

1.540***
(0.0184)

-

Candidate Twitter Activity

-

0.0133***
(0.00109)

Res. Social Media Use

0.0934*
(0.0504)

0.101
(0.0615)

Res. Political Social Media Use

0.0120
(0.0143)

0.0207
(0.0181)

Candidate Republican

-

-

Respondent Republican

0.453***
(0.0497)

0.425***
(0.0535)

Partisan Match

0.856***
(0.0428)

1.311***
(0.0584)

Candidate Male

1.043***
(0.0415)

0.520***
(0.0483)

Respondent Male

-0.0232
(0.0416)

-0.0219
(0.0467)

Gender Match

0.150***
(0.0407)

0.173***
(0.0453)

Respondent White

0.435***
(0.0425)

0.286***
(0.0537)

Respondent Age

-0.00826***
(0.00122)

-0.0107***
(0.00151)

Respondent Income

-0.00223
(0.00533)

0.0289***
(0.00705)

State Fixed Effects?

YES

YES

Constant

13.38***
(2.394)

21.66***
(2.967)

33,577

29,278

Observations

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

their predicted probability of an individual voting for them increases to .53, giving them

a higher probability of receiving the vote than not. Senate candidates who are present on

all three social media platforms have a predicted probability of an individual voting for
them of .95.

While the predicted effects of Senate candidate social media presence are huge in

changing the probability of an individual voting for a candidate, the effect of Twitter

activity simply increases an already high probability of vote choice for all candidates

present on Twitter. Candidates who are on Twitter but do not tweet at all have a predicted
probability of an individual voting for them of .87. Compared to candidates with the

highest level of Twitter activity (candidates tweeting around 200 times per month who
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have a predicted probability of an individual voting for them of .98), candidates with low
levels of Twitter activity are at a slight disadvantage. However, while the effect of Senate
candidate Twitter activity causes a notable positive increase in the probability of an
individual voting for the candidate, the substantive effect is much smaller than the
substantive effect of social media presence on individual vote choice, going against
the hypothesis that social media activity would have a larger impact on vote choice
than social media presence.
Finally, the third hypothesis of this research suggests that, when controlling for
partisanship and other demographic factors, citizens in the 2016 election cycle with
higher levels of political social media engagement will be more likely to vote for candidates with higher levels of social media presence and activity. In only one case, when
considering the impact of social media presence on vote choice, is the effect of social
media use by a constituent statistically significant on vote choice. The political
social media presence of constituents shows no effect on vote choice.

Figure 10

The Effects of Gender

Theories about the social media behaviors of politicians and candidates suggest that
there may be gendered differences in the benefits these individuals receive from social
media investment. Many theoretical arguments for this gendered difference rely on the
idea that social media is inherently more personal than other forms of media and that
male politicians and candidates are more likely to benefit from their constituents or voters seeing their “personal side.” This may be because women in these positions are more
likely to be seen as unreliable or unprofessional for sharing personal or emotional information, particularly when it is about their families. Given this theoretical argument, it is
expected that men and women will see differing benefits from social media investment,
particularly when it comes to social media activity.
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In terms of gendered differences among sitting senators, female senators are slightly
more likely than male senators to be recognized and approved of by their constituents
regardless of senator social media engagement. This is particularly true among female
constituents of female senators. However, the major difference in benefit of social media
investment is seen among Senate candidates. The predicted effects of candidate social
media activity on the probability of an individual voting for a candidate, as well as a
candidate winning their election based on gender, are shown in Figure 10. The predicted
effects indicate there is a gender gap in the benefit Senate candidates receive from social
media activity that slowly decreases as candidates approach higher levels of social media
activity. This suggests female Senate candidates can close the gender gap and benefit
from social media engagement with constituents by raising their level of social media
activity compared to their male counterparts.
In addition to these gendered candidate effects, this research also indicates
there are gender differences among constituents in terms of both senator recognition and approval. Men are more likely in all cases to recall the name and correctly
identify the partisanship of their senator than women are. The men are also slightly
more likely than women to approve of their senator. There is no significant difference in individual vote choice based on the gender of the respondent, except
for cases where the candidate and the respondent are of the same gender. In these
cases, there is a significant and strong increase in the likelihood of an individual
voting for a candidate.
Discussion
Through several analyses, this paper has shown that senators and Senate candidates experience benefits in terms of constituency recognition and approval and
electoral outcomes from increased investment in social media. While not all of the
theoretical hypotheses of this research were confirmed, the analyses show in what
conditions senators and Senate candidates are most likely to experience benefits from
both social media presence and activity.
The first analysis showed that the benefits sitting senators receive from increased
social media engagement are entirely based on social media activity rather than social
media presence. While the increases in constituency recognition and approval from
increased levels of Twitter activity for senators in the 114th Congress are small, they
are consistently positive and statistically significant. When compared to members of
the 112th and 113th Congresses, where all results were null, these findings indicate an
increase in the benefits senators see from increased social media activity over time. This
may be attributable to the increase in social media use over time (with the 112th Congress
beginning in 2011 and this study focusing on the 114th Congress in 2016) by legislators
and constituents alike.
The second analysis showed that Senate candidates receive benefits in terms of both
electoral outcomes and individual constituent vote choice as they increase both their
social media presence and activity. Most notably, it was shown that for each 5-tweet
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increase per month by a Senate candidate, the candidate experiences a one percentage
point increase in vote share.
This research also considered the potential for benefits that senators and Senate candidates experience from social media investment to be gendered. Among sitting senators, female senators are slightly more likely than male senators to be recognized and
approved of by their constituents regardless of senator social media engagement. However, among Senate candidates a distinct gender gap in the benefit received from social
media activity is seen, with the gap decreasing as female candidates increase their Twitter activity when compared to their male counterparts.
It is important to recognize the limitations of the analyses conducted within this
research. Beginning with problems of data collection and availability, there are important questions about whether the data collected is truly representative of the social
media investment by senators and Senate candidates. This research uses Twitter activity as its predominant measure of social media activity. This measure is based on data
collected from each individual Twitter profile as outlined in the Data and Methodology
section of this paper. However, there are important measurement errors likely present
within this research because of the non-permanency of social media behaviors. Individual actions on social media, as well as entire social media profiles, can be deleted. This
creates a situation in which the certainty of the behaviors of these individuals on social
media is fairly low. It is incredibly likely that the measure of average Twitter activity (the
average number of tweets a senator or candidate posts per month) is not representative
of all their Twitter activity, as they have possibly deleted several posts, particularly if
they have been on the platform for several years. However, the current limitations of
data availability about political uses of social media in the U.S. make the data collected
for this research about senators and Senate candidates across several years the best data
currently available to examine the questions considered in this project.
There are also limitations on the measurement of constituency behavior because of
the nature of the CCES dataset. The questions asked in 2016 about social media use as
well as specific political actions on social media asked respondents whether they had
done the action within the last twenty-four hours. This small period of time specified in
the questions likely truncates the sample of both social media users and respondent’s
levels of political social media engagement. Future research on this topic could be
improved by conducting a survey meant to measure important factors of social media
engagements by constituents, as well as their recognition and approval of their senators
and their vote choice in elections.

Conclusions

This research has shown that while varied in magnitude, senators and Senate candidates experience benefits in terms of constituency recognition and approval and electoral outcomes from increased investment in social media. This research also showed
that benefits senators and Senate candidates experience from social media investment
are greater for men than women. These results have significant implications on both
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the understanding of political engagement of constituents and the political strategies
of legislators and candidates. Given that constituents are becoming increasingly more
likely to use social media as their main form of news acquisition, understanding the
way this news acquisition may involve direct engagement with their legislators and
the impact this may have on political engagement and efficacy is crucial. It is also
important for legislators and candidates to understand where they may best strategically invest in social media engagement to increase their constituency recognition and
approval as well as their probability of electoral success.
Further work on the benefits legislators and candidates receive from social media
investment should consider both the findings and the limitations of this research. Additional exploration of the social media activity of legislators and candidates should be
conducted. Potential research could examine both the frequency of engagement on
the part of the political figure and the engagement on the part of those within their
networks towards the political figure. This would give substantially more information
about the true social media activity of these individuals. It would also be beneficial to
examine the content of social media engagement to understand potential differences
in the benefit of social media investment based on the types of content legislators and
candidates are engaging with on their social media platforms.
Given the shown dramatic increase in the importance of social media in the 2016
congressional elections when compared to these elections in both 2012 and 2014, it is clear
that political uses of social media are becoming more influential. If social media continues
to increase in importance for both legislators and candidates, it will be crucial to understand the benefits that they may receive from investing in social media as well as what
types of social media investment are most likely to give these benefits.
NOTES
1. The CCES survey data from each year includes weighted variables to allow for a more nationally representative sample (Vavreck, 2008). Given that this research is looking specifically for
differences between individuals within state-level constituencies rather than a nationally representative sample these weights are not used in this study.
2. The majority of Senate candidate’s social media pages are archived within one week before
Election Day in each election. For a small portion of candidates, the closest archive was slightly
earlier with the furthest measurement being seventeen days prior to the election.
3. Preliminary analyses were conducted using social media activity on both Facebook and YouTube, all results showed no effect from activity on these platforms. This is also true for the models of Senate candidate social media activity.
4. Analyses were conducted for the 112th and 113th Congress as well. They showed similar results
in terms of both statistical and substantive significance.
5. Analyses of the effect of Senate candidate social media activity and presence were conducted for
the 2012 and 2014 congressional elections were conducted. These regressions showed predominately null results with no statistical or substantive significance.
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APPENDIX

Table 3: Senator and Senate Candidate Social Media Presence by Year
Senators
Facebook

Senate Candidates

Twitter

YouTube

Facebook

Twitter

YouTube

2012

82%

88%

91%

90%

97%

72%

2014

95%

97%

85%

93%

100%

83%

2016

97%

100%

100%

100%

98%

59%

Table 4: Social Media Data Collection by Platform
Facebook

Twitter

YouTube

Presence

X

X

X

Years Present

X

X

X

Number of Followers

-

X

X

Number of Posts

-

X

-

Number of Views

-

-

X
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Table 5: Logistic Regressions of the Effect of Senator
Social Media Presence
(1)

(2)

(3)

VARIABLES

Senator Name
Recall

Senator Party Identification

Senator
Approval

Senator Social Media Presence

-0.209***
(0.0786)

-0.0776
(0.0730)

-0.0797
(0.0666)

Res. Social Media Use

-0.421***
(0.0229)

-0.311***
(0.0207)

-0.118***
(0.0203)

Res. Political Social Media Use

0.305***
(0.00716)

0.246***
(0.00623)

0.0812***
(0.00555)

Senator Republican

0.371***
(0.0191)

0.359***
(0.0170)

-0.282***
(0.0163)

Respondent Republican

-0.0696***
(0.0224)

-0.102***
(0.0193)

-0.556***
(0.0185)

Partisan Match

-

2.042***
(0.0243)

2.247***
(0.0171)

Senator Male

-0.235***
(0.0214)

-0.308***
(0.0188)

-0.170***
(0.0178)

Respondent Male

0.629***
(0.0202)

0.518***
(0.0179)

0.184***
(0.0169)

Gender Match

0.0447**
(0.0200)

0.0677***
(0.0176)

0.0755***
(0.0166)

Respondent White

0.121***
(0.0192)

0.188***
(0.0173)

0.149***
(0.0175)

Respondent Age

-0.0407***
(0.000576)

-0.0418***
(0.000519)

-0.0129***
(0.000472)

Respondent Income

0.116***
(0.00292)

0.110***
(0.00260)

0.0313***
(0.00212)

State Fixed Effects?

YES

YES

YES

Constant

80.32***
(1.162)

81.79***
(1.047)

24.47***
(0.951)

73,292
101,298
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

101,298

Observations
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Table 6: Regression of the Effect of Candidate Social Media Presence and Activity on Vote
Share and Race Results
VARIABLES

(1)
Vote Share

(2)
Race Won

(3)
Vote Share

(4)
Race Won

Candidate Social Media Presence

15.24***
(3.041)

2.612***
(0.682)

-

-

Candidate Twitter Activity

-

-

0.228***
(0.0445)

0.0287***
(0.0110)

Candidate Male

0.945
(3.120)

-0.144
(0.762)

5.025
(3.501)

0.453
(0.702)

Candidate Republican

4.359
(3.222)

1.424**
(0.672)

5.290
(3.382)

1.179**
(0.586)

Candidate Incumbency

18.88***
(3.291)

-

20.33***
(3.430)

-

State Fixed Effects?

YES

YES

YES

YES

Constant

5.199
(7.829)

-7.365***
(1.965)

31.71***
(3.817)

-2.013**
(0.805)

Observations

63

63

62

62

R-squared

0.352
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX 2
CCES Variables and Coding
Case ID (All Years)

coded: continuously

Abbreviation of State of Respondent (All Years)
coded: string

Birth Year of Respondent (All Years)
coded: continuously

Gender of Respondent (All Years)

coded: binary (1=Male, 2=Female)

Education of Respondent (All Years)
coded:

1= No High School

2= High School Graduate
3= Some College

4= Associates Degree

5= Bachelor’s Degree
6=Post-Grad

8/9=Skipped/Not Asked

Race of Respondent (All Years)
coded:
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1= White
2=Black

3=Hispanic
4=Asian

5=Native American
6=Mixed
7=Other

8=Middle Eastern

98/99=Skipped/Not Asked

Party of Respondent (All Years)

Coded: Democratic/Republican/Independent

Party Recall/Name Recall Senator 1 (All Years)
Coded:

1= Never Heard of
2=Republican
3=Democrat

4=Other/Independent
5=Not sure

8/9=Skipped/Not Asked

recoded: 0=Never Heard Of (1), 1= Any Choice (2,3,4,5)
Choices 8/9 omitted.

Party Recall/Name Recall Senator 2 (All Years)
Coded:

1= Never Heard of
2=Republican
3=Democrat

4=Other/Independent
5=Not sure

8/9=Skipped/Not Asked

recoded: 0=Never Heard Of (1), 1= Any Choice (2,3,4,5)
Choices 8/9 omitted.

Approve of Senator 1 (All Years)
Coded:

1= Strongly Approve
2= Approve

3=Disapprove

4=Strongly Disapprove
5=Never Heard Of

8/9=Skipped/Not Asked
Choices 5,8,&9 omitted.

Approve of Senator 2 (All Years)
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		Coded:

		1= Never Heard of
2=Republican

3=Disapprove

4=Strongly Disapprove
5=Never Heard Of

8/9=Skipped/Not Asked
Choices 5,8,&9 omitted.

Party of Senator 1 (All Years)

Coded: Democratic/Republican/Independent

Party of Senator 2 (All Years)

Coded: Democratic/Republican/Independent

Gender of Senator 1 (All Years)

Coded: binary (1=Male, 2=Female)

Gender of Senator 2 (All Years)

Coded: binary (1=Male, 2=Female)

2016 Media Use Questions

Each of the following questions asks respondents if they have engaged with a specific media

platform in the last 24 hours.
Blog

Coded: binary (1=Yes, 2=No)

Television

Coded: binary (1=Yes, 2=No)

Newspaper

Coded: binary (1=Yes, 2=No)

Radio

Coded: binary (1=Yes, 2=No)

Social Media

Coded: binary (1=Yes, 2=No)

None

Coded: binary (1=Yes, 2=No)

All coding for the 2016 media use questions were recoded to a 0/1 binary with 1 = Yes and 0

= No.

2016 Political Social Media Engagement Questions

Each of the following questions asks respondents if they have engaged with politics on social

media in various ways in the last 24 hours. These questions were only asked of individuals who
identified they had engaged with social media in the last 24 hours in the media use questions.
Posted a story, photo, video or link about politics.
Coded:
1 = Yes
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2 = No

9 = Not Asked

Posted a comment about politics.
Coded:
1 = Yes
2 = No

9 = Not Asked

Read a story or watched a video about politics.
Coded:
1 = Yes
2 = No

9 = Not Asked

Followed a political event.
Coded:
1 = Yes
2 = No

9 = Not Asked

Forwarded a story, photo, video or link about politics to friends.
Coded:
1 = Yes
2 = No

9 = Not Asked

All coding for the 2016 media use questions was used to create a measurement of political social
media engagement based on a sum of the number of ways an individual behaved politically on
social media.
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Inter-Female Hostility:
Attractiveness and Femininity vs.
Likeability
Savannah Henshaw, Lydia Estes, and Lauren Olsen

Introduction

Gender discrimination in business and politics is not a new phenomenon. Stories
about the gender gap, feminist movements, and the glass ceiling have peppered the news
since the women’s movement began, and, until recently, people have generally blamed
men for this inequality. However, research suggests that women actually play a significant role in perpetuating the gender gap due to a concept known as female hostility (Loya,
Cowan, and Walters 2006). Female hostility is a destructive comparison mentality women
sometimes exhibit when they feel inferior to another woman in some way. Examples of
this mentality include: “If she is pretty, I’m not;” “If she is successful, I am a failure;” and
“If she is smart, I am dumb.” By comparing themselves to each other in this way, women
inadvertently foster a mindset of competition that destroys relationships among them.
While many factors could influence this mentality, we focused specifically on physical
appearance and its effect on female hostility. Our experiment attempted to answer the
following question: what is the relationship between a woman’s physical appearance
and her perceived likeability among other women? Specifically, we investigated whether
women were more likely to ascribe negative traits to a female candidate if she is perceived
as attractive. Using a simple survey, we studied the behavior of 139 women and found
that attractiveness is negatively related to likeability among female voters at a 95 percent
confidence level.

Female Hostility and Attractiveness in Politics

Our research question and design was based on an intriguing field of research
within political science that investigates why women are underrepresented in Congress. Research in this field has demonstrated interesting relationships between attrac67
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tiveness (femininity), gender, and success in politics. For example, despite multiple
feminist movements and millions of women seeking representation in Congress, only
20 percent of federal legislators are female (Center for American Women and Politics 2017). Although many women advocate for female voices to represent them in
Congress, recent polls show that U.S. women prefer men in positions of leadership
(Litwan 2017; Ferber, Huber, and Spitze 1979). The obvious contradiction between
what women say and how they vote has played a significant role in the underrepresentation of women in Congress.
For decades, research has shown that women are more hostile to each other than
they are to men (Bleske-Recheck and Lighthill 2010; Chelser 2009; Gaitskill 2006; Haas
and Gregory 2005; Jack 2009; Simmons 2002; Tulshyan 2012). In fact, from an early age,
women begin demonstrating aggression and hostility almost exclusively to their female
peers (Chesler 2009; Simmons 002). Women judge more attractive females to be less trustworthy; they threaten the resources and opportunities of their peers and create a lack of
trust in other women (Gatskill 2006). As a result, women are much harsher critics of their
female colleagues and, in many cases, they endorse gender-stereotypes more enthusiastically than their male counterparts (Ellemers, Van den Heuvel, de Gilder, Maas, and
Bonvini 2004). This comparison and competition among females encourages women to
succeed by elevating themselves above other women in the workplace and perpetuating gender inequalities among their inferiors. This pattern of separation and subjugation
among professional women is known as the queen bee syndrome (Ibid.). It causes women
to perceive assertiveness in other women as negative and augments feelings of distrust
in female leadership (Haas and Gregory 2005; Mathiason 2010). This environment of
competition can cause an attractive woman to decline in social status and popularity
among her female friends and colleagues (Haas and Gregory 2005; Loya, Cowan, and
Walters 2006; Simmons 2002). Though ample research has investigated the way successful women perceive and react to other women, little has been done to evaluate how those
women perceive and react to their successful female colleagues. In this paper, we hope to
address this gap.
In addition to the queen bee syndrome, the relationship between political success
and attractiveness plays an important role in our research. In politics today, many citizens
are poorly informed about candidates’ qualifications or views. Unfortunately, this often
leaves appearance as a primary factor for election success (Atkinson, Enos, and Hill 2009;
King and Leigh 2009; Rosar, Klein, and Becker 2007; Martin 2014). Not only are attractive
politicians more likely to be elected and supported by their constituents, but handsome
and pretty politicians get away with unethical behavior while their less attractive counterparts are punished (Stockemer, Prain, and Moscardelli 2016). The voter population has
repeatedly given their support to candidates who are well dressed, carefully coiffed, and
genetically blessed. This phenomenon is not manifested exclusively in politics; in nearly
every aspect of work, success is positively correlated with how well a person conforms to
cultural beauty standards (Hamermesh 2011).
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There is ample evidence that positively links hostility among women to attractiveness and femininity as well as to attractiveness and electoral success. Social scientists
have thoroughly investigated the relationship between physical appearance and election results, but there have been insufficient studies about the influence of gender on this
trend. To fill this void, we sought to combine previous scholarship by connecting female
hostility and attractiveness to electoral success.

Attractiveness and Likeability Defined

We hypothesized that as a female candidate’s attractiveness increased, her perceived likeability among other women would decrease. We planned to test our theory
by manipulating the attractiveness of a female candidate and using a survey to measure her perceived likeability among female voters. In order to test this accurately, we
needed to have clear definitions of our variables. Our primary independent variable
was attractiveness, which we defined as the physical trait in an individual that is visually appealing to others. We operationally defined attractiveness by how well a person
conforms to traditional beauty standards through the use of makeup. Beauty standards
change constantly and vary by country and culture; however, the use of cosmetics has
consistently been associated with higher levels of perceived “attractiveness, femininity, and sexiness” across borders and nations (Narang 2013). Research has suggested
that the use of makeup positively reinforces sex-role stereotypes and is used regularly
around the world as a method for women to appear and feel more attractive and
feminine (Cox and Glick 1982; Miller and Cox 1982). These studies linking makeup
and female attractiveness or femininity are abundant and reliable. In addition, using
makeup allowed us to present the same political candidate in both treatments to avoid
unnecessary bias in our results; because beauty is subjective, using different models as
our political candidate would have created an enormous bias within our subject pool.
Although makeup application is not the only method of measuring attractiveness and
femininity, it was the best measure of the variable for our purposes.
In this experiment, we defined our dependent variable, likeability, as positive reactions to an individual. We measured this variable operationally by asking survey participants to rank the candidate’s likeability using a Likert scale of one to ten. We also
tested phrases that national public opinion polls typically associate with positive or
negative attributes of politicians, such as informed, trustworthy, and qualified (Botti
2014). Using these phrases, we focused the participants’ attention on what they liked
and disliked about the woman specifically as a politician. Each participant rated the
candidate on a scale of one to ten for different positive and negative attributes. We then
looked at how likeable they rated her, which we used as our dependent variable to
perform our statistical analysis.

Experimental Design

Our experimental design included a treatment group, a placebo group, and a control group. Based on common statistical norms, we needed at least thirty participants
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for each group in order to achieve statistical power, with ninety participants overall. To
find these participants, we used a script to personally invite our Facebook friends
to take a survey, which they could complete at their convenience (see Appendix—A). We
invited people from various socioeconomic classes to participate to make the sample as
representative as possible. Using this method, we gathered data from about 139 women
ages eighteen and older. We acknowledge that the group may not have been an accurate
representation of the general public, but it did give us a basic idea of how plausible our
theory was.
At the beginning of the survey, we asked participants to give their consent to be
part of our research and to answer a series of demographic questions (see Appendix—
B). Though we were explicitly studying the effects of attractiveness or femininity on
our outcome measure, we were also interested in how differences among several subgroups in our sample affected our results. The subgroups we evaluated included age,
employment status, and political affiliation. The distribution of these subgroups is
shown in Table 1. By analyzing this demographic information, we measured the influence of these subgroups on our results.

Table 1

Following the demographic questions, each participant listened to a twenty-second
clip of a speech by a fictional female politician running for Senate (see Appendix—C).
To avoid partisan bias, we chose a mock stump speech written by two former professional speechwriters—one Republican and one Democrat (Swaim and Nussbaum
2016). We also chose a section of the speech that focused on neutral topics, such as
improving America, without addressing controversial or partisan issues.
All participants listened to the same speech, but each group saw a different
screen while doing so. The placebo group saw a blank page. The control group saw
a picture of a female candidate with unstyled hair and no makeup (see Appendix—
E). The treatment group saw a picture of the same woman, but with well-kept hair
and professional makeup (see Appendix—F). As we explained in the definitions section, we selected makeup as our treatment because females without cosmetics are
typically viewed as less attractive or less feminine. For our placebo, the blank screen
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eliminated any bias based on levels of attractiveness and femininity. Using the blank
screen forced the participants to focus exclusively on the audio clip from the politician
rather than on any visual cues. In this way, we determined how the candidate’s physical appearance, rather than the content of the speech, affected participants’ opinions.
After listening to the speech, participants ranked how likeable the candidate
was using a simple Likert scale from one to ten. We used their responses to this
question as our dependent variable to gauge how the women participating in the
survey viewed the potential candidate. Finally, the participants answered several open-ended, qualitative questions about the candidate. These questions gave
us more insight about how participants felt toward the candidate and why (see
Appendix—D).

Causes and Effects of Female Hostility

Based on this experimental design, we hypothesized that as the female candidate’s attractiveness increased, her perceived likeability among other women would
decrease. This hypothesis was based on the evidence that female competition causes
women to feel threatened by attractive females (Haas and Gregory 2005). As previously
mentioned, this pattern is referred to as the queen bee syndrome. If a woman perceives
another woman as attractive and successful, she is more prone to judge that female
candidate according to traditional gender stereotypes (Ellemers, Van den Heuvel, de
Gilder, Maas, and Bonvini 2004). For example, women will perceive attractive women
as unintelligent, unambitious, or unassertive (Huddy and Terkilsden 2016; Ellemers,
Van den Heuvel, de Gilder, Maass, and Bonvini 2004). Once women have attributed
these stereotypes to the candidate, they subconsciously judge her as less qualified and
will not vote for her.

Statistical Analysis of Likeability

To reliably assess this hypothesis, we ran several statistical tests in order to determine the impact of each of the treatment conditions as well as other variables on the
candidate’s likeability. Our survey included questions regarding three other subgroups
in our sample that could have influenced the perceived likeability of the candidate.
The subgroups we measured were age, employment status, and political affiliation.
We asked about age to determine if women in various age groups responded differently to successful women. For example, older participants closer to the candidate’s
age might experience stronger levels of female hostility, because they feel more threatened by her than younger participants do. We also investigated how political affiliation affected participants’ opinions by asking participants to indicate which political
party they identified with. Different political parties have different perceptions about
feminism and gender equality, which could influence participants’ responses. Finally,
we evaluated differences in socioeconomic status by asking about employment status.
Participants who are currently working might feel a more competitive response toward
the candidate than a stay-at-home mom would, because they are competing for the
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same opportunities and resources. However, in our analysis of these subgroups, we
found no statistically significant differences between these groups. This suggests there
is no relationship between age, employment, or political affiliation and likeability (See
Appendix—G).
After evaluating the subgroups, we began our analysis by using a t-test to compare the makeup treatment to the no makeup control. The results are included in
Table 2. The difference between the mean likeability score for both groups was .80,
which had a p-value of .036. Thus, we can confirm at the 95 percent confidence level
that there was a statistically significant difference between the two groups. Additionally, with a p-value of .018, we can confirm at the 95 percent confidence level that
there was not only a difference, but the mean for the makeup group was statistically
lower than the mean of the no makeup group. Based on this evidence, we can reject
the null hypothesis that there was no difference between the two groups.

Table 2

To further investigate this relationship, we also compared the makeup group to
the no makeup and placebo groups combined. The results of this t-test are included
in Table 3. As it shows, there is a surprising difference between this test and the last
test. When comparing the makeup group to the no makeup group, we found statistically
significant evidence that the groups were different. However, when we added the placebo group, the difference was no longer significant. This suggests that the placebo group
was more similar than the no makeup group was to the makeup group. Though we cannot confirm any causal reasons behind this discovery, further research could investigate
them. It is possible that the women listening to the speech with no picture were imagining
the speaker’s physical appearance as they listened and expected that she would be wearing makeup. Additionally, perhaps not wearing makeup actually makes the candidate
more likeable, rather than our original theory that wearing makeup makes the candidate
less likeable. None of this speculation can be confirmed through our experiment, but it
does provide opportunities for further research.
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Table 3

The information we have gathered from the two t-tests and the regression of our
subgroups have significantly added to the current literature on female hostility. The
candidate was statistically less likeable when she was wearing makeup, meaning there is
a significant relationship between attractiveness and likeability. We can confidently reject
the null hypothesis that the candidate was equally likeable whether she was wearing
makeup or not. Though the t-test that included the placebo group was not statistically different from the makeup group, future research with a larger sample size and
improved methods of testing could achieve greater statistical power to investigate
this relationship more thoroughly.

Qualitative Analysis of Likeability

Our qualitative data, like our quantitative data, demonstrated that there is a correlation between attractiveness, femininity, and likeability. Analyzing participants’
responses to our survey’s open-ended questions helped us discern the rationale behind
the participants’ perceptions. While these responses are individual and do not represent the respondents in general, they are valuable, because they give insight into our
quantitative results.
To evaluate these mechanisms, we asked participants to give advice to the candidate and to identify what they liked and disliked about her. We avoided asking questions regarding the candidate’s political views in order to collect information regarding
the participants’ overall perception of the candidate. The responses to these questions
helped us identify the relationship between hostility, femininity, and attractiveness by
illustrating the factors that affected likeability. They also indicated whether participants
subconsciously stereotyped the candidate with makeup according to the traditional
gender stereotypes as discussed earlier.
To accurately distinguish the differences in the qualitative data, we started by
identifying comments that appeared across all groups and exempted them from our
analysis. Most of the responses generated by the placebo group focused on the disin73
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genuous nature of the candidate’s speech. In an attempt to avoid party biases, we
chose a speech that was vague and nonpartisan. Due to the general nature of the
speech, participants in the control group thought the candidate sounded “robotic and
fake” and suggested that she include more specifics. Comparing these comments to
the treatment and control groups, we found that they appeared consistently across all
groups. Similarly, when asked what they liked about the candidate, participants in
all groups mentioned her “friendly” nature and “kind” demeanor. These comments
illustrated several limitations of our experimental design. If we were to repeat this
study in the future, we would alter the instructions, speech, and questions to guide
the survey participants to respond about the candidate herself, not about her political opinions. Because these remarks appeared frequently in all groups, we assumed
these comments originated from other influences and not from the effects of the treatment. Accordingly, we ignored comments that appeared in responses across all of
the groups and those regarding the content of the speech. We also recognize that one
person’s comment does not speak for the entire group. By focusing exclusively on
the differences between the groups, we were able to identify comments that provide
insight pertaining to specific individuals’ experiences within each group.
We began our qualitative analysis by first evaluating responses that specifically mentioned physical appearance. As explained earlier, we hypothesized that
attractive candidates would be more likely to be perceived as untrustworthy or
incompetent due to intrasexual competition among females. We anticipated this
competition would cause participants to feel hostility toward the candidate and
attribute these negative feelings to the candidate’s appearance. Therefore, if participants cited physical appearance as an influential factor in their opinion of the
candidate, this would indicate a causal relationship between appearance and likeability. The most interesting comment that mentioned physical appearance was one
woman’s response about the candidate with makeup: “She doesn’t really look the
part of a politician. I’d probably take her more seriously if she was brunette.” This
comment strongly suggested that the participant viewed the candidate as less qualified because of her appearance. By implying that she judged the candidate more
stereotypically because of her hair color, she illustrated the competitive mentality
that results from female hostility.
Another response that mentioned physical appearance shed additional light on
the connection between attractiveness, femininity, and likeability. The participant said,
“You seem nice, but perhaps some light makeup will make you look more polished and
less granola.” Initially, this comment seemed to contradict our hypothesis—this woman
noticed the candidate’s appearance and suggested she change it, just like the woman who
commented about the candidate’s hair color. On the surface, both participants appeared
to have the same reaction. However, as we compared the two responses, we noticed an
intriguing contradiction. Both comments suggested the candidate change her appearance in some way. However, in the first comment, the participant implied that the can74
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didate’s appearance negatively impacted her opinion of the candidate’s capability. The
second comment, however, only suggested that she change her appearance to look more
polished, not to seem more capable. Though the reason for the participant’s response is
unclear, it is interesting that she commented on physical appearance rather than the candidate’s other characteristics.
Though the first two responses supported our hypothesis, another woman who
saw the woman with makeup gave a different perspective. She said, “[The candidate]
seemed inviting to talk to. I think her appearance in the picture helped illustrate that.”
This was an intriguing response because it demonstrated another possible aspect of
female hostility that we did not anticipate: female hostility could affect women in
varying degrees. A woman’s susceptibility to female hostility could potentially be
weaker or stronger depending on her confidence level, life circumstances, or personal
goals. Further research could examine the link between a woman’s personal confidence and how strongly she experiences female hostility.
The qualitative responses we analyzed demonstrated important insights concerning the way individual women experience female hostility. They also provoked questions we would like to investigate further regarding why different women experience
hostility differently. Though these results are not universally applicable, they do provide important insights to our quantitative findings about the relationship between
attractiveness and female hostility.

Limitations

Though we have carefully designed our experiment and analyzed the results, we
do recognize that all research inherently has limitations. In our case, we experienced
limitations due to the need for ambiguity about the subject of our research. We have
attempted to mitigate potential errors in our research by identifying and addressing
these limitations individually.
One potential limitation was that likeability depends on more than simple levels of attractiveness and femininity. Some participants could have rated the candidate
based on factors besides appearance, such as political biases, tone of voice, or other
influences controlled for through our randomization. Our experiment sought to measure implicit biases; as a result, participants could not know the intent of the research,
because it would have influenced their responses. Consequently, our questions elicited
some vague or irrelevant comments in our qualitative data. We expected participants
to discuss the candidate’s character and ascribe negative or positive attributes due to
judgments about her physical appearance. However, some participants inferred that
the survey intended to measure political affiliation and gave answers regarding the
content of the speech instead of the candidate herself. If we could conduct this experiment again, we would explicitly state that we were not measuring political values
to discourage participants from responding about the speech’s content. This would
encourage participants to base their responses on the candidate’s likeability and personality instead of on her political affiliation or policies.
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Similarly, the intrinsic limits of quantitative and qualitative data posed another
potential problem. While quantitative data provides statistical information, it does
not explain the causal mechanisms behind these numbers. Conversely, qualitative
responses do reveal causal mechanisms behind individual participants’ responses but
do not necessarily represent the population as a whole. In spite of these limitations,
using both types of responses helped us understand the relationship between attractiveness, femininity, and likeability. The quantitative data helped us evaluate the direction and magnitude of this relationship, and the qualitative data helped us identify
the causal logic behind it. Our qualitative data allows us to infer a relationship, but we
cannot definitively confirm it for the entire sample.
Finally, one of the greatest limitations of our research is our sample. Because of limited resources, we only administered the survey through our personal social networks.
Our acquaintances are possibly skewed toward our community’s political leanings
and are not representative of women from a normally distributed socioeconomic and
geographic population. Thus, if we were to conduct this experiment again, we would
survey a larger, more random, and normally distributed sample. Although many limitations restricted our design, our experiment helped us obtain important data regarding female hostility.

Conclusion

In spite of our limitations, we found that our quantitative data reflected a statistically significant relationship between attractiveness and femininity and likeability. We
found statistically significant evidence that the candidate without makeup was more
likeable than the candidate with, and we rejected the null hypothesis. In addition,
our qualitative responses told an important story regarding the relationship between
female hostility, attractiveness and femininity, and electoral success. For example, the
participants in the makeup group evaluated the candidate much more negatively and
stereotypically than those in the control group. Various comments demonstrated the
role of attractiveness and femininity in this relationship.
Though our results were compelling and informative, we have only begun to
examine the full implications of female hostility. The shocking void in current research
must be filled for women to be represented equally in politics. Other factors, such as
confidence and intelligence, could influence female competition. Further questions we
could investigate include the following: Would women who are competing directly
against each other dislike their more attractive competitors? Does the reaction of
women to other attractive women vary from culture to culture? How does personal
confidence affect variation in female hostility?
Though more research is needed, our findings have certainly added to the current literature on female hostility and have given us insight into what more we can
study. Based on our compelling results, efforts to balance the ratio of men to women
in Congress need to change and refocus. Thus far, most of these movements have been
focused on influencing male voters, but if a woman’s attractiveness and femininity
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truly does decrease the likelihood that other women will vote for her, female hostility
may be the new key to shattering the glass ceiling.
APPENDIX
A. Script for inviting people to participate in the study
Hi ___,

I hope you’re doing well. For one of my classes at BYU, we are researching elections and voter

perceptions of candidates and we have to gather data using a survey. Would you mind taking a
5-minute survey to help me gather the data we need? I would appreciate your help so much.
Thank you in advance,
____

B. Consent

This study is being conducted by Lydia Estes, Lauren Olsen, and Savannah Henshaw as

part of a political science course. We are studying what people look for in their political candi-

dates. If you choose to proceed with this survey, we will introduce you to a potential candidate
to gauge interest and future support for them in the upcoming state Senate elections. You will

listen to a 30-second message and answer a few questions about how well they come across

to the public. The survey should take no more than five minutes of your time. All information
will be kept confidential and anonymous. Participation is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to
participate altogether or withdraw from the survey at any time. If you give your consent, click
next. We appreciate your time!
C. Script for Speech

You’re not here for a lot of political rhetoric. You didn’t show up to hear a lot of talk about

how things could be different and better than what they are. You’re here because you’re done with

politics. You’re here because the promise of American democracy—the promise of opportunity for
all— remains unfulfilled for too many.

If you paid any attention to this election, or the last one, or the one before that, you can be

forgiven for thinking that our problems are insurmountable, that there’s just nothing we agree on
enough to get it done. But that’s not true.

There’s more that unites us than divides us. And while elections focus on the divide, I want to

focus on what we share. Because—yes—there’s sacred ground. But for each of us, I believe, there’s
also common ground. And that’s the ground we need to cultivate.

We know we can make progress. But for us to do something, I need you to do something. I need

you to vote. I need you to get your friends and neighbors to vote. I ask you to stand with me. Join me.
And together we’ll build the country we know we can be.

Because remember: This election isn’t about any one candidate. It’s about where we’re

headed as a nation, and I believe we’re headed toward economic freedom, self-governance,
strength abroad and prosperity at home. Thank you.
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D. Survey Questions

1. What is your age?

a. 18–28 b. 29–38 c. 39–48 d. 49–58 e. 59–68 f. 69–78 g. 79–88

2. What is your annual household income?
*College students married and unmarried signify your parents’ household income
a. $0–29,000 b. $30,000–50,000 c. $60,000–80,000 d. $80,000–100,000
e. $100,000–$200,000 f. $200,000+ g. prefer not to answer

3. Are you currently

a. Employed for wages b. Self-employed c. Out of work and looking for work
d. Out of work but not curently looking for work e. A homemaker f. A student
g. Retired h. Unable to work

4. What Political Party do you most identify with?

a. Republican b. Democratic c. Independent d. Green e. Other f. None

5. The candidate speaking below is running for Senator in your state. Please click the link below

to hear a portion from her speech. In answering the questions that follow, please assume the
candidate agrees with your political views and shares the same values.
[Random assignment of picture one, picture two, or no picture]
[audio clip]

6. Select how strongly you agree with each statement. (on a scale of 1–10)
This person is friendly.

This person is likeable.
This person is warm.

This person is approachable.

I would ask this person for advice or for help.
I would like this person as my representative.
I would like to be friends with this person.
I would trust this person.

This person is similar to me.

This person is knowledgeable.
This person is entitled.
This person is bossy.

This person is annoying.

This person seems uninformed about important issues.
This person is arrogant.

This person appears indecisive.

This person appears to be easily swayed.

This person presented their message poorly.
This person is a poor leader.

This person is unqualified to run for office

7. What three words best describe the potential candidate?

8. What advice do you have for the candidate if they were to run for office?
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9. What political party do you think this candidate belongs to? Why?
10. What do you like about the candidate?

11. What do you dislike about the candidate?

E. Photo One

G. Subgroup Regression

		

Table 4
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Who is My Neighbor? Identifying
Epistemic Peers among Polarized
Communities
Alex Hoagland

While philosophers have extensively discussed the problem of disagreement
among epistemic peers, they have generally set aside the question of identifying these
same peers. However, especially in the context of questions of politics and religion,
the labeling of others’ opinions as important or meaningless is particularly relevant.
In such a situation of disagreement, where the correct1 opinion is not immediately
apparent yet has significant moral weight, whose opinions are worth hearing and
under what conditions can we exclude other opinions?
Before beginning a thorough exploration of this topic, I will present some terminology used frequently by philosophers in this conversation.2 A person is considered
your epistemic peer in a subject or issue if, loosely speaking, that person is “as good
as you at evaluating claims [related to the issue]” (Elga 2006). That is, in performing
a complicated mathematical calculation, I would count as an epistemic peer someone who 1) had equivalent mathematical training as I have, 2) had about equivalent
experience performing this type of calculation as I have, and 3) was about as likely as
I was to make mistakes in the course of the calculation. My peer is someone whom,
once I set aside my own reasoning, I think is just as likely as I am to get the “right”
answer to a certain question. A person who is more likely to solve the problem correctly than I am would be my epistemic superior, while one who is less likely to do so
is my epistemic inferior.
The classification of a person as an epistemic peer (or superior or inferior) is issuespecific. While I may be inclined, for example, to see a colleague as an epistemic peer
in mathematical questions, this labeling does not necessarily extend to any other issue.
I would not be under any obligation to classify my graduate advisor as an epistemic
superior in politics or religion, even while I may consider her my superior in our field
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of research. It is therefore possible—even likely—for a person to fill the roles of epistemic
inferior, peer, and superior in relation to another person across a continuum of issues.
The question of epistemic disagreement, then, is as follows: given that I hold an
opinion p about an issue and subsequently discover that someone I consider an epistemic peer holds the opinion ~p, how should I alter 1) my belief or 2) my confidence
in that belief? There are several hypotheses that attempt to answer this question. For
simplicity, I will discuss the two main camps. Those ascribing to the Equal Weight
View (Ibid.) assert that you should give your peer’s conclusion equal weight as your
own—that is, “you should think that the two of you are equally likely to be correct” (Ibid., p. 13). On the other hand, those who deny this view assert that there are
some instances in which it is appropriate, even upon discovering that your peer has
adopted the opinion ~p, to “stick to your guns” and continue to maintain your confidence in your original supposition of p (Schoenfield 2014, p. 3).
Neither of these views, however, gives any indication regarding who qualifies as
an epistemic peer. Therefore, I will take a few steps back in order to answer this question, and then see what this implies about disagreement. This is particularly relevant in
issues that are non-mechanistic. Even when performing a complicated calculation, the
conditions for considering another person my epistemic peer seem relatively obvious.
On the other hand, when discussing the existence of God among a group, there are less
well-defined conditions. In fact, Elga discusses a case similar to this in his exposition of
the Equal Weights View:
Consider Ann and Beth, two friends who stand at opposite ends of the political spectrum. Consider the claim that abortion is morally permissible. Does Ann consider
Beth a peer with respect to this claim? That is: setting aside her own reasoning about
the abortion claim, and Beth’s contrary view about it, does Ann think Beth would be
just as likely as her to get things right? (2006, p. 21).
Elga asserts that the answer to this question is “no,” precisely because “by Ann’s
lights, Beth has reached wrong conclusions about most closely related questions,” such as
“whether human beings have souls, whether it is permissible to withhold treatment from
terminally ill infants, and whether rights figure prominently in a correct ethical theory”
(Ibid., pp. 21–22). Because the two differ on issues that are related to the abortion claim, but
somehow separate from the claim itself, each is unlikely to consider the other as her peer.
Elga follows this with a moral: “with respect to many controversial issues, the associates
who one counts as peers tend to have views that are similar to one’s own” (Ibid., p. 23).
Therefore, when looking specifically at what Elga calls “controversial issues”—but
which I will refer to as non-mechanistic issues3—one potential hypothesis about peer classification is Elga’s claim that we have an obligation to consider someone an epistemic
peer on an issue only if they share our opinions on it. I will refer to this hypothesis as
the community hypothesis, but I will claim that this hypothesis is problematic, especially
among political communities.
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The Problems of Polarization and Independence

Before explaining the theory’s flaws, let us assume it is true. In a world where
epistemic hierarchies are created by this thesis, disagreement among epistemic peers is
vacuously avoided (except in mechanistic cases)—I will never disagree with someone I
consider my epistemic peer. My opinion on an issue will be altered only by interactions
with epistemic superiors who hold opinions different from my own,4 in which case, I
will adopt theirs. Recall that an epistemic superior is more likely to arrive at the correct
conclusion than you are, this is a desirable result.
However, there is inconsistency in assuming the existence of epistemic superiors
with competing opinions in a system that excludes them from being your peer. Under
Elga’s view, Ann was not Beth’s epistemic peer, precisely because Beth could judge—on
the basis of fringe issues—that Ann had frequently come to the “wrong” conclusion. Beth
would thus consider Ann her epistemic inferior, rather than the other way around.
Under the community hypothesis, then, an agent either holds the same views as
you do or is your epistemic inferior, in which case you have no reason to regard their
opinion as even remotely valuable. With no reason to bend on any non-mechanistic
issues, disagreement then amounts to nothing except angry Facebook posts. This seems
to undermine an important function of disagreement, as implied in both Condorcet’s Jury
Theorem and the Median Voter Theorem: that of generating consensus. The community
hypothesis allows individuals to reinforce their own convictions with self-selected epistemic peers while simultaneously removing themselves from their opponents, eliminating the need for compromise altogether. This is the problem of polarization.
Other critiques of this hypothesis seem compelling.5 Consider one central problem in the abortion scenario: When Ann judges Beth based on her opinions on closely
related issues, she is judging Beth inferior on claims that 1) are not fully separable from
the issue at hand and 2) are not verifiable; therefore, they are not evidence of Beth’s
incompetence or irrationality. When considering non-mechanistic issues, such as politics, people tend to form opinions consistent across issues in order to minimize cognitive dissonance.6 Therefore, judging someone an epistemic peer (which asserts that
independent of your reasoning, a colleague is as likely to come to the right conclusion as
you are) requires you to set aside these ideologies and examine only traits, such as the
ability to think critically and rationally. By asserting that these “clusters of controversy”
determine an epistemic hierarchy, Elga asserts that disagreement implies inferiority
(Ibid, p. 23).
One potential rejection of the community hypothesis is that we have no special obligation to consider anyone an epistemic peer—call this the stand-alone hypothesis. Yet this
too is problematic. After all, it does seem right to conclude that a person who shares your
view on an issue and has no external qualifications for superiority or inferiority should
be considered your epistemic peer. Under these conditions, considering her a superior
would be to invalidate the independence of your opinion forming, while considering
her an inferior would be to invalidate hers. The stand-alone hypothesis thus seems to
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violate some core of individual opinion forming by not calling a duck a duck. Call this the
problem of independence—without some obligation to view members of a like-minded
community peers, these communities devolve into bandwagons.

Peer Classification Outside of Like-Minded Groups: The Conversation Hypothesis

As an alternative to both the community and stand-alone hypotheses, I propose a
middle ground: While we ought to consider those sharing our views as epistemic peers,7
there additionally exist circumstances under which we are obligated to consider those
outside of our like-minded communities as epistemic peers. My argument for this claim—
call it the conversation hypothesis—is summarized here:
1. Agent A considers agent B her epistemic inferior if and only if A is more
likely to reach the correct solution to I than is B. A similar definition holds
for epistemic superior.
2. With regard to an issue I, any agent must consider other agents either her epistemic inferior, superior, or peer.
3. An issue I is considered non-mechanistic or controversial if a third party possessing
the sum total of mankind’s knowledge could not assess the correct response to I.
4. A is more likely to reach the correct answer on an issue I if and only if A has better training, experience, evidence, or history8 than B.
5. When I is non-mechanistic, training and experience are irrelevant in determining
the likelihood that an agent will reach a correct conclusion. Similarly, a nonmechanistic I prohibits there being any history of correctness.
6. Therefore, if agents A and B share the same evidence E on a non-mechanistic
issue I, it is neither the case that B is an epistemic inferior to A, nor that A is an
epistemic inferior to B.
7. Thus, when two agents share the same body of evidence on a non-mechanistic
issue I, they are epistemic peers.
Premises 1–3 are definitional, and I take them as assumptions. Notice that the first is
simply a restatement of the definitions of superiority or inferiority as used by a wide base
of the philosophy of disagreement literature (e.g., Elga 2006 and Shoenfield 2014, among
others). The second statement provides a complete framework for the binary relation of
“epistemological knowledge” and follows immediately from the first definition. If I take
any other person and any issue I, that person is either more likely, less likely, or equally as
likely as I am to reach the correct solution to I. Therefore, that person must be exactly my
epistemic superior, inferior, or peer.
Premise 3 restricts our attention to the class of issues relevant to our discussion,
making it the most important definition. It is important to note that we are not considering issues that have no solution, but those that have no evidence-based or mechanistic
solutions. In general, these issues fall into two classes: moral issues and unanswered
questions. Elga’s abortion case is an excellent example of the first class, as the legality of
abortion depends almost entirely on the respective moral weights placed on a person’s
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freedom to choose and another person’s right to life.9 It may well be the case that, objectively, the freedom to choose ought to be given more moral weight than a person’s freedom to life, or it may be that no such objective ranking of moral weights exists. In either
case, no amount of knowledge or experience can equip a person to come to a foolproof
awareness of their existence or nonexistence, so the issue is non-mechanistic. Similarly,
some questions have objective answers that reside outside our current scope of knowledge; it is objectively true either that God exists or that he does not (but not both), but
completely impossible for any person to provide a proof of either result, even if that
person had access to the complete ken of human knowledge or experience. The class
of non-mechanistic issues, then, represents a wide swath of issues, including (among
other issues) important political questions related to same-sex marriage or the treatment of refugees. In a later section of this paper dedicated to responding to objections, I
will further refine this definition to classify exactly which moral questions belong in the
world of non-mechanistic issues.
Premise 4 is a collection of all possible ways one agent could label another as either
superior or inferior to them on an issue; I have chosen these categories from the relevant
literature on disagreement. No other categories appear to be relevant in determining
the likelihood of arriving at the correct response to an issue. While there are some objections (e.g., B may have access to an epistemic superior in the issue to whom A does
not, etc.), these can be handled readily by absorbing them into one of the categories
(for example, access to a knowledgeable source on I could be considered part of the
evidence E).
Premise 5 is the heart of the argument. Specifically, it asserts that in the class of
non-mechanistic issues to which I have restricted my attention, only evidence can create an epistemic hierarchy. As this is the most important premise in the argument, I will
attempt to present a thorough justification for its use. First, consider the roles of training
and experience, which are common heuristics in assigning another individual to the
role of epistemic superior or inferior. However, I claim that in the case of non-mechanistic issues, this reduces to a fallacious appeal to a false authority. Because a specific
issue, say the morality of abortion or the existence of God, is non-mechanistic, there is
no system of reasoning or training that has yielded a resolution to the issue. In such a
scenario, distinguishing between differences in training or experience is impossible.
Who is to say that a nurse who has performed hundreds of abortions is more or less
likely to understand the correct moral weights assigned to an abortion than a professor
of ethics, or that a physicist is more or less likely to be correct on the existence of God
than a priest? Neither the training nor the life experience of any of these four occupations can be considered comparable, but there does not exist a clear way to assert dominance of one over the other. Furthermore, given that no clear path to resolution exists, it
is not clear that years of experience or prestige of training would matter in assigning
value to a person’s opinion. If physics is not a confirmed path to understanding the
existence of God, why should Stephen Hawking have any more moral authority on
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the issue than a peruser of A Brief History of Time? For that matter, why should he have
any more authority than a layman with no knowledge of physics whatsoever? Once the
issue arises, it is self-perpetuating, and backward induction asserts that it is invalid in
any potential comparison based on training or experience.
Second, consider the role of history in examining a non-mechanistic issue. Suppose
that there was a history of correctness with regard to such an issue—were this the case,
it would be included in the sum total of man’s knowledge, and, therefore, reduced to a
mechanistic issue, as a correct solution is known and accessible. Therefore, the second
half of the premise follows merely from the definition of a non-mechanistic issue.
If, then, there are no other criteria by which a person can be labeled an epistemic
inferior on some class of issues except through evidence, it follows that two agents who
share the same body of evidence each ought to consider the other as their epistemic peer.
Notice that this argument solves both the problems of polarization and independence: If
these claims are true, and an agent outside of our community has the same evidence we
do (even though he has reached a different conclusion), we still ought to consider him
our peer. Similarly, those in our like-minded communities (that share evidences as one of
their principal functions) will be considered our peers. Additionally, this argument has
several critical implications, which I will explore in the subsequent section.

Application of the Conversation Hypothesis to Disagreement

Up to this point, I have been vague about the definition of the “correct” answer to an
issue, especially non-mechanistic issues, for which the notion of correctness seems particularly obscure. Notice, however, that one implication of this argument is that the Equal
Weights View leads to absurdity. Consider the case of Ann and Beth once more. Assuming, as Elga does, that Ann and Beth have had a lengthy conversation in which each has
shared her views and evidences, there is no other criterion to separate Ann and Beth
from peer ship. Yet the two have staunchly opposed opinions on the same issue and
(at least, after the discussion) evidence that there is no intuition suggesting either will be
dissuaded from her view.10 Were the Equal Weights View legitimate, each would have to
judge the other as equally likely to arrive at the correct conclusion, a process that would
force both parties into agnosticism about the issue of abortion. Thus, the Equal Weights
View, at least for non-mechanistic issues, for which hierarchy is impossible to form except
by evidence, seems to imply widespread skepticism about the murkier moral questions.
Many could argue—and indeed, have done so—that these are precisely the questions that need to be answered the most. Indeed, almost every question on political
policy can be reduced to a complicated question of balancing moral values.11 Given
that political policy questions (among others) require implementable solutions, skepticism is an undesirable goal. Therefore, it is unavoidable in non-mechanistic issues under
the Equal Weights View that situations exist when it is rational to stick to one’s original
opinion even in the face of an epistemic peer who disagrees with you. This is precisely
the hypothesis of Steadfastness. Additionally, this seems to imply12 a form of Working Permissivism. That is, even if non-mechanistic issues have unique, correct solutions (and the
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questions of existence and uniqueness are a matter for another paper entirely), it is not
irrational for two agents to share a body of evidence and reach different conclusions. I
will discuss important applications of this result in a later section. This result is interesting
for two principal reasons, depending on the type of non-mechanistic issue at hand: For
moral issues, it asserts that policy ought not to be based on unanimity, while for unanswered questions, it maximizes the chance of reaching a solution by jointly expanding the
base of evidence. A multiplicity of unchanging viewpoints may lead to policy inefficiencies—it may be the case, for instance, that our policies around abortion cycle depending
on fluctuations in a nation’s majority opinion. However, allowing for this variability creates a space for educated conversation amidst the noise of impossible conversion. For
moral issues, whose solutions are usually not theoretically attainable given any amount
of experimentation or knowledge, working permissivism yields an important implication in political conversation and policy: listening with compassion. For unanswered
questions, this is just as important but for a different reason. Allowing for the priest and
the physicist to share information while preserving their own views is critical for interdisciplinary studies and the pursuit of further knowledge. Given that no path of training is
more viable than another, allowing each to follow their own candidate path while learning from the triumphs and pitfalls of others increases the chance of success.

Response to Objections: Moral Absolutes and Subjective Evidence

I can see a few potential objections to this argument. The first major objection
is empirical and rests on the apparent preponderance of unacceptable responses to
non-mechanistic issues. Consider, for example, the issue of female infanticide and its
proponents—should not the conversation hypothesis allow agents who hold morally
repulsive views as epistemic inferiors? This objection can take two forms. The first is
a mere rephrasing of the community hypothesis with the question: Is there a threshold level of ideological difference after which I can label an agent my epistemic inferior? The second is a more puzzling question: Is there an objectively identifiable set of
opinions that are unacceptable on moral grounds?13 The answer to the first question
is an easy “no”; the epistemic hierarchy cannot be determined based on the distance
between opinions but must be based on the likelihood of correctness. To do anything
else would be to assert superiority in experience, training, or history, none of which is
valid in answering a non-mechanistic question. On the other hand, the second question is a more difficult one; to examine it further, I will formalize it. Two agents—A and
B—disagree on the issue of whether it is morally permissible to murder female infants
but share the same evidence E on the issue. If agent B believes that female infanticide is
acceptable, is agent A justified in labeling him an epistemic inferior?
It may seem immediately apparent that all issues of morality must be non-mechanistic; it appears that any arbiter possessing the totality of human knowledge would
be unable to answer correctly any moral question. However, this seems too hasty. For
example, it would appear to many that such an arbiter would clearly be able to identify
the objectionable nature of murder and could decisively state that murder is morally
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impermissible through an appeal to the human experience. If this is the case, then the
objection can be rectified by revising premise 3 to say:
3. Agent A considers agent B her epistemic inferior if and only if A is more likely
to reach the correct solution to I than is B, or if B has an opinion that requires the
violation of a mechanistic moral question (such as the legitimacy of murder).
This revision of premise 3 is also desirable in order to address a similar but perhaps
more general objection: one of extreme moral relativism. If we consider any moral issue
non-mechanistic, then any response to the current body of evidence is a viable one and
policy reflects merely the whims of the majority, whatever they may be. While I do not
wish to make any normative claims regarding theories of moral relativism, interpretations of the conversation hypothesis that reduce the illegality of murder to merely the
fact that more than 50 percent of the population favor not murdering others seems
dubious. It may seem that in some instances, moral questions can be answered by
enough human experience or experimentation—in such cases, the conversation would
not apply, because a moral hierarchy could be built around experience and training,
meaning that we need not be permissive about certain ideas, such as murder.
In order to respond fully to this criticism, then, we must address the question:
When can a moral issue safely be considered mechanistic, and when can it not? It is
likely that this is a question for future responses to the conversation hypothesis and the
questions of political disagreement in general. However, I will offer an initial pass at
an answer. Recall that a mechanistic issue is answered correctly by examining the complete body of evidence of human experience. We can similarly define a morally mechanistic issue as a moral issue that is answered easily by the application of a specific view of
morality, such as utilitarianism or the categorical imperative. This is essentially equivalent of reducing moral issues to simple and compound issues; many (if not all) theories
of normative ethics would conclude that murder is morally impermissible in the black
and white, making murder a morally mechanistic issue. In fact, on simple moral issues,
generally acclaimed theories of normative ethics tend to agree, making it almost natural to conclude that the question can be (at least very closely) determined. When context compounds the issues is when these theories diverge. Hence, when a moral issue
becomes more non-mechanistic, for example, the “simple” question of murder can be
generalized to the “compound” cases of abortion or the question of Jim and the Indians
(Smart and Williams 1973). Given that different theories will reach different answers,
the arguments above detailing the pitfalls of appealing to experience or training apply,
making the issue more non-mechanistic.
A third and final critique lies in my (perhaps) flippant discussion of the evidence
surrounding an issue. What exactly constitutes this evidence? Consider, as an example,
the case of a jury in a criminal trial; while each juror receives the same evidence provided in the courtroom, might not previous life experiences alter the way evidence is
perceived? In this sense, is it ever possible to share evidence completely?
This is exactly the type of problem that the community hypothesis was built to
90

HOAGLAND
address. Previous philosophers have relied on arguments such as this to advocate for
uniqueness in the face of the empirical evidence of frequently divided juries. However, if we define evidence as strictly objective and tangible (e.g., the testimonies of
the witnesses and arguments of the attorneys), the community hypothesis requires
no raised eyebrows at the existence of a non-unanimous verdict. While it is true that
subjective perception of evidence leads to differing views, this subjectivity is not a
problem for non-mechanistic issues.14 Even among differing perceptions, peer ship
is not forfeited.

Applications and Conclusion

Therefore, while we may be under more obligation to view others as our epistemic peers than perhaps previously assumed, we are under less obligation to suspend our own beliefs in order to accommodate disagreement. This result has direct
applications to almost any area of interest in the domain of political science, as political
activities and behavior are inevitably built on discussion of non-mechanistic issues,
such as abortion. In fact, current research in political science empirically substantiates
the use of the conversation hypothesis by people utilizing social media sources such
as Facebook and Twitter. For example, Kim, Hsu, and de Zuniga (2013) use Facebook
network data in the U.S. to conclude that political posts on Facebook contribute to an
increased level of “heterogeneity in discussion networks,” or an increased likelihood
that a political participant will engage in conversation with other political participants from across the political spectrum.15 In general, the authors find these increased
conversations from “across the aisle” lead to an increase in civic engagement.
One important gap in this research, however, is an examination of the results
of such cross-partisan discussions. Specifically, current political science research has
been silent on the ways these conversations affect the initial opinions of their participants. Future researchers may focus on analyzing these political conversations
in a setting that allows them to determine whether the conversation 1) brought the
participants to a “middle ground” solution, as predicted by the Median Voter Theorem; 2) polarized the participants even more, as suggested by either the community
hypothesis or the stand-alone hypothesis; or 3) encouraged a socially beneficial conversation without shifting each agent’s own political opinions, as predicted by the
conversation hypothesis. This research would have important political implications
on fostering political discussion among heterogeneous groups and answer questions such as ideological selectivity in social media use (Iyengar and Hahn 2009).
Once established, these results extend to almost any aspect of political science that
relies on political dialogue about non-mechanistic issues, such as policy formation,
political economy, and international relations.
On issues the collective human spirit has not adequately addressed, we have no
sufficient criteria for distinguishing epistemic superiority and, therefore, cannot close
our ears or minds to the arguments of those who have reached different conclusions
than us. However, this does not need to lead to widespread skepticism or the sur91
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rendering of belief. Rather, the exposure to different views on the same evidence can
have a purely positive impact on discussion and embodiment overall. As Nietzsche
wrote, “let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute reversals of the familiar perspectives . . . to see differently in this way for once, to want to see differently, is no
small discipline and [serves] . . . so that one knows how to make precisely the difference in perspectives and affective interpretations useful for knowledge” (On the
Genealogy of Morality, III.12).
NOTES
1. I recognize that for many of the issues discussed in this paper, the use of the word “correct” to
describe a solution to the issue may seem vague. Over the course of the paper, I hope to clarify
this sentiment.
2. These definitions appear in broad strokes—there are many variations on a theme when it comes
to the semantics of the debate. However, in order to focus on the more critical issues, I will
attempt to use definitions that appeal to many philosophers’ views.
3. As a pass at a definition of these types of issues (which I think synthesizes the views of philosophers such as Elga who have written on the subject), I assert that an issue is non-mechanistic if
it is impossible to amass a body of evidence E large enough to arrive at a unique answer to the
question being considered. According to another way of thinking, an issue could be considered
mechanistic if we could reasonably conceive of a computer or robot possessing the sum total of
humanity’s knowledge answering the question for us, thereby eliminating the need to handle
disagreement stemming from human error. I will clarify this definition further in the next section of the paper.
4. We can assume, for the purposes of this paper, that the discovery that an epistemic superior
holds an opinion contradictory to your own is strong enough evidence for you to change your
opinion. Whether this is true is a matter for another paper.
5. For one thing, it seems to be begging the question by arguing that a label of epistemic peer is
conditional on minimizing disagreement.
6. The validity of this claim is questioned by some, who maintain that we merely think that we do
this when, in fact, our opinions are quite inconsistent. While this may be true, it is the very perception of opinion-forming that I am concerned with, and so this objection is an irrelevant one.
7. Unless some obvious condition exists, which labels one of us as superior.
8. i.e., a better history of being correct on issues similar to (or exactly identical to, in the case of
mechanistic issues).
9. This is a broad-strokes portrayal of the issue in order to avoid a larger tangent.
10. Even Elga avoids claiming this, as the bulk of human interaction would suggest the opposite.
11. As in the case of abortion, in which different opinions arise from assigning different preferences
to the values of freedom and the right to life.
12. Although the argument for this conclusion would take substantially more work.
13. An even more basic question may arise concerning the labelling of any view as morally
repulsive within the domain of a non-mechanistic issue. Here, we must remember that nonmechanistic issues are not unsolvable ones—opinions held by agents assessing a body of
evidence are considered candidate solutions to an issue, and one agent’s candidate solution
may be viewed as repugnant or extremely off-base by another agent. Specifically, a view may
be repulsive because of its implications for other, more mechanistic issues, rather than its contrast to the true solution (which is inaccessible for these questions). For example, within the
question of abortion’s morality, it may be the case that a particular agent holds that children
hold no rights at all until they are able to contribute to society, thereby condoning not only
abortion but also other forms of child abuse (such as female infanticide). This candidate solution would be viewed as morally repulsive by many, even though there is no true solution
with which to compare the idea.
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14. Indeed, no standard of objectivity exists.
15. This article also includes important references to other studies attempting to understand the
role of political conversation on social media sites in elevating offline political participation, and
the role of different personal characteristics in mitigating these results.
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Women vs. Men—Who Makes Better
Use of Financial Aid?
Colton Keddington and Nichole Keddington

Introduction

Human capital is one’s ability to perform labor to produce value (Goldin 2014). As
marketable skills increase, human capital increases. Post-secondary education is a valuable component in human capital, because it increases the skill set that enables a person
to work and make a living. In the last few decades, through post-secondary education,
U.S. women increasingly have obtained more human capital (Executive Office of the
President of the United States 2014).
Women’s college attendance has increased substantially over time, and women
in the U.S. now graduate from college at higher rates than men do. Ishitani’s study
shows that women are 56 percent more likely to graduate in four years than men (2006),
and Astin points out that women also tend to have better grades in college even when
controlling for high school grades (1997). Although once barred from higher education completely, women now make up the majority of college students in the U.S.
(about 11.5 million females in 2017, compared with 8.9 million males, according to the
National Center for Education Statistics). Women also graduate at higher rates than
men do (about 1.8 million females in 2015, compared with about .8 million males).
Women surpassing men in both college attendance and graduation rates is evidence of
underlying differences in the factors that contribute to a person’s college education. We
further investigate these differences by analyzing how financial resources help members of each gender graduate from college.
We analyze how being a federal financial aid recipient contributes to a person’s
likelihood of graduation. We theorize that women who receive financial aid will
be more likely to graduate than men who receive financial aid. This hypothesis
can be viewed as a test of whether or not the economic development literature, which
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is primarily tested in Third World countries, may apply to First World settings. We
also theorize that females who receive financial aid are more likely to graduate than
both females and males who do not receive financial aid.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The existing research on women with financial aid versus men with financial aid
is limited while comprehensive data on students’ academic performance and financial aid statuses is essentially nonexistent. We do not claim that no research has been
done on this subject, as some studies on women and financial aid in higher education do exist. Hossler, Hu, and Schmidt studied women and financial aid in higher
education and found that women apply and enroll at lower rates when financial aid
is not available (1999). This gap disappeared when controlling for family financial
support, suggesting that women are more sensitive to tuition costs than men are.
Consequently, women probably apply, enroll, and graduate at higher rates than men
when given financial aid.
Some investigation has occurred on the effect of financial aid on retention and
graduation. In general, Wohlgemuth et al. find that providing financial aid does
increase the rate of retention (2007). Furthermore, Hossler, Gross, and Ziskin find
that women are retained more than men are when institutional aid is offered (2006).
However, this was not the main focus of their study, and their coding when gender is
unknown is questionable. Furthermore, Hossler, Gross, and Ziskin include all missing data as female. The potential issues of this practice are many but easily stated. We
can assume that at least some portion of those who do not list their gender are male.
One possible example is men who fear they will not receive fair treatment due to their
perception of institutions attempting to help females more than males. Perhaps realizing this issue themselves, Hossler, Gross, and Ziskin state that an investigation into
women on financial aid in higher education deserves its own study. We hope to add
substantively to these studies.
Among the strongest of the analyses on women and financial aid in higher education is that of Fenske, Porter, and DuBrock (2000). In their study, they analyzed
the persistence of women majoring in science, engineering, and mathematics (SEM).1
Measuring persistence by graduation rates, they found evidence suggesting that
women have a lower attrition rate than other groups of financial aid recipients. Their
analysis is highly focused on SEM majors and does not address the need for a more
generalized study of male and female use of financial aid in higher education.
We seek to do an analysis similar to Fenske, Porter, and DuBrock but with a
broadened scope from SEM majors to all students, with a larger emphasis on gender
differences. We show how women who receive financial aid differ from both men and
women who do not receive financial aid. In essence, we argue that women take better
advantage of the financial opportunities given them and that those that receive financial aid are significantly different from those that do not receive financial aid. Women
see themselves as responsible to graduate once they have received financial aid. Thus,
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receiving financial aid is a strong motivator for women to complete their postsecondary education. When the opportunities and resources are available to them, women
will be more likely to graduate from college.

Methods

To test this hypothesis, we will apply the 1987 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey data and use logit regressions to determine the likelihood of
different groups graduating from college. This data set includes information on
12,628 students who applied for Guaranteed Student Loans (GSL). Within this data
set are variables indicating whether the student received financial aid (“Any Aid”)
and, if so, how much (“Aid Amount”). We limit our analyses to only students in need
of financial aid. We do so by only including students who have applied for GSL. We
recognize that not all students in need of financial aid apply for GSL. Therefore, our
study is scientifically applicable to GSL applicants and arguably not to all students
in need of financial aid. However, applying for GSL shows a need for financial aid,
and the use of the GSL applicant data allows us to generalize onto all students with
financial aid needs. Using GSL applicants provides a way to compare aid recipients to
non-aid recipients, while eliminating bias that may arise from including students who
have no need for financial aid.
Using many control variables, we will test to see if women complete their postsecondary education more than men when given student financial aid. Some of the
key controls included are age, income, marital status, and race. Especially important is the control “Total Cost,” which indicates the reported total cost per one year
of school, depending on where that particular student attended college. If gender is
unknown, the observation will not be included in the model. Doing so specifically
addresses the methodological issue of Hossler, Gross, and Ziskin’s study. These
tests will allow us to analyze any relationship between gender and graduation rates
among financial aid recipients and between recipients and non-recipients.

Limitations

The main limitation to this study is the available data, in particular the year collected. It is reasonable to argue that data from 1987 is irrelevant to today’s world.
While we maintain that the principles and hypothesis still hold true today, we admit
it is a reasonable critique. The National Center of Education Statistics has done a similar survey as recently as 2012 but will only give out the data to those with a license.
Unfortunately, as undergraduates we do not qualify to obtain a license and are forced
to use older data.
Perhaps due to data age, the data set itself proposed some issues. The data started
in ASCII format and was saved on the University of Michigan’s Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) web site. The data was publicly
available for download and SAS instructions provided. A professional full-time staff
member at the university converted the data from ASCII format to a format readable
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by more modern statistical analysis software like Stata. Unfortunately, it seems that
a portion of the data failed to convert. The observations that failed to convert were
dropped, and the remaining 12,000 observations were used for this study.
Another issue with this dataset is the way some of the races are coded. The appendix contains the exact coding and tabulations of the race variable. The main issue with
the race coding is the combining of Asian and Pacific Islander. Perhaps combining the
two groups into one was accepted practice when this dataset was collected, but political science methodology has grown and combining the two groups is rarely, if ever,
done anymore. As seen in all of the Appendix tables, the Asian variable is seemingly
statistically significant. We choose to ignore these results because of the potential issues
caused by the combining of Asian and Pacific Islander into one race category and the
impossibility of disentangling the two in this data.
Also, there is a discrepancy between the data set and the codebook. Although the
stated universe is “all” students who applied for and received GSLs, data exists for
whether or not each student “received any financial aid.” We assume, then, that loans
do not qualify as financial aid, and we can make broader assumptions about recipients
and non-recipients, even though all students have received GSLs. This makes our universe a sample of financial aid recipients and non-financial aid recipients who have all
exhibited a need for aid. It does not include, however, students who did not apply for a
GSL. We do argue that applying for GSL shows a need for financial aid and thus allows
us to generalize our results onto all students in need of financial aid. Despite the limitations explained above, we maintain our general results are accurate and applicable.

Findings

The reported coefficients from our analyses is found in the Appendix. There, we
also include demographic tabulations of the 1987 National Postsecondary Student Aid
Survey data available to us. We began by using the simplest model possible by regressing if a person had “completed degree/course of study” on gender. The results were
statistically insignificant. Such a finding seemed odd as much of the current literature
and data indicate that women are graduating at higher rates than men are (Executive
Office of the President of the United States 2014). The simple answer to this is to look
at the longitudinal data on graduation rates. This 1987 data fits into the time period
where most data indicate that men and women graduated at statistically the same rate
(Ibid.). Please see Figure 5 in the Appendix for more information. Model 1 in Table 8
(see Appendix) is in line with Current Population Survey data as calculated and presented by the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers. The consistency between
existing literature and data on graduation rates in 1987 works to support the claim that
our data set, although limited, is valid.
The lack of statistical difference in the gender variable in the simple model adds
intrigue as it becomes significant in the simple model that tests our theory (see Appendix Table 8, Model 2). In this logistic model, we added the interactive term of “Female
and Any Aid.” This interactive term is the main variable of interest in Table 8 (see
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Appendix). Here, we see that women have statistically different logged odds of graduating or completing their study than men given they receive any financial aid.

Table 1

VARIABLES

(2)

(7)

Female

-0.156**
(0.0710)

0.0258
(0.119)

Any Aid

0.00164
(0.0781)

-0.278**
(0.134)

Female × Any Aid

0.309***
(0.106)

0.364**
(0.175)

American Indian

-0.482
(0.382)

Asian

-1.246***
(0.166)

Black

-0.178
(0.158)

Hispanic

-0.452***
(0.164)

Age

-0.0395
(0.0270)

Age2

0.000291
(0.000341)

Income

2.75e-09
(1.09e-07)

Married

-0.183*
(0.0962)

Separated

-0.123
(0.277)

Total Cost

0.0001***
(2.83e-05)

Constant
Observations

1.758***
(0.0539)

2.413***
(0.514)

11,552

4,026

Models 2 through 7 in Table 8 (see Appendix) support the claim that women with
financial aid graduate at higher rates than men do with financial aid. The simplest of
these models, Model 2, shows that females receiving financial aid have an 84 percent
likelihood of graduation, while males have a 78 percent likelihood of graduation. This 6
percent is statistically significant. Model 7 shows that after including all relevant controls,
women receiving aid still have statistically significantly higher logged odds of graduating. Figure 1 is a visual representation of Model 7 Table 8 (see Appendix).
Models 2 through 6 in Table 9 (see Appendix) are conceptually important to our
theory. Here, “Aid Amount” is added to the model. Doing so filters the observations to
only those that received some aid. In effect, all variables in models 2 through 6 in Table 9
(see Appendix) are interacted with “Any Aid.” Because Models 2 through 6 only contain
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those that received financial aid, and control for how much aid was received and the
total cost of one year of schooling, the gender variable becomes more telling of our
theory. Every model except Model 3 in Table 9 (see Appendix) shows that women
have higher logged odds of graduating than men given that both are receiving the
same amount of financial aid and their schooling costs the same.

Figure 1: Probability of Graduation if Any Aid is Received

Table 10 (see Appendix) attempts to uncover if there is one particular subgroup
of women raising the odds of graduation or completion. In Table 10 (see Appendix),
the observations are limited to women only and allow us to compare the women
in this data set. Models 2 through 6 have the “Aid Amount” control variable and
are filtered to only those observations that received some aid. The total cost of one
year of schooling is very significant in all models in Table 10 (see Appendix). Interestingly, as the total cost of a year of school goes up, the woman is more likely to
graduate. (See Figure 2 below.) This finding also appears to be true for men, as this
control is statistically significant in all models of Table 9 (see Appendix) as well.
One possible explanation for this trend is that only people that have the means and
drive to finish a degree choose to attend a more expensive school. Those that question if they have the time, resources, or drive to finish would logically not risk as
much money by attending a more expensive program. It is likely that those attending the more expensive school are systematically different from those that attend
the less expensive schools.
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Table 2
VARIABLES
Female
Total Cost
Aid Amount

(2)

(6)

0.185**
(0.0815)

0.363***
(0.135)

0.000142***
(2.29e-05)

0.000136***
(3.35e-05)

-3.47e-06
(1.64e-05)

-3.18e-06
(2.38e-05)

American Indian

-0.275
(0.538)

Asian

-1.652***
(0.227)

Black

-0.256
(0.226)

Hispanic

-0.697***
(0.234)

Age

-0.0187
(0.0386)

Age2

-0.000112
(0.000492)

Income

4.09e-07**
(1.93e-07)

Married

-0.257*
(0.144)

Separated

-0.124
(0.367)

Constant
Observations

1.294***
(0.0960)

2.104***
(0.716)

5,240

1,904

Among women, the amount of aid is also significant. (See Models 2 through 6 in
Table 10 in the Appendix.) In the table, the coefficients are very small, ostensibly indicating that the aid amount has no substantive effect. However, “Aid Amount” is calculated
in single dollar increments, and aid is rarely if ever given in single dollar increments.
For example, each additional $1,000 of aid given to a female increased her logged
odds of graduation by 1 percent. The median amount of aid given in this data set
is $2,370. A female student with the median amount of financial aid has, according
to our results, 86.7 percent likelihood of graduating from college, as compared to
females in the 25th percentile of aid (85 percent likelihood of graduation) or females
in the 75th percentile of aid (88 percent likelihood of graduation). Realizing that the
coefficient of “Aid Amount” will change by hundreds and thousands helps us understand the substantive effect is more than initially indicated by the small coefficient.
(Figure 3 illustrates this point.)
Another variable that seems to be significant in both Table 9 and Table 10 (see
Appendix) is race. White is used as the baseline for the race comparisons listed in
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Figure 2: Probability of Graduation

Table 3

VARIABLES

(2)

(6)

Total Cost

0.000152***
(3.37e-05)

0.000178***
(5.54e-05)

Aid Amount

5.84e-05**
(2.69e-05)

9.70e-05**
(4.62e-05)

American Indian

-0.416
(0.825)

Asian

-1.591***
(0.396)

Black

0.0609
(0.300)

Hispanic

-0.761**
(0.314)

Age

-0.0191
(0.0502)

Age2

5.95e-05
(0.000624)

Income

2.11e-07
(2.45e-07)

Married

0.0576
(0.194)

Separated

-0.124
(0.405)

Constant
Observations

1.300***
(0.117)

1.783*
(0.952)

2,851

1,096
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the Appendix tables. Hispanic is significant in Table 9 (see Appendix) in all models
where race is included. In Table 10 (see Appendix), among women, Hispanic is not as
significant until income is considered. The data seem to indicate that Hispanics have
lower logged odds of graduating when compared to whites. (See Figure 4.)
The other piece of the race variable that comes out significant in every instance is
Asian. We have not neglected to notice this occurrence, but we have reason to believe
this finding is inaccurate. As noted in the limitations section above and in the Appendix, Asian and Pacific Islander are coded together in this 1987 dataset. While combining Asian and Pacific Islander may have been common practice in 1987, it is not today.
Today, Asian and Pacific Islander are coded separately for many reasons. Because of
this issue, we choose not to claim any valid results comparing the odds of Asians or
Pacific Islanders to the baseline White category.

Figure 3: Probability of Graduation

Conclusion

We find many noteworthy factors relating to likelihood of graduation. Among
women, the amount of aid given significantly increased the likelihood of graduation.
In both the simplest and most comprehensive models, we find that females with aid are
more likely to graduate than females without aid and males, both with and without aid.
This is our most substantive finding. It seems the data from the 1987 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey support our hypotheses that women use student financial
aid more effectively than men do.
Concluding that women use student financial aid better than men do supports
the economic development literature referenced above. Wong and Psacharopoulos
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appear to support the idea that women use resources more effectively than men do
by showing how children improve when the woman has control of the income. We
argue that this theory is not limited to development economics. We find evidence
to suggest that the same theory is true in higher education aid within United States.
The implications of these results reach into both practical and academic spheres.
For the institutions deciding who gets student financial aid, the results of these analyses
may be particularly helpful. For academia, this study may aid in increasing the external
validity of some gendered economic development theories.

Figure 4: Probability of Graduation

The limitations of this study are the data. However, the 1987 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey provides a place to start. The more recent versions of this survey, done as recently as 2012, will likely have fixed the data and coding issues. Further
research on more recent data would provide better insight into the current use of student
financial aid. If our findings hold, there would also be a need to identify what specific
mechanisms lead to women’s increased graduation rates as a result of receiving financial
aid. This information will help us know how to apply those factors to men so that members of both sexes can more effectively use the resources available to them.
NOTE
1. Now referred to as “STEM.”
APPENDIX
Description of data set

In our analyses, we included the variable age2 to account for the distribution of ages in the

population.

All observations received some amount of financial aid in this table.
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Table 4
“Have completed degree/course of study”

Frequency

Percent

No

1,713

14.83

Yes

9,839

85.17

Dependent Variable: graduation status.
Table 5
Sex

Frequency

Percent

Male

5,761

45.62

Female

6,867

54.38

Key Independent Variable: female.

Table 6

Any Aid

Frequency

Percent

No

6,816

53.98

Yes

5,812

46.02

Independent Variable: any aid.

Table 7

Race

Frequency

Percent

American Indian or Alaska Native

102

.81

Asian or Pacific Islander

719

5.67

1,073

8.5

781

6.18

9,953

78.82

Black, not Hispanic
Hispanic
White, not Hispanic
Independent Variable: race.
Independent Variable: age.

Figure 5
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Table 8
VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

Female

-0.0198
(0.0526)

-0.156**
(0.0710)

-0.184**
(0.0717)

Any
Aid

0.00164
(0.0781)

Female
× Any
Aid

0.309***
(0.106)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

-0.119
(0.0728)

-0.0225
(0.115)

-0.0223
(0.115)

0.0258
(0.119)

0.00711
(0.0786)

-0.0224
(0.0787)

-0.0431
(0.127)

-0.0676
(0.128)

-0.278**
(0.134)

0.294***
(0.107)

0.242**
(0.107)

0.362**
(0.168)

0.352**
(0.168)

0.364**
(0.175)

American
Indian

-0.196
(0.285)

-0.140
(0.284)

-0.380
(0.378)

-0.394
(0.379)

-0.482
(0.382)

Asian

-0.910***
(0.0906)

-0.942***
(0.0908)

-1.086***
(0.155)

-1.131***
(0.156)

-1.246***
(0.166)

Black

0.0935
(0.103)

0.125
(0.103)

-0.0350
(0.150)

-0.0964
(0.153)

-0.178
(0.158)

Hispanic

-0.148
(0.107)

-0.138
(0.108)

-0.293*
(0.158)

-0.325**
(0.158)

-0.452***
(0.164)

Age

-0.0836***
(0.0163)

-0.0532**
(0.0256)

-0.0404
(0.0262)

-0.0395
(0.0270)

Age2

0.0008***
(0.000244)

0.000414
(0.000328)

0.000268
(0.000334)

0.000291
(0.000341)

-3.74e-08
(1.03e-07)

-2.60e-08
(1.04e-07)

2.75e-09
(1.09e-07)

Married

-0.230**
(0.0932)

-0.183*
(0.0962)

Separated

0.00207
(0.272)

-0.123
(0.277)

Income

Total
Cost
Constant
Observations

0.0001***
(2.83e-05)
1.759***
(0.0390)

1.758***
(0.0539)

1.849***
(0.0566)

3.398***
(0.254)

2.873***
(0.489)

2.782***
(0.490)

2.413***
(0.514)

11,552

11,552

11,552

11,552

4,179

4,179

4,026

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9
VARIABLES
Female

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.0448
(0.0544)

0.185**
(0.0815)

0.130
(0.0833)

0.147*
(0.0841)

0.376***
(0.134)

0.363***
(0.135)

0.000179***
(1.64e-05)

0.000142***
(2.29e-05)

0.000147***
(2.34e-05)

0.000124***
(2.27e-05)

0.000136***
(3.38e-05)

0.000136***
(3.35e-05)

-3.47e-06
(1.64e-05)

1.09e-05
(1.66e-05)

1.85e-05
(1.64e-05)

1.03e-06
(2.39e-05)

-3.18e-06
(2.38e-05)

-0.411
(0.371)

-0.374
(0.370)

-0.264
(0.538)

-0.275
(0.538)

Asian

-1.356***
(0.138)

-1.386***
(0.137)

-1.600***
(0.224)

-1.652***
(0.227)

Black

0.123
(0.143)

0.118
(0.144)

-0.193
(0.221)

-0.256
(0.226)

Hispanic

-0.345**
(0.156)

-0.344**
(0.156)

-0.662***
(0.233)

-0.697***
(0.234)

Age

-0.0653***
(0.0245)

-0.0371
(0.0376)

-0.0187
(0.0386)

Age2

0.000599*
(0.000363)

9.71e-05
(0.000482)

-0.000112
(0.000492)

3.94e-07**
(1.90e-07)

4.09e-07**
(1.93e-07)

Total Cost
Aid
Amount
American
Indian

Income
Married

-0.257*
(0.144)

Separated

-0.124
(0.367)

Constant

1.249***
(0.0577)

1.294***
(0.0960)

1.401***
(0.101)

2.683***
(0.396)

2.293***
(0.713)

2.104***
(0.716)

Observations

11,126

5,240

5,240

5,240

1,904

1,904

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10
VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Total Cost

0.000197***
(2.25e-05)

0.000152***
(3.37e-05)

0.000155***
(3.42e-05)

0.000141***
(3.37e-05)

0.000177***
(5.49e-05)

0.000178***
(5.54e-05)

5.84e-05**
(2.69e-05)

6.54e-05**
(2.75e-05)

6.62e-05**
(2.69e-05)

9.40e-05**
(4.48e-05)

9.70e-05**
(4.62e-05)

-0.185
(0.553)

-0.154
(0.554)

-0.429
(0.818)

-0.416
(0.825)

Asian

-1.405***
(0.219)

-1.421***
(0.219)

-1.594***
(0.398)

-1.591***
(0.396)

Black

0.0760
(0.180)

0.0732
(0.180)

0.0351
(0.294)

0.0609
(0.300)

Hispanic

-0.386*
(0.211)

-0.389*
(0.210)

-0.778**
(0.313)

-0.761**
(0.314)

Age

-0.0429
(0.0311)

-0.0178
(0.0501)

-0.0191
(0.0502)

Age2

0.000437
(0.000454)

4.35e-05
(0.000621)

5.95e-05
(0.000624)

2.15e-07
(2.45e-07)

2.11e-07
(2.45e-07)

Aid
Amount
American
Indian

Income
Married

0.0576
(0.194)

Separated

-0.124
(0.405)

Constant

1.251***
(0.0626)

1.300***
(0.117)

1.388***
(0.125)

2.211***
(0.504)

1.793*
(0.960)

1.783*
(0.952)

Observations

6,093

2,851

2,851

2,851

1,096

1,096

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
This table shows differences in factors influencing graduation rates among women only. Men
are excluded from this table.
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Figure 6

Figure is from the October 14, 2014, update of the Women’s Participation in Education and the
Workforce report by the Council of Economic Advisers. We include their graphic to show where
our 1987 data fit in the overall trend.
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Improving the Bureaucracy: What
Leads Government Officials to Use
Evidence-Based Reports?
Nicholas Moffitt

Introduction to General Problem Area

“Suppose you were an idiot. [Now] suppose you were a member of Congress,
but I repeat myself” (Twain 1907). Although many people think negatively of politicians and governments in general, both the public and private sector are taking
actions to improve the quality of programs produced by governments and, hopefully, improve people’s lives and their perceptions of the government. To improve
the quality of government programs, scholars have produced many assessments that
precisely measure the impacts of public policies, but government officials typically do
not use these evidence-based reports (EBRs) in designing policy (Head 2016). More
rigorous policy evaluation started in the 1970s, but these policy evaluations only truly
gained momentum in the 1990s (Head 2016, p. 472).
Much of the impetus of the EBR movement stemmed from economists pushing
randomized control trials (RCTs) in public policy (Head 2016, p. 474). In governmentsponsored RCTs, various subsections of a population, which ideally reflect each other
and the entire population, each take part in unique public policies. After these RCTs
run for a sufficient time, data scientists analyze the results of the experiment and
compare the two groups. If the experimental groups share equal traits, the researchers
can then infer that the interventions in the public policies caused the different results
(Banerjee and Duflo 2009, p. 152). RCTs, therefore, more precisely measure policy
outcomes than simple observational data on the program, because they control for
other influencing factors through the experimental design. In the mid-1990s, when
economists were beginning to lay much of the groundwork for experiments on public policies, they found that governments and developmentally oriented NGOs were
spending thousands of dollars on programs that resulted in little real improvement.
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For example, after running initial RCTs on educational programs in Africa, prominent
economists found that policies geared at increasing years of education ranged in cost
effectiveness from $3.25 to $6,000 per year of increased education (Banerjee and Duflo
2009, p. 153).
The results of these studies clearly showed that many governments were not effectively using their resources or measuring the results of their policies; they needed to
apply serious analysis to their programs to evaluate which ones produced the best
results for the least time and money invested. In turn, by using RCTs and then reporting those results in EBRs, government officials can better evaluate which policies
produce the best results, and they can pinpoint the cost for each outcome produced. Unfortunately, despite the rising prevalence of EBRs in the 1990s, their use
increased almost exclusively in the private sector and only slowly started influencing
policies in the public sector. Clear examples of this varied implementation of EBRs
comes from the health industry, where medical professionals started heavily using
RCTs and EBRs in the 1990s, yet public policy regarding health hardly took notice of
them (Black 2001). Other sources that birth public policies include ideology, partisan
lines, and corruption. Because implementation of EBRs by government officials runs
scarce in the developing world, this project will identify which characteristics of government officials and which types of hiring and monitoring processes of bureaucrats
lead officials to have the most proficiency in, interest in, and intent in using EBRs.
Because people elect members of parliament and other legislators rather than hire
them, the term “officials” refers to bureaucratic employees hired through a meritbased application process.
The efficacy of any government relies heavily on the abilities of unelected officials, yet citizens often have no direct say in which unelected officials are hired. While
well-educated, thoroughly trained, and closely evaluated officials perform the best
work, many governments suffer from poorly prepared officials (Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008). Government officials often appeal to ideology, emotion, intuition, and
unique personal experiences when making policy decisions (Banks 2010). However,
governments should instead improve their effectiveness by precisely measuring the
results of specific policies using evidence-based reports. Methods of using such EBRs
have shown to increase program effectiveness in various fields including medicine,
education, agriculture, technology, and others (Slavin 2008).
Unfortunately, a huge gap still exists between the academic world, with its evidence-based reports, and government policymaking. In fact, in a recent global survey
of more than 3,000 scholars, 90 percent of them said, “There should be a larger number of links between academic and policy communities,” and 76 percent of them said
the gap between academia and policymaking has not improved in the last twenty
to thirty years (Maliniak et al. 2012, pp. 67–69). Similarly, heads of governmental agencies in the past, such as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have said that governments
should more frequently use the “untapped resources outside of government—resources
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like those our universities can offer” (Gates 2008). In fact, a 2014 survey of policymakers
showed that only 4.7 percent of government officials thought academics should not be
involved in the policymaking process (Avey and Desch 2014).

Implications

If the usage of evidence-based reports increases in the public policymaking process, then the effectiveness of public policies will also increase (Banks 2009). Higher
usage of EBRs in policymaking will improve policy results for several reasons. First,
governments can easily identify which projects are and are not producing the outcomes
they hoped for when they initiated the policies. Next, governments can empirically
measure the exact impact of each policy and thus create a precise cost-benefit analysis
of each program enacted. Finally, governments can perpetuate the cycle of successful
policymaking by hiring officials who express more interest in EBRs and use them more
frequently. If governments can pinpoint the officials most likely to use evidence-based
reports, then they can focus their efforts on including those officials in policymaking.
By hiring more officials who frequently use EBRs, governments can enact the most
statistically successful and result-oriented public policy options (Avey and Desch 2014).
By measuring officials’ knowledge and abilities, governments can identify which
characteristics correspond with officials possessing sufficient knowledge and willingness to implement successful, result-driven policies. However, little research has
been published on the topic of which characteristics cause individual officials to use
EBRs more often. Therefore, by using survey data from three hundred government
officials in developing countries on three continents, this investigation offers a
unique insight into the effects that specific characteristics of officials have on an
individual’s interest in and reported use of EBRs, such as years of education, university major, gender, age, and income. With the knowledge about which officials are
most likely to use EBRs, governments can further train those officials on such reports
and put them in policymaking positions, thus increasing the number of policies based
on reliable program evaluations.
Aside from personal characteristics, the survey also explores the effects of more
structural procedures imposed by the government itself. The first structural procedure included in the analysis deals with the hiring/screening processes. To quantify
the effects of governmental screening processes, the survey asked respondents if they
completed a civil service exam to get their current job, a common method many governments use to evaluate the competency of candidates before hiring them. The second structural measure assessed in the survey involved the monitoring process, or the
degree to which management promoted the use of EBRs. Two other important structural characteristics that could influence officials’ use of or interest in EBRs include
years worked in the government and workplace autonomy.
Overall, I found that female gender, higher income, post-graduate education,
greater workplace autonomy, receiving a technical science degree, and completing a
civil service exam lead to increased reported use of or interest in EBRs. Additionally, I
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found that more years worked in the government and holding traditional family and
religious values lead to decreased reported use of or interest in EBRs. Age had a quadratic relationship with reported use of EBRs: the youngest and oldest people reported
using more EBRs the most, while middle-aged people reported using them the least.
Management emphasis on EBRs appeared to increase employee interest, yet it did
nothing to increase their use.

Theoretical Framework

Structural Characteristics and Procedures
CIVIL SERVICE EXAM

Both screening and monitoring methods exist to better control agents’ or acting
government officials’ behavior and align their final policy outcomes with the outcomes
desired by the principals (the people to whom the agents are accountable). Screening
methods involve pre-hiring interviews, evaluations, and selection processes designed to
ensure hiring the most qualified applicants. On the other hand, monitoring mechanisms
focus on repeated evaluation, auditing, or supervision of agents after the hiring process
to ensure they keep performing efficiently and are complying with what the principals
desire. Kauppi and Raaj examine the effectiveness between the two mechanisms of controlling agent behavior and find that the pre-hiring controls of training and screening
much more effectively reduced noncompliance in agents than the post-hiring mechanism
of monitoring (2014). If civil service exams successfully screen employees and determine
the most competent individuals for policymaking positions, and if all the most competent
candidates understand how EBRs can improve policy outcomes, then I would expect to
find that government employees who took civil service exams before being hired report
higher interest in and use of EBRs.
MANAGEMENT EMPHASIS ON EVIDENCE-BASED REPORTS

Improper delegation to agents who lack proper knowledge in public policymaking leads to poor policy outcomes (Lupia 2000), but principals can and should attempt
to prevent unknowledgeable agents from entering the policymaking arena through
controls, such as screening before hiring them (Ibid. 2003). On the other hand, the
post-hiring control of monitoring government workers’ performance also provides a
valuable tool for aligning the interests of the principals and the agents. In their study
regarding public sector monitoring techniques, Sanders, Wright, and Horn show that
teacher scores on performance assessments in Tennessee significantly predict student
performance (1997). Just as teacher performance assessments can reliably predict student performance, governmental statistical evaluations in the form of EBRs can reliably predict policy outcomes.
Although the studies in Tennessee provide valuable insights into screening and
monitoring processes, they also reveal some limitations in those procedures. First,
although screening and monitoring of teachers can lead to hiring more effective employees, governments need to evaluate the effectiveness of their screening and monitoring
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methods to find which assessments effectively hire teachers who will produce the best
outcomes (Buddin and Zamarro 2009). Second, if school directors understand the basics
of EBRs, they can use them to find additional effective methods of improving student
performance by finding better teacher screening policies or classroom instruction programs (Sanders et al. 1997), while ignoring ineffective and costly methods of improving
student performance, such as reducing classroom size (Hoxby 2000). To achieve the best
policy results, programs must stem from previously implemented and tested policies
proven to promote success. As shown from panel data in Latin America from 1974 to
2003, simply increasing government spending and creating extra government programs
will not increase the welfare of the people (Lizardo and Mollick 2013). Increasing the
quantity of evidence-backed policies will.
Officials still do not use EBRs often enough: “Although most practitioners claim to
support the use of evidence relevant to their roles, their use of the best available evidence
is patchy” (Head 2016, p. 471). Head goes as far as suggesting mandating the use of evidence-based research by governments, asserting that “the key task is to institutionalize
rigorous processes for appraisal and evaluation [of policies in the public arena]” (2016,
p. 476). To test the institutionalization of, or at least the emphasis of, management on
using academic studies in public policymaking, our survey included a question asking
the respondent: “What sources do you think your superiors want you to use in decisionmaking?” The respondents then chose from seven options, including the use of EBRs,
and ordered them from most important to least important. Interestingly, 38.64 percent
of respondents said their bosses would have ranked EBRs as most important on the
list of seven decision-making factors, and 69.32 percent of them said their bosses would
have put EBRs in the top three. In the end, if public servants listen to and follow their
superiors, then I would expect to find higher reported use of and interest in EBRs by those
who have workplaces where management promotes EBRs.
AUTONOMY IN THE WORKPLACE

To successfully match the interests of principals with the outcomes produced
by agents, Fukuyama suggests “low-income countries [should] reduce bureaucratic
autonomy while high-income ones [should] seek to increase it” (2013, p. 347). Lowincome countries should rely on highly systematic bureaucracies instead of those
with high autonomy, because fewer people obtain higher education in poorer countries, so those few with more education can mandate more effective policy processes
such as requiring the use of EBRs to lower-level bureaucrats (Ibid.). According to
the World Bank, Peru classifies as an upper-middle-income economy, having a GDP
per capita of $6,046 US. India classifies as a lower-middle-income economy with a
GDP per capita of $1,709 US, and Tanzania classifies as a low-income economy with
a GDP per capita of $879 US (World Bank 2016). Therefore, based on Fukuyama’s
theory, if people from all three countries in the survey earn relatively low levels of
income countrywide, which they do in India and Tanzania, then governments could
create more effective policies through less autonomy in public servants. If part of hav115
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ing less autonomy includes mandating EBR use, which would be the case if higherranked officials know the importance of EBRs in successful policymaking, I would
expect to find that employees with lower levels of autonomy would use EBRs more
often and would report higher levels of proficiency with them.
Personal Characteristics
EDUCATION (DEGREE AND LEVEL OF SCHOOLING COMPLETED)

Overall, policymakers believe that academic reports specifically from the disciplines of history, area studies, and economics help them the most in their policymaking
processes. However, as the level of the agent’s education starts to increase, they
believe these studies will help policymaking less, especially in the fields of economics and political science. Additionally, policymakers overall gauge “sophisticated
social science methods such as formal models, operations research, theoretical analysis, and quantitative analysis to be ‘not very useful’ or ‘not useful at all’” (Avey
and Desch 2014). However, policymakers did report that they highly value quantitative analysis of public opinion. Therefore, one policy implication to improve
principal-agent compatibility could incorporate the implementation of frequent
public opinion polls on public policy issues. The media frequently report on public
opinion, but it usually does so in informal ways, so government-sponsored opinion
polls on especially salient issues could increase agent accountability.
GENDER

In the scientific research field, some studies have shown that female researchers
publish two less articles per five years than male researchers, controlling for all else
(Prpic 2002). Structural factors in the scientific research field, such as position within
their organization or network size, also appear to interact with women’s success in
publication, decreasing their success in relation to their male counterparts. However,
other studies show that women’s general level of lower productivity in the research
field comes from a trend in women to specialize less than men do, rather than from
institutional norms (Leahey 2006). Additionally, less women working exacerbate possible institutional problems that inhibit women from entering the research and innovation field and majoring in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). Although
women constitute almost half of the work force and more than half of college graduates
today, men still hold more than 75 percent of all STEM-related jobs (Beede et al. 2011).
Therefore, if experience in the STEM field leads to more interest in EBRs and women on
average go into STEM degrees and careers less often, I would expect women overall to
express less interest in EBRs than men.
Because women major in STEM fields much less often than men do and STEM
degrees use empirical evidence more often than other degrees, women might be
less likely to use and show interest in EBRs. On the other hand, women already
in the STEM field may show more interest in EBRs than men in STEM. Indeed,
women tend to trust others more and look out for the common good more than
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men do (Dollar and Gatti 2001). Additionally, governments with higher percentages
of women in lawmaking bodies house less corruption (Dollar and Gatti 2001).
Because corruption acts as an alternative source for policies, if a woman is making a policy decision, she is less likely to use corruption as an alternative to EBR
findings. Therefore, if EBRs help to highlight corrupt public policies by showing
their ineffectiveness and if women are more trustworthy and engage in corruption less than men, then women will be more likely to report use of and interest
in EBRs than men.
AGE AND INCOME

Income works as a powerful motivating tool as well as a reliable reward system for
diligence in the workplace. In the first half of careers, studies show that wage increases
accurately reflect productivity gains by employees (Cardoso et al. 2011). Although worker
productivity tends to decline or slow down as age increases, pay increases also slow down
at an even faster rate. Therefore, I expect to see a positive relationship between income
and reported use of and interest in evidence-based reports if more experienced officials
know more about EBRs and if more experienced officials also receive higher wages.
As people grow older, they increase their work productivity and develop greater
capacities to effectively fulfill their duties at work. However, at a certain point in
their careers, their productivity begins to level off or even decline (Ibid. 2011). Their
productivity may decline as their learning capacities decrease with old age or they cannot finish tasks as quickly. Interestingly, despite job performance decreasing later in life
regarding new skills and intensive problem solving, evidence shows that older employees still maintain high productivity working where they have had extensive experience
(Skirbekk 2004). Because governmental use of EBRs involving thorough statistical analysis has only recently received much attention, and this new skillset requires somewhat
in-depth training, I hypothesize to see a quadratic relation with age and reported use of
EBRs as described in Cardoso’s analysis (2011). As people gain experience at the beginning of their careers, their likelihood of using such reports will increase. If the oldest people did not receive training on EBRs earlier in their careers and have smaller
desires and capacities to learn innovative methods of research, such as those required
to understand EBRs, and the youngest officials have yet to develop those skills, then I
would expect to see the most use of and interest in EBRs among middle-aged government officials.
TRADITIONAL FAMILY AND RELIGIOUS VALUES

People perform their jobs with more productivity when they meet their physical,
emotional, and even spiritual needs. In some cases, companies around the world are
attempting to create workplace cultures that more openly accept spirituality and promote
spiritual discussions. Empirical evidence from studies of these companies shows that
increased spirituality in the workplace correlates with increased happiness and increased
performance (Garcia-Zamor and Jean-Claude 2003, pp. 361–62). However, I do not specu117
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late that holding more traditional values equates to both increased happiness and performance nor that increased job performance necessarily means increased use of EBRs.
Indeed, other studies have also shown that an increase in economic development on a macro-scale connects to an overall decrease in religiosity and an increase
in more reason-based values instead (Inglehart and Baker 2000, p. 19). Interestingly,
on a more individual level, national survey data shows this reflection of a stronger
adherence to reason-based values and scientific knowledge among the less religious;
people with weaker religious beliefs tend to support investment in groundbreaking
medical technology more than people with stronger religious beliefs (Brossard et
al. 2008). Therefore, if people with weaker religious beliefs tend to support reason
and the quest for hard evidence over personal beliefs, and if the use of EBRs stems
from the desire to believe in reason and hard evidence in place of personal beliefs,
I hypothesize that people with less traditional or religious convictions will express
more interest in and report more use of EBRs.

Methods

To evaluate the knowledge and skills of government officials in developing countries,
a large team of three BYU faculty, nineteen BYU students, and nineteen local researchers
administered a survey in Peru, India, and Tanzania. We posed dozens of questions about
governance and demographics with multiple queries about officials’ experience with and
interest in evidence-based reports. The research team also trained more than six hundred
government officials to use EBRs through a web site we developed, which contains more
than four hundred such reports; each report graphs key findings from public policies on
health, education, infrastructure, etc.
An initial summary of our survey data revealed that 20 percent of officials had
never used reports in their policymaking decisions, and an additional 34 percent of
all officials surveyed had not used EBRs in their policymaking processes during the
last six months. Furthermore, despite only 8 percent of them saying they use EBRs
in every policy decision they make, 92 percent of them said they believed that using
EBRs would improve the quality of their work. This simple evidence from the survey
confirms the literature that few government officials use EBRs despite the proven positive impact of using such studies and the acknowledgment that they would improve
policymaking decisions (Slavin 2008). These initial findings highlight the importance
of identifying the common characteristics of the few officials who do use EBRs so that
governments can find more employees like them and focus their efforts on involving
them in the policy making process.
After gathering and cleaning the survey data, robust statistical analysis revealed the
final statistical relations stated in the introduction. However, some of the relations found
from the survey differed from the original hypotheses and the literature as stated above
in the theoretical framework section. For example, the literature suggested that females
might use EBRs less than males, but in the survey, they reported to use more EBRs than
males. The literature on autonomy suggested that lower autonomy for employees in poor
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Figure 1: Importance of EBRs in Government

or developing countries might lead to better productivity and outcomes. Yet, in the survey, officials with higher autonomy reported more use of EBRs than employees with low
autonomy did. Previous surveys of government officials showed that those with more
education expressed less interest in academic studies of public policy, but our survey
showed the exact opposite: officials with post-graduate degrees were more likely to
report using EBRs than those without post-graduate degrees would. Additionally, age
and years worked in the government seemed to have reversed relationships with interest
in and reported use of EBRs from those suggested by literature about workplace experience and proficiency.
The independent variables discussed above in the theory section all come from
survey responses. Equally, the dependent variables come directly from the survey:
eleven of them are exact survey questions and four others are separate indexes of different combinations of those questions. The dependent variables about EBRs include
questions such as the following: How often do you consult academic reports when
making policy decisions? When was the last time you used an academic report in a
policy decision? How interested are you in them? Do you think they help you make
better policy decisions? (To reference all the questions used as dependent variables,
please reference survey questions 17–27 in the Appendix. All questions in the Appendix remain precisely as posed in the survey given to the individual officials.)
By creating several indexes through the combination of up to ten survey questions in some cases, these indexes should more accurately evaluate the relations of
specific independent variables with the use of and interest in EBRs. Factor analysis
showed significant correlations between multiple survey questions that theoretically
have a common theme and justified the creation of an index; the exact results from the
factor analysis are in the Appendix at the end of the paper. To create each of the indexes,
the responses to each survey question included in a specific index were transformed
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into standard deviations so that each question would have equal weight in the index.
After all the questions were transformed into standard deviations, they were combined
into the indexes and collapsed to a smaller scale so that, once again, the indexes themselves would be in the form of standard deviations. Standardizing the indexes allows
for analogous comparisons across indexes and simple magnitude tests for each independent variable because the independent variables’ impacts on reported use of or
interest in EBRs is given in terms of standard deviations.
In the results presented in this paper and elaborated on in the Appendix, 95 percent
confidence determines statistical significance, meaning an individual characteristic or
monitoring/screening process has a meaningful relationship with the official’s likelihood
of using EBRs. The tables attached below show all variables with their coefficients and
standard deviations, but only the variables with 95 percent significance are considered to
have a compelling relation with official interest in or reported use of EBRs. For each of the
indexes, higher scores mean higher reported use of or interest in EBRs while lower scores
mean lower reported use of or interest in EBRs. The compilations of the various indexes
are as follows:
1) Master Index: The questions used to compile the master index pertain to interest
in and reported use of EBRs. The theoretical reasoning for creating a master index
comes from the idea that, although the statistical results from one individual
dependent variable may not show strong enough evidence to result in statistical
significance, many questions combined into an index gauging a person’s interest
and use may. Factor analysis of multiple variables with high correlations between
each other also reveals an underlying common factor that an index can capture
but a written survey question cannot. The index includes questions 17–25. Mean:
0.00; Range: -2.59 to 1.07; Standard deviation: 0.60.
2) Importance index: The questions used to compile the importance index reveal relevance of EBRs in the workplace. The theoretical reasoning behind an importance
index stems from the idea that certain factors, such as a younger staff or a civil
service exam requirement, may help to improve the overall perception of using
new research methods, such as EBRs. In comparison to the other indexes that center more on the individual employee, the importance index takes a more general
focus on the workplace attitude toward EBRs. The importance index includes
questions 17 and 25–27, which ask about survey participants’ personal attitudes
toward EBRs and their perceptions of their co-workers’ and bosses’ views as well.
Mean: 0.03; Range: -1.86 to .97; Standard deviation: 0.79.
3) Interest Index: The questions used to compile the interest index include only those
regarding interest in and perceived importance of EBRs. The interest index provides a slightly different focus than the previously mentioned importance index,
focusing on the perception of the individual rather than the entire workplace.
Although the general workplace feeling toward EBRs as measured in the importance index gauges valuable overall views on EBRs, an individual’s perception of
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EBRs likely holds more influence in whether that individual will use them. Also,
focusing on the individual, more exclusively in the interest and use indexes, more
accurately measures the relations between characteristics specific to the individual and the official’s interest in and use of EBRs. The interest index consists of
questions 21, 23, and 24, which ask about overall interest in and perceived usefulness of EBRs. Mean: 0.00; Range: -3.83 to 0.66; Standard deviation: 0.86.
4) Use Index: The questions used to compile the use index include only those regarding reported use of EBRs. The use index provides a unique standpoint from the
other indexes in that it focuses only on questions regarding frequency of physically using EBRs rather than simply believing in their importance or usefulness. In
the end, academics make EBRs with the goal of affecting public policy, and those
reports cannot influence policy unless officials use them. Therefore, the use index
is a crucial indicator of which personal and systemic factors can lead to better public policy. The use index includes questions 18–20, which ask about the frequency
the officials’ report using EBRs. Therefore, although the measurement of EBR use
relies on survey questions asking for reported use, many other high standard surveys use similar methods for measuring behaviors. This measurement of use does
introduce some limitations because of systematically high reporting of socially
desirable behaviors like using EBRs, but more accurate behavior measures would
have significantly increased the survey’s time and cost parameters. Mean: 0.00;
Range: -1.59 to 1.62; Standard deviation: 0.83.
Aside from the indexes, each survey question acts as a dependent variable by itself.
For survey questions with a mostly continuous set of responses, I simply used ordinary
least squares regressions, checking for both interaction terms and quadratic relationships
with other variables, including age and years worked in the government. Some academics suggest that questions with ordinal responses require more in-depth models, such as
the ordered probit model. However, a simple use of OLS regressions can still create accurate predictions of significance for ordinal variables, especially when those variables have
more than five possible ordered responses or are indexes created through the compilation
of multiple survey questions. In fact, some scholars consider using ordinal variables as
continuous variables a more powerful statistical approach, and in many cases, such an
approach can reveal important relationships not shown in a model that keeps those variables as categorical (Pasta 2009).
Additionally, linear OLS models do not require perfectly even spacing between
ordinal variables. Usually one-unit changes in continuous variables do not equal exact
linear changes in another variable, because relationships are never perfectly linear, most
“results are remarkably insensitive to the spacing of an ordinal variable, except in the
most extreme cases” (Ibid.). Therefore, the final model for each dependent variable
involves OLS regressions using country fixed effects, clustering the standard deviations
by country as well.
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The final model of the master index includes eighteen independent variables, and
various other models also appear in the Appendix, some having fewer control variables
and some having more interaction and quadratic effects included as well. Recall that to
form the different indexes, survey responses were measured first in terms of standard
deviations so that a compilation of questions with differing scales would not skew the
indexes. Then the results from the different questions were added to the index with equal
weight for each question, and the final number divided by the number of questions in
each index. Therefore, each coefficient in the master index, as well as the other three
indexes reported, is in terms of how many standard deviations the index moves with a
one-unit change in the independent variable.

Results

Structural Characteristics and Procedures
Appraising which government employees express the most interest in and report
the most use of EBRs becomes more important as the chain of delegation grows longer.
As the consumers of public policies and programs, citizens often do not vote directly on
what types of policies they want implemented or for the bureaucrats who enact those
policies. Instead, citizens vote for political candidates who then choose the bureaucrats

Table 1

Showing positive and negative relations between the IV and DV. Only relations with at least 95 percent significance
after incorporating all the control variables shown below are reported.
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VARIABLES

Table 2

(1)
Master Index

(2)
Interest Index

(3)
Use Index

Female

0.128**
(0.0646)

0.172*
(0.0998)

0.243**
(0.0970)

Age

-0.0445**
(0.0205)

-0.00230
(0.00595)

-0.0713**
(0.0308)

Age Squared

0.000464**
(0.000220)

0.000787**
(0.000330)

Years Worked in Govt.

-0.00313
(0.00434)

0.00392
(0.00667)

-0.0160**
(0.00651)

Post Graduate

0.177**
(0.0834)

0.102
(0.128)

0.208*
(0.125)

Civil Service Exam

0.152**
(0.0607)

0.0499
(0.0939)

0.272***
(0.0911)

Importance to Boss

0.0686***
(0.0148)

0.0676***
(0.0229)

-0.000810
(0.0222)

Traditional Values

-0.0848**
(0.0394)

-0.0490
(0.0604)

-0.144**
(0.0591)

Autonomy

0.145***
(0.0377)

0.138**
(0.0582)

0.172***
(0.0565)

Perceived Importance

0.00673
(0.0118)

0.0141
(0.0183)

-0.00148
(0.0177)

Witness of Corruption

0.0937***
(0.0303)

0.100**
(0.0468)

0.126***
(0.0454)

# of Ministries Worked in

0.0372**
(0.0159)

0.0225
(0.0245)

0.0679***
(0.0239)

Income

0.108***
(0.0263)

0.171***
(0.0404)

0.0959**
(0.0394)

Business Degree

-0.0994

-0.0810

-0.105

(Compared to Poli Sci)

(0.0910)

(0.141)

(0.137)

Tech. Science Degree

0.221***
(0.0676)

0.138
(0.104)

0.277***
(0.102)

Stats/Math Degree

-0.234*
(0.131)

-0.156
(0.202)

-0.512***
(0.197)

Humanities Degree

-0.212
(0.155)

-0.225
(0.239)

-0.172
(0.232)

Other Degree

-0.247*
(0.143)

-0.386*
(0.222)

-0.208
(0.215)

Constant

-0.556
(0.465)

-1.913***
(0.406)

0.489
(0.698)

280

280

280

0.493

0.412

0.296

Observations
R-squared

Pictured above are the final fixed effects models clustering by country for each of the three main indexes with
all controls included. Alternate models for each individual dependent variable are available in a separate excel
spreadsheet. Remember that all the coefficients are in terms of standard deviations.
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that realize policy decisions. In this way, the general population of the country acts as a
principal in telling the agents what they want out of a public policy. However, as agents
delegate policymaking power to more people down the chain of command—officials
more enveloped in the bureaucracy—they become less accountable to the people. Therefore, screening and monitoring processes allow governments to evaluate which employees are most likely to enact efficient policies closely aligned with the constituents’
interests and thus help reduce waste and misuse of power in the government (Lupia
2003). Table 1 shows a color-coded grid highlighting which independent variables,
such as personal characteristics or screening/monitoring processes, have a statistically
significant relation with the master index, use index, and interest index. After using a
fixed-effects-model regression analysis using all the control variables shown in Table 2
(on previous page), the final models run for each of the dependent variables, each one
clustering by country-fixed effects.
CIVIL SERVICE EXAMS (QUESTION 7)

In the master index that combines ten survey questions regarding interest in and use
of EBRs, individuals who took a civil service exam prior to hiring are statistically .31 standard deviations higher in the master index than government officials who did not take
the civil service exam. This result, along with all other results reported in the paper, exhib-

Figure 2

Civil service exam takers report more use of and express more interest in EBRs than non-civil service exam
takers.
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its significance at the 95 percent confidence level. The use index also shows a positive
relation with a coefficient equal to 0.32 standard deviations, as do four other individual
dependent variables in the survey, reinforcing its significance in leading to higher interest
in and reported use of EBRs. These results show the importance of implementing screening practices in hiring; governments should use screening processes to more effectively
eliminate less knowledgeable officials and should promote more effective policymaking
by having people who will use evidence-based research with higher frequency.
MANAGEMENT EMPHASIS ON EVIDENCE-BASED REPORTS (QUESTION 27)

I focus on the use index and the interest index to measure the effectiveness of
superiors placing emphasis on EBRs in the workplace, because the two indexes show
different outcomes. The importance that superiors place on using evidence-based
reports makes a notable difference in the interest of their employees in using EBRs. If
superiors place more emphasis on such reports, then their employees report greater
interest in them, think they are useful, and believe they will help them work better.
In fact, an employee who says their superior rates evidence-based reports as number
1/7 of important factors in public policy decision making ranks 0.47 standard deviations higher on the interest index than someone who says their superior rates EBRs
as 7/7 in importance. According to these results, repeated focus of bosses on using
evidence-based reports positively influences the employees’ views on using such
reports. Aside from the interest index, management stress of EBRs also positively
correlated with six other dependent variables. Regrettably, the survey results here do
not necessarily mean causation because perhaps people who show greater interest in
EBRs simply assume their superiors want them to value EBRs as well.
Unfortunately, that same positive impact of a superiors’ influence on interest does
not translate to increased use or knowledge in any of the four knowledge and use questions, and no significant relation appears in the use index either. These results suggest
two important considerations for implementing future monitoring policy. First, superiors
exert considerable power over what methods their employees identify as most effective
in helping them to do their jobs. However, it also highlights the flaws in some monitoring techniques. Although government officials acknowledge greater importance in using
EBRs as their superiors stress their value, officials still do not use them more often. Therefore, governments should research more effective monitoring techniques or oversight
procedures besides simple management emphasis to ensure that governments use EBRs
with greater frequency. Perhaps mandated use of EBRs for policy decisions, such as Head
suggests, could lead to more frequent use (2016, p. 476). Additionally, this odd relationship between management emphasis on EBRs and increased interest without impacting
use suggests the need for further research on how to ensure that government officials
keep their actions more in line with their superiors’ priorities.
NUMBER OF YEARS WORKED IN THE GOVERNMENT (QUESTION 12)

One concerning find was that, as bureaucrats work more years in the govern125

SIGMA

Figure 3

As bosses rank EBRs as more important, employees show more interest in using them. Note that the ranking goes
from 1 being least important to 7 being most important.

ment, their interest in and reported use of EBRs decrease; three survey questions
regarding interest and use, as well as the overall use index, confirm this relationship. Every ten years spent working in the government results in a 0.19 standard deviation decrease in the use index. That decrease in use may not seem significant initially.
However, when considering the average number of years worked in a lifetime, usually
somewhere around forty (Brandon 2014), the effect of years worked in the government
on the likelihood of using EBRs becomes quickly apparent.
The negative relation revealed between years worked in the government and use of
EBRs highlights the importance of government monitoring as discussed earlier. Not only
did the post-hiring tool of management emphasis on EBRs show no effect in increasing
EBR use, but even the years spent working in the government may decrease their use.
These combined results accentuate the prevalent problem of continually monitoring and
improving agent efficacy. Unfortunately, it appears that sufficient post-hiring methods do
not exist in developing countries, at least using the post-hiring proxy measures of management emphasis on EBRs and years worked in the government, once again confirming
what Kauppi and Raaj stated in their article about the lack of successful post-hiring mechanisms in governments (2014). If such mechanisms did exist and successfully increased
productivity and innovation, then the survey should show that more years worked in
the government leads to an increase in knowledge of, interest in, and use of EBRs. Policy
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Figure 4

Officials who have worked more years in the government report to use EBRs less than newly employed officials.

implications to improve the use of EBRs as officials stay in the government longer include
EBR training and possible bonuses or promotions for those using them with greater frequency in policymaking decisions.
AUTONOMY IN THE WORKPLACE (QUESTION 15)

In Fukuyama’s earlier stated theory, he predicted that lower autonomy in government officials would lead to more effective bureaucracies and policies in less-developed
countries. Using the evidence from earlier in the paper that higher EBR use leads to
more effective policy outcomes, the survey data contradicts Fukuyama’s theory, revealing that autonomy has a statistically significant positive relation at the 95 percent level
with reported use of and interest in EBRs. Six individual dependent variables along with
the interest index and the master index confirm this positive relation. A move from completely subservient to almost completely autonomous on the autonomy scale results in a
positive shift of .45 standard deviations in the master index and a positive shift of .48 in
the interest index.
These results could signify two patterns. First, perhaps there could be reverse causation. In fact, people most educated in and interested in using EBRs also rank higher up
in the governmental hierarchy and, therefore, have more autonomy. Second, more workplace autonomy leads to trying new and different methods of research for public policies.
As agents receive more freedom to devise their own public policy plans, they expand
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their vision and use newer sources of information, such as EBRs. The idea of bureaucratic entrepreneurship and innovation when given more freedom receives direct support from evidence in the private sector of the same innovative principle, but just as in the
private sector, bureaucratic entrepreneurship does not come immediately after receiving
greater autonomy (Ibid., p. 34). For bureaucratic entrepreneurship to take place, agents
must have high levels of autonomy for longer stretches of time. Additionally, agents must
first develop a trusted capacity before receiving bureaucratic autonomy. Otherwise, with
little knowledge and drive, the newly granted autonomy could lead to decreased productivity (Carpenter 2001, p. 14). Therefore, greater autonomy in agents may not lead
to greater innovation and improved policy outcomes immediately, but improvements
based on increased autonomy come from long-term investments in human capital leading to improved agent experience and abilities.

Figure 5

Officials with more autonomy report more use of and interest in EBRs. Note that on the autonomy scale, 1
means less autonomy and 4 means more autonomy.

Personal Characteristics
EDUCATION: DEGREE AND LEVEL OF SCHOOLING COMPLETED (QUESTIONS 3 AND 4)

In the survey data, the relations between collegiate discipline and interest/use of
EBRs are compared to the political science discipline. Most degrees show no difference
of interest in or use of evidence-based reports. However, officials with technical science
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Figure 6

Officials who obtain technical science degrees report the most use of and interest in EBRs compared to all other
degrees measured.

Figure 7

Postgraduates report more use of and interest in EBRs than non-postgraduates.
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degrees do register higher on the use index, importance index, and master index with an
increase in standard deviations of .33, .26, and .34, respectively. Because technical sciences
use more hard evidence than other disciplines do, technical science graduates demonstrate more interest in reports based on empirical evidence. On the other hand, the master
index shows that post-graduate education in general also shares a significant positive
relation with interest in and reported use of EBRs, with an increase of .41 standard devia-

Figure 8

Females report higher usage of EBRs than males do.

tions compared to no post-graduate education. Officials with post-graduate degrees also
report more interest in or use of EBRs as shown in four other dependent variables.
GENDER (QUESTION 1)

Contrary to what some background research suggested, survey data shows females
are more likely to report seeing and using EBRs than their male counterparts. The use
index shows an increase of .29 standard deviations in usage for females over males, and
the master index shows an increase of .28 standard deviations for females over males.
INCOME (QUESTION 5)

Income by far appears to most strongly predict reported use of and interest in EBRs.
The survey divides income levels into six categories. An official in the highest income
bracket compared to an official in the lowest income bracket is .75 standard deviations
higher in the master index and 1.0 standard deviation higher in the interest index. Income
also has a significant positive relation in six other dependent variables.
AGE (QUESTION 2)
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Figure 9

Officials with higher income levels report more interest in and use of EBRs.

Figure 10

The youngest and oldest officials report higher interest in and use of EBRs while middle-aged officials report lower
interest in and use of EBRs.
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The survey results confirmed previous studies done by Cardoso that age maintains
a quadratic relationship with productivity and learning (2011), yet the survey shows the
opposite quadratic relation from that predicted by Cardoso. As officials grow older, they
report using EBRs less and less. However, usually around the age of 45–50, they start
using reports more often again. As shown in Figure 10 (on previous page), middle-aged
officials report the least use of EBRs of any age group, and three other dependent variables confirm the same parabolic relation between age and reported use of EBRs.
TRADITIONAL FAMILY AND RELIGIOUS VALUES (QUESTION 6)

Just as the research suggests, higher levels of traditional religious values lead to
lower levels of emphasis in logical, evidence-based research (Inglehart and Baker 2000, p.
19). In the survey, those who say they hold more traditional religious and family values
report to use less and have less interest in EBRs. A person reporting to have the strongest
traditional religious and family values compared to someone with the weakest values is

Figure 11

Officials who place more importance on traditional family and religious values report less interest in and use of
EBRs. Note that on the traditions scale, 1 means less traditional and 4 means more traditional.

on average .55 standard deviations lower on the master index and .52 standard deviations
lower on the use index. Overall, more traditional people also report lower use of/interest
in EBRs in four other individual dependent variables.

Limitations, Case Selection, and Further Research

The survey used as the main evidence has several limitations. First, the survey gath132
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ers quantitative data in a non-experimental manner. Therefore, all the statistically significant relations found do not necessarily mean causation. However, as stated in the
theories section pulling from academic literature earlier, causal relations theoretically do
exist even if not proven by the method of data collection. On the other hand, use of survey
data adds a high level of external validity, or applicability across governments, especially
in developing countries, because the survey responses come from government officials in
three developing countries on three continents. Other contributing factors to high external validity include the completely randomized assignment of enumerators to administer
the surveys and the wide distribution of demographics among those surveyed. Few studies of such magnitude have been conducted involving government officials from developing countries in the past, so even a sample size of three hundred provides significant
new findings on what influences an individual official’s interest in and use of EBRs.
More limitations to the study include any vagueness in the survey questions or dishonest responses that could skew the results and decrease the internal validity. Additionally, some of the questions in the survey asking about interest in EBRs use repetitive
wording and may condition the participants to choose what they think the researchers
want them to choose, once again skewing the results. Limitations from over-reporting a
socially desirable behavior could skew the results of the survey if those who dishonestly
answered as more likely to use EBRs all had shared characteristics that differed from those
who reported being less likely to use EBRs (Zeglovits 2014, p. 225). Additionally, even if
respondents did not lie to conceal a less socially desirable history of not using EBRs, they
could simply misremember the proper frequency with which they used them and misreport due to memory recall problems (Krosnick 2002, p. 93). To possibly eliminate these
reporting errors, we could have included a “don’t know” option for all these questions
on the survey, but because many studies have shown that such response options do not
significantly increase reliability and will decrease sample size and, therefore, statistical
strength (Ibid., p. 91), we decided to exclude a “don’t know” option on the survey.
The responses to the survey may also have some selection bias. Because enumerators
administered the survey only to government officials who had already accepted a visit to
learn more about how they could use EBRs in policy making, the survey may include a
disproportionate number of government officials who already use EBRs while ignoring
those who have no interest. Despite the survey’s limitations in internal validity, the high
external validity of quantitative analysis justifies the use of statistical analysis. Because
280 officials completed the survey on three continents, the results of the survey should
more accurately reflect the dispositions of government officials overall than if only several
officials had received a more in-depth, qualitative interview. In the end, despite strong
theories and robust statistical analysis, it is hard to infer causation, because observational
data was extracted from surveys rather than from a randomized control trial.

Conclusions

Overall, I found that female gender, post-graduate education, receiving a technical science degree, higher income, greater workplace autonomy, and completing
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a civil service exam increase reported use of or interest in EBRs. Additionally, I found
that the number of years worked in the government and greater regard for traditional
family and religious values decrease reported use of or interest in EBRs. Age had a quadratic relationship with use of EBRs: Middle-aged people reported using fewer EBRs to
a certain extent, but the youngest and oldest people reported using more. Management
emphasis on EBRs appeared to increase employee interest, yet it did nothing to increase
employee use.
The survey evidence used in this report plainly outlines which personal and structural characteristics correlate with increased use of EBRs in developing countries today.
Increased use of EBRs, according to both policymakers and academics, will objectively
improve the outcomes of public policies. Governments are always trying to improve the
effectiveness of their programs to better help their constituents. Because increased use of
EBRs translates to improved policy outcomes and improved well-being of the impacted
population, governments should use them with greater frequency and thereby improve
their public policy decisions. Finally, by knowing which personal and structural characteristics correspond with higher use of EBRs, governments can design better hiring,
monitoring, and training processes to ensure the inclusion of the officials most likely to
use EBRs in their policy decisions.
APPENDIX
Regression tables

Table 3

Use Index
Variable

Factor 1

Uniqueness

Question 19

0.7335

0.4619

Question 20

0.6596

0.565

Question 18

0.6844

0.5317

Interest Index
Variable

Factor 1

Uniqueness

Question 21

0.7019

0.5074

Question 23

0.7549

0.4302

Question 24

0.7725

0.4033

Importance Index
Variable

Factor 1

Uniqueness

Question 27

0.7233

0.4731

Question 26

0.6091

0.6198

Question 25

0.7537

0.4271

Question 17

0.7399

0.4568
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Master Index
Variable

Factor 1

Uniqueness

Question 22

0.6227

0.5334

Question 19

0.5258

0.4432

Question 20

0.5754

0.5188

Question 18

0.4418

0.5212

Question 21

0.7268

0.4095

Question 23

0.7044

0.399

Question 24

0.6819

0.4228

Question 25

0.4349

0.5424

Question 17

0.4961

0.4045

For regression tables of alternate models, please request an extended excel file.
Factor Analysis
Survey Questions
Impact Evidence Survey

This research study is being conducted by Darren Hawkins, professor, Brigham Young Uni-

versity to determine how to best provide high-quality impact evidence to policy makers. You have

been invited to participate because you are a government official in one of our focus countries.
The study consists of 27 questions and will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. There are

minimal risks for participation in this study. You may feel some discomfort in answering some
of the sensitive questions on our survey. You may feel badly about not scoring better. Poor scores
will never be revealed to others. The benefits of participating are learning more about what works

in policy and what does not, which could be useful in your job and to recipients of government
services. Involvement in this research project is voluntary. You may withdraw at any time without

penalty or refuse to participate entirely. We will only report anonymous results from this study so
you will not be identified in our research findings in any way. If you have questions regarding this

study you may contact Darren Hawkins at (801) 422–5526 or dhawkins@byu.edu. If you have ques-

tions regarding your rights as a participant in research projects, you may contact: IRB Administrator,
A-285 ASB, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, (801) 422-1461, irb@byu.edu. By advancing in this survey, you consent to participate.

Thank you for taking this survey! Your participation is completely anonymous and will help us

learn more about how to provide helpful information to government officials.
Please enter the code provided by the research assistant
1. What is your gender?
Male

Female

2. What is your age?

3. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
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Primary school
High school

Vocational school
College

Graduate degree

4. What did you study for your highest degree?

Social Sciences (Economics, Political Science, Sociology, Policy, Development, etc)
Business

Technical Science (Engineering, Agriculture, Chemistry, Biology, Physics, etc)
Statistics or Math

Humanities (Literature, Languages, Arts, Design, etc)
Other: ____________________

5. Is your monthly income:

20,000 Rupees or below

Between 20,000 and 40,000 Rupees
Between 40,000 and 60,000 Rupees
Between 60,000 and 80,000 Rupees

Between 80,000 and 100,000 Rupees
Over 100,000 Rupees

6. To what extent do you agree with the following statement? “Tradition--customs handed
down by one’s religion or family--is important to me.”
Strongly Agree

Somewhat Agree

Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree

7. Did you take a civil service exam to get your current job?
Yes
No

8. Which factors help someone get the job that you have? Please count how many

of these things matter in getting a job and tell us the number of relevant factors.
a. Civil service exam score
b. Political party

c. Personal connections
d. Corruption

e. Prior experience and performance in other jobs
f. Physical appearance
g. Gender

______ How many of the above apply? (Provide just a count of the number that apply)

9. Have you ever seen evidence of corruption in the work you do?
Yes, all the time
Yes, sometimes
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Yes, but rarely
No, never

10. Have you ever seen evidence of corruption in work others do in government jobs?

Yes, all the time
Yes, sometimes
Yes, but rarely
No, never

11. Please check all of the following that apply to your current position:
Policy or program formulation and design

Policy or program monitoring and evaluation
Policy or program implementation
Policy or program administration
Compliance

Accounting and budget
Human resources
Archives

Legal services

Equipment and facilities
Technical services

Other ____________________

12. How many years have you been employed by the government?

13. What sectors of the government have you worked in during the past 10 years?
Please choose all that apply
Agriculture

Commerce and Trade
Culture

Defense

Education
Energy

Environment and Natural Resources
Finance, Credit, Banking
Foreign Ministry

Gender and Family
Health

Housing
Industry
Justice
Labor

Macroeconomic Management
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Public Safety

Social Welfare and Development
Sports

Transportation

Other ____________________

14. How many people do you believe your policies influence?
15. How much autonomy do you have in your job?
Almost full autonomy
Some autonomy
Little autonomy
No autonomy

16. What kind of decision-making process is used in your office?

One person makes the decision without the counsel of others

One person makes the decision, but takes counsel from others
A committee makes the decisions

Everyone has to agree with the decisions
Other ____________________

17. What source is most useful to you when making your policy decisions? Please order the
following with 1 being the most useful and 7 being the least useful
______ My intuition

______ My experience

______ My formal education

______ Job-related conferences
______ My coworkers

______ Public opinion

______ Reports, studies and other written material

18. International organizations and governments, often in partnership with academic

researchers, are performing rigorous impact assessments of government programs and
publishing reports with their findings. Have you seen such academic reports?
Yes, many
Yes, some
No, none

19. How often do you consult such academic reports when you make policy
decisions?

Every time

Most times
Sometimes
Never

20. How recently have you used academic reports to make a policy decision?
In the past month

In the past six months
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In the past year

In the past five years
More than five years
Never

21. How interested are you in learning from academic research?
Very interested

Somewhat interested
Indifferent

Somewhat disinterested
Not interested at all

22. How well do you feel you understand academic research?
Very well

Somewhat well
Not very well

Not well at all

23. How helpful is academic research is in making policy?
Very useful

Somewhat useful
Not very useful

Not useful at all

24. Do you think using academic research makes your work better?
Yes, definitely

Yes, somewhat
No, not really

No, definitely not

25. What sources do you think are the most important for policy makers to use in decision-

making? Please order the following with 1 being the most useful and 7 being the least useful
______ Their intuition

______ Their experience

______ Their formal education

______ Job-related conferences
______ Their coworkers
______ Public opinion

______ Reports, studies and other written material

26. What sources do you think your coworkers use in decision-making? Please order the 		
following with 1 being the most useful and 7 being the least useful
______ Their intuition

______ Their experience

______ Their formal education

______ Job-related conferences
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______ Their coworkers
______ Public opinion

______ Reports, studies and other written material

27. What sources do you think your superiors want you to use in decision-making?

Please order the following with 1 being the most useful and 7 being the least useful
______ My intuition

______ My experience

______ My formal education

______ Job-related conferences
______ My coworkers

______ Public opinion

______ Reports, studies and other written material
Survey Responses

The following list includes the different dependent variables in the survey used to measure

government official proficiency in, interest in, and intent in using evidence-based reports. The defini-

tions show the question as presented in the survey along with the possible answers officials could

select. The percentages along the side of each answer show a tabulation of what percent of survey
takers chose each response.
18. Seen Studies (1–3)

International organizations and governments, often in partnership with academic

researchers, are performing rigorous impact assessments of government programs
and publishing reports with their findings. Have you seen such academic reports?
Yes, many 	 	
Yes, some 		
No, none 		

19. Use Studies (1–4)

20.34%

20.34%
59.31%

How often do you consult such academic reports when you make policy decisions?
Every time 	 	

8.35%

Sometimes 		

52.58%

Most times 		
Never 			

20. Recent Studies (1–6)

24.08%
14.99%

How recently have you used academic reports to make a policy decision?  
In the past month		

In the past six months 	

23.89%
22.17%

In the past year		 22.91%
In the past five years 	7.14%
More than five years 	3.94%

Never 			19.95%

21. Interest Studies (1–5)

How interested are you in learning from academic research?  
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Very interested	 	

61.58%

Indifferent 		

4.93%

Somewhat interested 	

Somewhat disinterested 	

Not interested at all	 2.22%

28.82%
2.46%

22. Know Studies (1–4)

How well do you feel you understand academic research?  
Very well 		

41.38%

Somewhat well 		

47.04%

Not well at all 		

1.97%

Not very well 		
23. Useful Studies (1–5)

9.61%

How helpful is academic research is in making policy?  
Very useful 		

62.22%

Not very useful 		

7.16%

Somewhat useful 		
Not useful at all 		

24. Work Better (1–4)

29.14%
1.48%

Do you think using academic research makes your work better?  
Yes, definitely		

Yes, somewhat 		

65.10%
27.23%

No, not really		 6.93%
No, definitely not 	

0.74%

The following rankings of 1–7 were later reversed in the indexes to make 1 least important and

7 most important:

17. What source is most useful to you when making your policy decisions (Rank of
evidence-based reports, 1–7)?
1) 38.69%
2) 16.83%
3) 14.32%
4) 6.53%
5) 5.78%
6) 6.03%

7) 11.81%
25. What sources do you think are the most important for policy makers to use in
decision-making (Rank of evidence-based reports, 1–7)?
1) 40.40%
2) 18.94%
3) 10.10%
4) 5.56%
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5) 7.58%
6) 6.06%

7) 11.36%

26. What sources do you think your coworkers use in decision-making (Rank of
evidence-based reports, 1–7)?
1) 25.59%
2) 14.12%
3) 12.65%
4) 10.88%
5) 9.41%
6) 9.12%

7) 18.24%

27. What sources do you think your superiors want you to use in decision-making (Rank of
evidence-based reports, 1–7)?
1) 38.64%
2) 15.93%
3) 14.75%
4) 8.26%
5) 5.60%
6) 7.37%
7) 9.44%
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Religion, Nationality, and
Empathetic Responses to Refugees
Reed Rasband

Introduction

Recent years have witnessed a dramatic surge in refugees seeking asylum throughout the developed world. While many of these asylum seekers originate from war-torn
countries in the Middle East, large numbers have also left countries in Africa, Central
America, and Southeast Asia. Contentious national responses to this surge have pitted
supporters of refugee resettlement against those who express concerns over national
security, vetting procedures, and threats to national cultural unity. In the UK, public discourse about refugee resettlement has been accompanied by rising rates of Islamophobic
incidents (Adesina and Marocico 2015; Shepherd 2016; Batchelor 2017).
In these conditions, some opinion groups circulate anxiety-provoking information
about refugees, while at the same time many media outlets choose to run stories portraying refugees as empathy-deserving victims of circumstance. Most research, however,
focuses on the former and not the latter (Brader et al. 2008; Gadarian and Albertson 2014;
Albertson and Gadarian 2015). This leaves us with much less certainty about whether
empathetic media effectively shifts readers’ attitudes toward refugee policies. We also do
not know if these appeals are effective for the population as a whole (versus only a subset) or if appeals about certain types of refugees are more effective than others.
To answer these questions, I implement a survey experiment that exposes UK residents to an empathetic article about refugees, with descriptions that varied the refugees’
religion and national origin. This experiment not only fills the current gap in knowledge
about empathetic outgroup portrayals but also clarifies whether prejudice against certain
immigrant groups reflects their religion or national origin by concurrently manipulating
both. It also accounts for variations in response among individuals with differing degrees
of pre-existing outgroup antipathy by measuring respondents’ attitudes before treatment.
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I find that empathetic media appeals about refugees are effective in generating
empathy and shifting policy opinions for most individuals but hardly influence individuals with strong prior feelings of antipathy toward refugees. For UK residents overall,
opinions are particularly intransigent when considering Muslim refugees. Articles about
Christian refugees dampened active opposition (willingness to send a letter about the
issue to a respondent’s MP) among most people, and articles about non-Christian refugees motivated supportive action among individuals with little prior outgroup antipathy.
Thus, empathetic appeals are ineffective in swaying the citizens who are perhaps their
most important target: strongly prejudiced individuals.

Citizen Responses to Empathetic Appeals

Political psychologists frequently point to affect or emotion as determinant of political attitudes. In particular, a growing set of recent research has explored the connection
between emotions and immigration attitudes, of which refugees are a subset. Research
has shown that different immigrant ethnicities elicit differing levels of anxiety from
Americans and Spaniards (Brader et al. 2008; Igartua and Cheng 2009). Anti-immigrant
media can encourage negative feelings, such as anxiety or anger, which then encourages
restrictive policy attitudes, while pro-immigrant media induces feelings such as sympathy and enthusiasm, which then discourages restrictive attitudes (Verkuyten 2004;
Brader et al. 2008; Iguartua and Cheng 2009; Lecheler et al. 2015). However, experimental
research into how positive emotions, such as empathy, influence support for immigration
has been less extensive. Verkuyten (2004), Lecheler et al. (2015), and Adida et al. (2017) are
among the few articles that take this approach directly. This lack of attention is surprising given the rising level of empathetic immigrant/refugee appeals currently promulgated through traditional and social media. These appeals are common, yet we have little
knowledge of whether they are effective in influencing the American public.
Empathy is an emotional response defined as “the act of perceiving, understanding,
experiencing, and responding to the emotional state and ideas of another person” (Barker
2008, quoted in Gerdes et al. 2010) or “the other-focused, congruent emotion produced by
witnessing another person’s suffering” (Batson et al. 1987). Generally, empathy is measured by self-report measures, where people report how strongly they are feeling a set
of related emotions, such as compassion, sympathy, or tenderness (Batson et al. 2002,
1997; Gerdes et al. 2010). Typical experimental designs expose individuals to information
portraying other people in emotional situations, with the expectation that subjects will
absorb or reflect that same emotional state (Eisenberg and Miller 1987). Some authors also
use exercises that ask respondents to imagine themselves in the place of another person,
a treatment that perhaps adheres more closely to definitions of empathy as a concept but
drifts away from the sorts of stimuli citizens would encounter in an everyday setting
(Adida et al. 2017).
Before considering how empathetic appeals may change public opinion and political behavior, we must first establish that they actually provoke an empathetic emotional
response. If they do, the following expectation would hold:
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H1) Individuals exposed to media that presents refugees in an empathetic light will feel more
empathy than people who are not.
Simply feeling an emotion, such as empathy, in response to media about an outgroup does not guarantee that other variables, such as policy opinions and political
behavior, will also change. Still, research has shown that these outcomes often do
change in response to emotion-generating stimuli. For example, studies show that
enthusiasm increases voting, anxiety increases political learning, and anger increases
campaign involvement (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Valentino et al. 2011). Anxiety
increases people’s propensities to seek further information about immigration threats,
to trust certain political actors, and to favor restrictive immigration policies (Brader et
al. 2008; Gadarian and Alberson 2014; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). These studies
portray emotions as mediating variables between stimuli (news media or campaign ads
about immigration) and public opinion or behavior around immigration issues.
It follows that empathetic appeals may also be effective in shifting these other
outcomes. After all, research on empathy in non-political contexts has yielded results
showing that empathetic treatments encourage prosocial behaviors, such as helping others, while also improving perceptions of stigmatized outgroups (Coke et al.
1978; Eisenberg and Miller 1987; Batson et al. 1987; Batson et al. 2002, 1997). “Taking the perspective of a person in need tends to increase one’s empathic emotional
response [and] empathic emotion in turn increases motivation to see that person’s
need reduced” (Coke et al. 1978). Within political science, Bansak, Hainmueller, and
Hangartner’s (2016) findings that citizens are more likely to approve hypothetical refugee applications if the refugee has experienced trauma, such as torture or the death
of family members, also suggests that empathy can change attitudes and behavior.
Adida et al. (2017) found that empathy treatments were effective in promoting inclusionary attitudes toward refugees and encouraging political action in favor of refugees,
at least among certain subsections of the U.S. population.
If empathetic appeals indeed are effective in generating prosocial attitudes and
behaviors toward refugees, the following expectations would hold in addition to the
hypothesized relationship between these appeals and feeling empathy itself (H1):
H2) Individuals who encounter empathetic media treatments about refugees will (a) be more
likely to hold opinions supporting open refugee policies and (b) will be more likely to act in
support of those opinions.
Up to this point, the hypotheses have implied a uniform treatment effect across
all individuals, yet there is reason to question that assumption. A recent experimental
study that asked individuals to reject or deny hypothetical asylum applications found
that 9 percent of European respondents rejected all applicants, regardless of their skillset or experienced vulnerabilities (Bansak et al. 2016). Adida et al. (2017) also noted a
strong backlash against empathetic refugee appeals among sections of the U.S. populace. These findings indicate the presence of a subset of the population who dislike
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refugees as a group. It is reasonable to suppose that emotional responses to sympathetic
portrayals of refugees and other outgroups might differ for this subset.
There are several approaches to explaining how attitudes may form in this case.
Theories of motivated reasoning indicate that existing affect continues to influence
individuals’ appraisals of new information (Redlawsk 2002; Gadarian and Albertson
2014). In this vein, various studies found that people with strong prior attitudes have
greater difficulty processing concepts that they find affectively incongruent, are more
skeptical of such material and tend to argue against messages that do not match their
existing feelings (Lodge and Taber 2005; Lodge and Taber 2013; Taber and Lodge
2006). For these people, new empathetic information about refugees may be harder
to incorporate into their existing beliefs and may generate counterarguments contradicting the intended message, proving less effective in changing opinions about refugee policy. This effect is similar to that predicted by Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample
(RAS) model, which posits that individuals are less likely to accept new information
that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs (1992).
Another potential explanation for the hard-to-move attitudes among people with
strong outgroup biases is that empathy may trigger distressing emotions as well (Eisenberg et al. 2014). Generally, political psychologists have incorporated this potential for
distress into their theories through the concept of dissonance, a discordant emotional
response that arises when people encounter information about an outgroup that contradicts their core beliefs or existing ideals about themselves, their own in-group,
or an out-group (Gubler 2016; Gubler et al. 2016). These feelings might be generated, for example, if an individual encounters evidence portraying her own group as
violent, or information portraying a stigmatized outgroup positively (Ibid.). Citing
Harmon-Jones, Amodio, and Harmon-Jones (2009), Gubler suggests that dissonant
feelings might be especially common “when the cognitive inconsistency suggests a
new ‘action tendency’ that an individual is loath to adopt—e.g. an individual feels like
he needs to act differently as a result of the new information but knows that behavior
change will be costly or difficult” (2016). In this situation, it may prove more comfortable for the receiver simply to reject the new information or even generate self-justifying arguments that strengthen his or her own attitudes against the outgroup (Ibid.).
Whether we approach this issue from the angle of motivated reasoning or dissonance, the expected result is the same: Individuals with strong negative affect toward
refugees (outgroup antipathy) will be less likely to change their opinions about refugee policies than other individuals. Inasmuch as empathetic media provokes either
phenomenon in these individuals, they may become more likely to support closed
refugee policies and to reveal those attitudes in their political behavior.
H3) Individuals will feel more empathy and exhibit stronger opinions and action
supporting pro-refugee policies as their level of prior outgroup antipathy decreases.
In addition to variation in treatment effects across different types of individuals, it
is probable that treatment effects will also vary for different types of refugees. Studies
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of group attitudes such as prejudice or in-group centrism often find that these attitudes
also relate to attitudes about specific outgroups (Brader et al. 2010; Valentino et al. 2013;
Hutchings and Wong 2014; Gubler 2016; Gubler et al. 2016). Social identity theory suggests that, within specific cultures, some group attributes are more salient markers of
in-group/outgroup categorization and comparison than others (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
Because of this, we might expect empathetic appeals to be especially ineffective for highantipathy individuals considering refugees whose religious, ethnic, or other characteristics particularly set them apart from the cultural norms of the receiving nation.
A large body of recent research in the U.S. and Europe has investigated how attitudes toward refugees and immigrants vary according to immigrant characteristics.
These studies have established that receiving populations consistently prefer the immigration of high-status, educated, and skilled individuals who speak the local language
instead of comparatively low-status individuals, who perhaps may have greater difficulty assimilating into the new culture (Harell et al. 2012; Iyengar et al. 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Bansak et al. 2016; Ostfeld 2017). Investigation of cultural
factors, such as national origin and religion, generally uncovers bias against Middle
Easterners and against Muslims (Igartua and Cheng 2009; Adida et al. 2010; Adida et
al. 2017; Harell et al. 2012; Iyengar et al. 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Bansak
et al. 2016; Adida et al. 2017).
Most of these experiments only vary one or two immigrant traits at a time, making
it difficult to parse out which characteristics provoke differing responses (Hainmueller
and Hopkins 2015; Bansak et al. 2016). This seems to be an especially relevant concern
for generating conclusions about cultural cues like national origin and religion. Some
studies look only at religion without looking at national origin (generally Muslim versus Christian) (Adida et al. 2010; Adida et al. 2017), while others only look at national
origin without separating religion (Sniderman et al. 2004; Harell et al. 2012; Iyengar et
al. 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015). Some authors have suggested religious stereotypes are the salient characteristics that provoke hostility toward immigrants from
the Middle East but acknowledge that no clear conclusions on this issue are possible
without experimentally manipulating both religion and national origin (Sniderman et
al. 2004; Iyengar et al. 2013).
Bansak et al. (2016) is one of the only studies that manipulates both of these variables, in the context of a conjoint experiment asking Europeans to evaluate asylum seekers for admittance. They noted minor differences in asylum acceptance rates between
countries of origin but significantly lower acceptance for Muslims vis-a-vis Christians.
In the present study, I will further elucidate the ambiguity between religious discrimination and national origin discrimination present in the existing literature. Following the general expectations of the authors above, I also expect that most ill will felt
toward Middle Easterners actually reflects religious bias against Muslims, not concerns
about a specific country of origin.
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This hypothesis seems consistent with growing levels of Islamophobic incidents
in the UK (Adesina and Marocico 2015; Shepherd 2016; Batchelor 2017) and would
match the findings of Bansak et al. (2016). Furthermore, Tajfel reports that multigroup
membership and overlapping social identities can help to break down discriminatory
attitudes toward an outgroup (1982). Religion is a social identity category that can either
associate refugees with an overlapping in-group trait (Christianity in the British context)
or further differentiate the refugee outgroup from the ingroup. The degree to which citizens categorize refugees as an outgroup then determines their receptiveness to empathetic appeals about refugees. Refugees’ nationality, in contrast, is a category that few
British residents would share (or perhaps even recognize), making variation in national
origin unhelpful for moderating identity categorizations when all other traits are held
equal or when other, more familiar categories are referenced.
In the context of empathetic media accounts, Islamophobic bias would be manifest
by less significant changes in opinion and behavior outcomes after respondents consider Muslim refugees than when they consider other religious groups. If this hypothesis
holds, religious differences will predict support of refugee policies better than differences
in national origin, especially for individuals who have strong pre-existing biases against
refugees in general.
H4) Empathetic media about Christian refugees will encourage citizens to support open
refugee policies more than media that references Muslim refugees, regardless of the refugees’
national origin.

Experimental Procedure

In order to test these hypotheses, I conducted a survey experiment on a sample of
UK residents. Preliminary results for this experiment come from an online survey performed on Prolific Academic, a UK-based online platform similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk that allows researchers to convenience sample a large and varied, though not
necessarily representative, segment of the UK population (Peer et al. 2017). When used as
response pools for experimental studies, online crowdsourcing markets such as these are
known to yield results that are as valid as results obtained in laboratory or field experiments (Horton et al. 2011; Berinksy, Huber, and Lenz 2012). I fielded the experiment in
September 2017 with a group of 1,421 adult UK residents. A quota mechanism along with
block randomization by gender ensured there would be a balanced gender distribution
across the entire sample and within treatment conditions. More details about the demographic characteristics of the sample are included in Appendix 1.
Successfully testing Hypothesis 4 requires a measure of outgroup antipathy, since
emotional responses should depend in part on those pre-existing attitudes. To do this,
respondents answered three questions asking them to rate, on a seven-point scale,
whether they agreed or disagreed with a statement, such as “Refugees are more prone to
violence than other groups.” The statements were taken from a larger set asked by Gubler
et al. (2016) and are included in Appendix 2.
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These statements were presented in random order at the beginning of the survey.
To minimize social desirability bias, the questions began with the statement, “There
are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We’re simply interested in your honest responses.” In order to minimize priming effects from these statements that might
interfere with the treatments, the respondents completed a number of other questions
on unrelated issues before receiving the treatment or control articles and answering the
remaining questions of this survey.
Respondents also answered a battery of standard questions measuring political psychological characteristics. These questions are primarily taken from the 2015 American
National Election Survey (ANES) and the British Election Study and include measurements of political party affiliation, political ideology (left/right), interest in politics, egalitarianism, and authoritarianism (this last is presented through questions about values in
child rearing).
Following these questions, respondents read either a news article that discussed a
refugee family that resettled in London (the experimental treatment) or an article that
discussed the nutrition value of fruit juice (the placebo control). Random assignment
determined which article respondents read. Presenting the information about the refugees as a news article was done to mimic a real-world context in which UK residents
might encounter similar humanizing appeals.
There were six versions of the treatment article, each of which varied the family’s
national origin and religion following a 2 × 3 design (Syrian Muslim, Syrian Christian,
Syrian no religion, Sudanese Muslim, Sudanese Christian, Sudanese no religion). This
allows analysis based on not only national origin but also religion. The no-religion condition only varied the national origin of the refugees, without any information about their
religious beliefs. The refugees’ names also varied to match the families’ ethnic origins.
Sudan and Syria were chosen as the countries of origin due to their relevance in
the British context and the similarity of the political situation in both countries. Britain
has received a substantial number of refugees from both countries in recent years (UK
Home Office 2017), and both countries have dealt with bloody civil wars that have
received substantial recent coverage from UK and international news media. Besides
this, the two countries have similar levels of average income and education and are
equally distant from the UK, helping us to discard the possibility that respondents’
assumptions about those characteristics will influence their responses. Importantly, for
the sake of treatment credibility, Sudan and Syria both have populations of Christians
and Muslims. Crucially, the ethnic and racial makeup of these countries is distinct, with
most Sudanese asylum seekers being of African origin, while Syrian refugees are generally Arab. These characteristics allow us to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 without large
concerns of confounding variables.
All other characteristics of the family remained constant in all six treatments.
Respondents learned the refugee family had close family members that were killed and
abducted during war in their home countries, had lost their material possessions, had
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ing these questions, respondents responded to a battery of questions measuring their
demographic attributes.
As a manipulation check, respondents answered two questions at the end of the
survey (after completing items measuring their emotions, attitudes, and behavior) that
asked them to identify the family’s religion (from a list of options in random order
including Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or none) and nationality (from
a list including Syria, Sudan, and some additional distractor options). This allows me to
ensure that respondents were truly cognizant of the refugees’ religion and nationality
as they read the article. Results showed that 81.4 percent of treated respondents correctly remembered the religion and 85.5 percent correctly remembered the nationality
of the refugees. This suggests that the manipulation was successful.
The end of the survey included a debriefing disclaimer informing individuals in
the treatment groups that the religion and national origin of the family they read about
may have been modified. All respondents also received a disclaimer that no message
to their MP would actually be sent and that the question was for survey purposes only.
Individuals received the debriefing material after all other data had been collected.
After data collection, successful randomization was confirmed using Wald tests
to search for significant differences between treatment groups for all demographic and
psychological characteristics (see Appendix 1 for details). Results show no systematic differences across treatment groups beyond what would be expected by random
chance. In order to construct the empathy and dissonance dependent variables, factor
analysis with varimax rotation of the fifteen emotion variables yielded two unambiguous factors (empathy and dissonance), which corresponded to my a priori expectations.
Details on the factor loadings for the emotions outcomes are available in Appendix 1.
Each of the antipathy, dissonance, and empathy scales were rescaled from zero to one
for ease of interpretation. The opinion measure was also rescaled from zero to one.

Results

Before sequentially discussing the treatment effects on empathy, opinions, and
political behavior, it will be useful to discuss some details about the outgroup antipathy measure, since it is used as the basis for conditional analysis of all three outcomes.
Responses to the outgroup three antipathy questions yielded an approximately
normally distributed index with a mean of .466, a standard deviation of .213, and Cronbach’s alpha of .644. The somewhat low internal consistency of this scale, although not
substantially different from typical standards, is understandable given that it is composed of only three questions taken from a larger index.
For ease of interpretation, and to avoid imposing a linear form on the relationship of the outcomes with antipathy, interaction effects with antipathy in the subsequent analysis are estimated with conditional effects models that separate the sample
by antipathy level. In these models, high antipathy indicates an index score above .75
(N=130), mid antipathy includes index scores less than or equal to .75 but above .25
(N=1061), and low antipathy indicates an index score of .25 or less (N=230). Although
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the smaller sample size of individuals with high outgroup antipathy is somewhat
problematic for identifying treatment effects within this group, I show below that significant differences are still visible. Regression results that treat the antipathy variable
as continuous show the same patterns as the conditional effects models. Expected
values plots for the continuous models are available in Appendix 1.
Note that the statements used to generate the present results referred to “refugees” in general; respondents were not asked to elaborate on which assumptions, preconceptions, or suppositions guided their answers to the questions that made up the
index. It will be up to future research (including an already-planned extension of this
study) to delve more deeply into how British citizens define refugees as an outgroup.

Figure 1: Mean Anthipathy Levels by Party

As a somewhat newer measure, it will be useful to compare outgroup antipathy
with other political psychological indices. In this sample, outgroup antipathy correlates positively with authoritarianism (ρ = 0.375) and ideology (ρ = 0.426, where the
variable increases from left to right) and negatively with egalitarianism (ρ = -0.363).
Adida et al. (2017) found that reactions to refugee policy differed by party in the U.S.;
Figure 1 shows that within the UK context, antipathy levels also vary with party affiliation, with left-leaning parties showing less antipathy than right-leaning ones.
Treatment Effects on Emotions
Overall, reported empathy increased for individuals who had read the empathetic
media article, as predicted by H1. H2, which deals with the opinion and behavior
outcomes, is discussed in the next sections. As expected from H3, the strength of the
treatment varied according to citizens’ levels of prior outgroup antipathy. Figure 2
shows the expected values of empathy for each religious treatment condition for both
the overall sample and conditional upon levels of prior antipathy. Figure 3 similarly
reports the expected empathy values by nationality treatment condition. Regression
tables for these and all following figures are provided in Appendix 1. Results show that
low-antipathy individuals experienced the largest treatment effects, while mid-antip153
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athy individuals saw milder but still significant increases in empathy. High-antipathy
individuals’ levels of antipathy were not distinguishable from the control.

Figure 2: Expected Values of Empathy by Religion Treatment

Figure 3: Expected Values of Empathy by Nationality Treatment

While Hypothesis 4 predicted differing treatment effects by religion for the opinion outcome, even in the empathy outcome we begin to see indications of religious bias.
These differences are not apparent when observing the sample overall, nor are religious
differences significant for low- and mid-antipathy individuals. Nevertheless, as shown in
Figure 2, high-antipathy individuals’ feelings of empathy are lower after reading about
Muslim refugees. None of the three religious treatments is statistically different from
the control for this subgroup. However, the Muslim treatments elicit significantly lower
empathy than Christian treatments (P<0.007) and treatments where religion is not mentioned (P<0.022). Interestingly, this more detailed analysis also shows that treatment may
not have been completely ineffective for the high-antipathy group: The coefficient for the
Christian and no religion treatments was positive. The difference between the Christian
treatment and the control group nearly attained established significance levels (P<0.109)
and may have reached established benchmarks had a larger number of high-antipathy
individuals been surveyed.
Further analysis tested whether the refugees’ religion or nationality affected feelings
of empathy. As shown in Figure 3, there are no significant differences between Syrian and
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Sudanese treatments vis-à-vis the control, regardless of the respondents’ antipathy level.
Consistent with the expectations of H4, refugee nationality does not seem to affect significantly respondents’ feelings of empathy in response to the treatment article.
Before continuing to the opinion outcome, I provide some basic analysis of reported
dissonance in order to explore at least minimally the mechanisms behind the lack of
treatment effects for high-antipathy individuals. Figure 4 shows expected values plots for
each treatment condition and the control. As happened for empathy, treatment increased
feelings of dissonance overall, although to a much milder degree than it did for empathy. Treatment increased empathy by about .27 points on the empathy scale but did not
surpass an increase of .11 points on the dissonance scale. The significance of the findings
decreased for low-antipathy individuals in Muslim treatment conditions and highantipathy individuals in Christian treatment conditions. In other words, high-antipathy
individuals felt no significant increase in distress when reading about Christian refugees
but did feel this distress when reading about Muslim refugees. This pattern was reversed
for low-antipathy individuals. The fact that all individuals, regardless of their level of
prior antipathy, felt relatively similar levels of dissonance leaves open the possibility that
respondents at either end of the antipathy scale are reporting the same emotions for different reasons. I discuss this possibility further in the discussion section.

Figure 4: Expected Dissonance Levels

Treatment Effects on Opinions
Figure 5 shows expected values for opinions on refugee policy in the UK by religion and antipathy level. H2a predicted that empathetic media appeals would also affect
respondents’ opinions about refugee policy in addition to producing empathy itself. Supporting this expectation, results show a slight, yet significant, shift in public opinion away
from reducing refugee intake.
H3 predicted conditional effects according to prior antipathy. Subdividing analysis by antipathy group, we see basically the same patterns for opinions as were visible
for the empathy outcome, consistent with H3. Low-antipathy individuals shifted their
already-welcoming opinions toward admitting even more refugees in response to all
treatments. Mid-antipathy individuals also saw treatment effects on opinion but only for
individuals who read about Christians or refugees without a specified religion; Muslim
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treatments generated null effects compared to the control. High-antipathy individuals
advocated a drastic reduction in refugee intake regardless of which article they read.
Differences between the treatment groups are not significant for this subset of respondents, but average opinions in the Muslim treatment are lower than for the other treatment groups, just as they were for empathy.

Figure 5: Expected Opinion Levels

The lack of opinion change in the Muslim treatment condition for high- and midantipathy individuals provides evidence of the Islamophobic religious bias anticipated
by H4. However, the fact that these differences were significant for the large group of
mid-antipathy individuals contrasts with the observations for empathy and also suggests that anti-Muslim bias extends far beyond just a small segment of the population.
Utilizing the same analytical strategy as for the empathy outcome, I found that refugee
national origin was not a significant factor in changing citizens’ opinions. As shown in
Figure 6, the expected values of the opinion index for the Syrian treatments are virtually

Figure 6: Expected Opinion Levels by Refugee Nationality
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identical to those of the Sudanese treatments, regardless of respondents’ levels of prior
outgroup antipathy.
Treatment Effects on Behavior
With regard to the behavior outcome, by far the most common choice for responding
citizens was not to take action on the proposed bill to allow admittance to refugees’ families. Overall, 56.3 percent chose not to send a letter to their parliamentary representative,
29.9 percent chose to send a message in support of the bill, and 13.8 percent chose to voice
their opposition to the bill. Because the behavior measure allowed for three potential
outcomes, analysis was performed using multinomial logistic regression, with no action
being the baseline outcome for comparison. Multinomial logistic regression was used
instead of ordered logistic regression since the three behavior outcomes do not fit onto a
single ordered schema; the support and oppose option both indicate greater willingness
to act than the option to not send any message at all, but they do so in opposite directions
in terms of openness toward refugees.
Figure 7 shows predicted propensities of active support for the pro-refugee bill
for the whole sample and for each antipathy subgroup, as generated from the regression results. Figure 8 shows the propensities of active opposition to the pro-refugee
bill. The results table for these figures is available in Appendix 1. The results show that
the behavior measure is the only outcome variable for which no treatment effects are
distinguishable over the entire sample, contradicting the expectations of H2b. Whether
treatments are analyzed by religion or by nationality, no significant differences in action
propensity are visible relative to the control. Wald tests between the regression coefficients of the nationality analysis, both overall and by antipathy subgroup, show that
supportive action for the Sudanese treatment groups was slightly higher than the Syrian treatment groups. However, this effect only reached the 0.05 significance level when
analysis was conducted on the sample overall (not in analyses divided by antipathy
level). The fact that at least one difference in nationality treatment effects reached
significance for the behavior outcome but not for opinion or empathy indicates that
political behavior is a separate phenomenon from those outcomes that may be susceptible to nation-of-origin priming effects.
As shown, the propensity to actively support the bill increases as outgroup antipathy decreases, while the propensity to actively oppose the bill increases as antipathy
increases. In most cases, however, this pattern only represents a prior attitudes effect,
not a treatment effect interacting with prior outgroup antipathy as was observed in the
empathy and opinions outcomes. The propensity to actively support or oppose the bill
was statistically indistinguishable from the control condition in nearly all treatment conditions, regardless of the degree to which respondents reported prior outgroup antipathy.
However, when treatments are examined by antipathy subgroup, two conditional
effects do emerge, as shown in the conditional effects plots from Figures 7 and 8. First,
an action motivation effect is observed for low-antipathy individuals who read articles
about Muslim refugees or about refugees without reference to religion (Fig. 7). These
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individuals are more likely to request a letter be sent expressing their support for the bill
than individuals who read about Christians or who read the placebo article. No treatment effects are observed for high-antipathy individuals. It is, however, notable that not
a single high-antipathy individual chose to act in support of the bill after reading about
Muslim refugees (this was the only treatment category that generated zero proponents
among an antipathy subgroup).
Second, an action inhibition effect is observed for mid-antipathy individuals who
received a treatment about Christian refugees (Fig. 8). These individuals are less likely to
actively oppose the bill than are mid-level individuals who read about other refugees or
received the placebo article.

Figure 7: Percentage of Sample Choosing to Actively Support Refugees

Figure 8: Percentage of Sample Choosing to Actively Oppose Refugees

Discussion
H1) Empathetic Media Promotes Empathy
While this hypothesis may seem simple, it was by no means a guarantee. Indeed,
roughly 9 percent of individuals (those with high levels of outgroup antipathy) saw
no statistically significant change in empathy vis-à-vis the control. Still, we can reject
the null for this hypothesis with strong confidence, as reading an empathetic article about refugees, on average, produced a highly significant increase of 0.27 on the
empathy scale.
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H2) Empathetic Media Encourages More Open Policy Opinions and Pro-Refugee Action
The behavior results suggest that empathetic treatments are not very effective
in modifying political behavior for the British public at large, but that they can have
some results for subsets of the population. Interestingly, the same treatments that are
the least effective in mobilizing pro-refugee action for low-antipathy individuals (that
is, articles about Christian refugees) are the most effective in dampening anti-refugee
action in the much larger group of individuals with moderate amounts of outgroup
antipathy. More generally, these results suggest that opposition toward refugees in
the general public is best palliated by media that present those refugees as sharing a
dominant cultural trait with the receiving country (in this case, Christianity). Meanwhile, the subset of individuals that are already very open to refugees are most likely
to act when primed with information about refugees that do not match wider societal norms, perhaps out of a feeling that these individuals in a religious or other
minority are the most in need of active advocacy.
H3) Treatment Effects Are Conditional on Pre-Existing Levels of Outgroup Antipathy
Differences in treatment magnitude and significance according to respondents’
levels of prior outgroup antipathy were the most consistent findings across all three
outcome variables. In all cases, the high-antipathy group was the most impervious to
change in aggregate emotions, opinions, or behavior after reading the treatment articles. While the small sample size of high-antipathy individuals means we should not
immediately assume there is absolutely no treatment effect for this group (after all,
mean opinions and empathy in the Christian and No Religion treatment groups were
higher than the control average for this group), any effect is likely to be relatively small.
On the other hand, the largest effect sizes took place among low-antipathy individuals. Within the placebo control group, these individuals had a similar level of latent
empathy levels as any other antipathy group, but they had the highest levels of empathy
among any treated individuals. While this group was already the most likely to favor
open refugee policies in the control condition, they evinced even stronger opinions and
action in favor of refugees after reading the empathetic media article. Predictably, the
results for mid-level antipathy individuals fall in between those of the high- and lowantipathy groups.
These findings support the expectations of Hypothesis 3. However, they do not indicate which (if any) of the mechanisms proposed above are responsible for the patterns we
see here. Feelings of dissonance increased slightly for all individuals, although the patterns were slightly different for low- and high-antipathy groups. Furthermore, the
measurement of dissonance itself does not explain why individuals reacted with those
feelings. The negative feelings reported may have been due to a clash of new information
with individuals’ prior beliefs, but they may also be evidence of distress felt in response
to the difficult situations reported in the treatment articles. Either or both of these pathways may have led to greater feelings of dissonance, and the pathway itself may have
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varied according to prior levels of antipathy. Determining what theory best explains the
phenomena capsulated by Hypothesis 3 will be a task for further research.
H4) Citizen Reactions Show Differences According to Refugee Religion
All three outcomes showed differing treatment effects according to refugee religion,
although these differences were sometimes limited to specific antipathy subgroups.
Overall, the results showed patterns of Islamophobia; high-antipathy individuals felt
significantly less empathy after reading about Muslim refugees than they did after
reading about Christians, and the Muslim treatments were the only treatments that
did not elicit more open refugee policy opinions for the large group of mid-antipathy
respondents (75 percent of the sample). For the behavior outcome, aggregate opposition only decreased for most individuals when confronted with Christian refugees, the
group that shared Britain’s dominant religion.
No significant differences existed between Sudanese and Syrian treatments for
opinions and empathy, although some positive differences were visible in the behavior
measure. These results within the fully crossed experimental treatment design confirm
the suppositions of past authors that religion, not national origin, is indeed the more
salient factor driving public opinion about refugee and immigrant admission (Sniderman et al. 2004; Iyengar et al. 2013).

Conclusion

The results of this study are preliminary, and questions linger over how responses
may have differed if treatments varied additional refugee characteristics or if the experimental sample had been truly representative of the UK population. Furthermore, the
comparison between Sudan and Syria alone does not allow us to determine what underlying opinions about those countries (apart from religion) are at work in influencing
attitudes. Finally, we do not know exactly why respondents’ pre-existing attitudes influence their appraisals of empathetic appeals, although a clear relationship exists. Still, we
can maintain a high level of certainty in attributing causality to the relationship between
empathetic media portrayals and respondent’s feelings, opinions, and actions.
This experiment proposed to address several limitations in the current literature
on attitudes toward refugees and immigrants. First, this study focuses specifically on
refugees, who migrate for different reasons than typical economic immigrants and
may elicit differing responses from citizens in receiving countries (Verkuyten 2004;
Bansak et al. 2016). The results indicate that empathetic media accounts of refugees
raise general feelings of empathy and shift opinions about refugee policy toward
greater admittance. While methods of demonstrating variable mediation are contested and are not presented here (after all, empathy was not manipulated separately
from the treatment itself), it is possible that positive emotions, such as empathy, drive
changes in opinion and political behavior, as other scholars have shown happens with
negative emotions (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Albertson and Gadarian 2015).
Regardless of the psychological pathway this effect takes, these results show that fear
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and anxiety are not the only emotions that can sway the court of public opinion. Purveyors of media that empathizes with or humanizes outgroups may have confidence
that their accounts are persuasive for the general public, although they may have less
efficacy in promoting political action.
Second, by varying both the religion and the national origin of the refugee family
in the treatment prime, this study allows us to distinguish between two cultural factors that may elicit differing responses in receiving citizens. This improves on past
research that has only looked at variation in one or the other of these characteristics.
Notably, accounts about Muslim refugees were the least effective in shifting opinions
about refugee issues. This demonstrates the difficulty that opinion leaders face in combating religious prejudice in public opinion about immigration. It also suggests that,
at least in the UK, the best way to encourage positive perceptions about refugees is to
either emphasize a trait that the refugees share with the local populace (such as Christianity) or to avoid the topic of religion altogether.
Finally, this paper explores how empathetic media appeals about outgroups
influence citizens’ emotions, opinions, and actions. Beyond addressing the general lack
of research on how positive affect influences opinions on refugees, this experiment
allows us to distinguish between the empathy and dissonance felt by experimental subjects and to observe patterns between these feelings and individuals’ prior outgroup
antipathy. These results show that, for the general population, empathetic appeals successfully encourage positive affect and opinions about refugees. However, these
appeals have little effect for people who feel the most negatively about refugees.
This is especially concerning given that people with outgroup antipathy would be
clear targets for empathetic appeals. Thus, while empathetic appeals may preach to
the choir that already supports refugees and even win over a section of the public
without strong set opinions, they are unlikely to change the feelings of the most
prejudiced subset of individuals.
These individuals’ attitudinal intransigence suggests competing policy
responses: On one hand, opinion leaders seeking to promote greater empathy for
refugees might need to recalibrate drastically their messages if they seek to persuade this group. Alternatively, they might develop messages that do not even
attempt to sway the possibly unswayable but instead focus their energies motivating those who already favor refugee resettlement to advocate for them more vociferously (as was shown to be possible in these results). The results of this experiment
were one-time and short-term; it is a possibility that a longer media campaign may be
effective in wearing down hardened opinions against refugee resettlement. However,
regardless of the tack one takes in responding to these individuals, the fact that
a sizable percentage of the British public harbors unyielding prejudicial opinions
about refugees is worrying. Its implications for refugee and immigration policy, as
well as for democratic politics in increasingly diverse Western nations, should be
the topic of further research.
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APPENDIX 1
Additional Results, Tables and Figures

Randomization checks conducted using Wald tests to search for significant differences

in observable traits between all treatment groups. Tests covered all demographic and psychological traits with more than one hundred observations. Of 357 pairwise comparisons, 2.8

percent were significant at the 95 percent level, well within levels of what would be expected
by random chance.

Factor Loadings for the Empathy and Dissonance Scales

Factor analysis with varimax rotation of the fifteen emotion variables yielded two unam-

biguous factors, one which I call empathy (λ = 5.58) and one which I call dissonance (λ = 2.21).

Both of these factors corresponded to my a priori expectations. A third factor, which I call positive
affect, had an Eigen value of 0.80. Using the highest-loading emotions within each factor, I con-

structed two scales. The empathy scale (α = 0.9254) includes the emotions “compassion,” “warm,”

“softhearted,” “tender,” “sympathetic,” and “moved.” The dissonance scale (α = 0.8642) includes
“bothered,” “tense,” “angry,” “anxious,” “afraid,” and “uncomfortable.” Anger was the only emo-

tion included on this scale that was not expected in the experimental design phase. Results for
dissonance change very little with or without the inclusion of anger in the scale.
Regression Results of Treatment Effects by Nationality and Religion

As discussed in the main body of the paper, there are no significant differences between

the Syrian and Sudanese coefficients for any outcome. For supportive action, the Sudanese
treatment effect is statistically significant while the Syrian treatment effect is not. However,

the confidence intervals around the coefficients overlap greatly. Tables 2 and 3 give the OLS

regression results for the empathy and opinion outcomes, respectively. Table 4 gives multinomial logistic regression results for the behavior outcomes. Both overall sample estimates and
conditional estimates are provided.

Tables 5–8 show regression results for models that test for religious treatment effects. Both

overall sample estimates and conditional estimates are provided.
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Table 1: Sample Demographic Characteristics
Gender

%

Marital Status

%

Female

50.46%

Married

38.63%

Male

49.54%

Single

31.81%

Cohabitating

21.62%

Divorced

3.38%

Race
White

92.47%

Black

1.27%

Annual Income

Asian

4.01%

< £20,000

28.80%

Other/Mixed

2.32%

< £40,000; ≥ £20,000

38.24%

< £70,000; ≥ £40,000

24.65%

≥ £70,000

7.30%

Age

36.77 (mean)

Table 2: Nationality Treatment effects on Empathy
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Syrian

0.269***
(0.0200)

0.0187
(0.0673)

0.265***
(0.0224)

0.424***
(0.0424)

Sudanese

0.271***
(0.0200)

0.101
(0.0678)

0.245***
(0.0225)

0.469***
(0.0415)

Constant

0.244***
(0.0173)

0.238***
(0.0592)

0.258***
(0.0197)

0.203***
(0.0344)

Observations

1,419

130

1,059

230

R-squared

0.128

0.031

0.123

0.378

OLS Regression with the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Nationality Treatment effects on Opinion
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Syrian

0.0524**
(0.0250)

0.0662
(0.0519)

0.0742***
(0.0267)

0.101**
(0.0439)

Sudanese

0.0664***
(0.0250)

0.0275
(0.0522)

0.0888***
(0.0268)

0.0986**
(0.0430)

Constant

0.433***
(0.0217)

0.0588
(0.0457)

0.404***
(0.0234)

0.667***
(0.0356)

Observations

1,419

130

1,059

230

R-squared

0.128

0.031

0.123

0.378

OLS Regression with the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Behavior on National Treatments
Action to Oppose the Bill
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Syrian

-0.284
(0.231)

-0.288
(0.568)

-0.471*
(0.275)

0.405
(0.913)

Sudanese

-0.222
(0.232)

-0.298
(0.571)

-0.395
(0.276)

0.480
(0.914)

Constant

-1.192***
(0.196)

-0
(0.500)

-1.241***
(0.232)

-2.351***
(0.740)

Action to Support the Bill
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Syrian

-0.0722
(0.189)

-0.693
(1.287)

-0.0776
(0.234)

0.629
(0.383)

Sudanese

0.205
(0.186)

-1.355
(1.469)

0.207
(0.231)

0.915**
(0.382)

Constant

-0.693***
(0.164)

-2.079**
(1.061)

-0.922***
(0.206)

0.0465
(0.305)

Observations

1,421

130

1,061

230

Pseudo R-squared

0.002

0.005

0.004

0.016

Multinomial logistic regression with “No action” as the omitted outcome category and the placebo
control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Religion Treatment Effects on Empathy
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Christian

0.272***
(0.0213)

0.112
(0.0693)

0.259***
(0.0237)

0.430***
(0.0464)

Muslim

0.256***
(0.0212)

-0.0450
(0.0721)

0.241***
(0.0237)

0.445***
(0.0443)

No Religion

0.282***
(0.0212)

0.0873
(0.0695)

0.266***
(0.0237)

0.467***
(0.0459)

Constant

0.244***
(0.0173)

0.238***
(0.0583)

0.258***
(0.0197)

0.203***
(0.0345)

Observations

1,419

130

1,059

230

R-squared

0.129

0.070

0.123

0.376

OLS Regression with the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

164

RASBAND

Table 6: Religion Treatment Effects on Dissonance
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Christian

0.0771***
(0.0174)

0.0860*
(0.0518)

0.0645***
(0.0213)

0.101***
(0.0348)

Muslim

0.0685***
(0.0173)

0.110**
(0.0539)

0.0591***
(0.0213)

0.0653*
(0.0332)

No Religion

0.115***
(0.0173)

0.136***
(0.0520)

0.0971***
(0.0212)

0.161***
(0.0344)

Constant

0.135***
(0.0142)

0.0858*
(0.0435)

0.159***
(0.0176)

0.0806***
(0.0259)

Observations

1,418

130

1,058

230

R-squared

0.031

0.054

0.020

0.094

OLS Regression with the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors in
parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Religion Treatment Effects on Opinions
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Christian

0.0637**
(0.0265)

0.0692
(0.0544)

0.0891***
(0.0282)

0.124**
(0.0478)

Muslim

0.0350
(0.0265)

0.0115
(0.0566)

0.0409
(0.0282)

0.0869*
(0.0457)

No Religion

0.0798***
(0.0265)

0.0537
(0.0546)

0.114***
(0.0281)

0.0918*
(0.0473)

Constant

0.433***
(0.0217)

0.0588
(0.0457)

0.404***
(0.0233)

0.667***
(0.0356)

Observations

1,419

130

1,059

230

R-squared

0.008

0.021

0.020

0.030

OLS Regression with the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Multinomial Regression of Behavior on Religious Treatments
Action to Oppose the Bill
VARIABLES

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Christian

-0.369
(0.249)

-0.201
(0.592)

-0.661**
(0.303)

0.454
(0.965)

Muslim

-0.266
(0.247)

-0.511
(0.619)

-0.364
(0.291)

0.560
(0.968)

No Religion

-0.126
(0.246)

-0.211
(0.597)

-0.292
(0.293)

0.272
(1.054)

-1.192***
(0.196)

-7.37e-06
(0.500)

-1.241***
(0.232)

-2.351***
(0.740)

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Constant

All

Action to Support the Bill
VARIABLES

All

Christian

-0.0994
(0.200)

-1.012
(1.473)

-0.0502
(0.246)

0.454
(0.416)

Muslim

0.0504
(0.198)

-14.22
(772.1)

-0.0551
(0.247)

0.955**
(0.411)

No Religion

0.252
(0.197)

-0.272
(1.293)

0.295
(0.242)

0.894**
(0.424)

-0.693***
(0.164)

-2.079**
(1.060)

-0.922***
(0.206)

0.0465
(0.305)

Constant
Observations

1,421

130

1,061

230

Pseudo R-squared

0.003

0.018

0.005

0.020

Multinomial logistic regression with “No action” as the omitted outcome category and the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Linear Analysis of Treatment Interactions with Prior Outgroup Antipathy
Linear analysis of treatment effects by refugee nationality shows the same patterns as condi-

tional analysis. No significant differences in response to Syrian and Sudanese refugees are visible.
For supportive action, the Sudanese treatment effect is statistically significant while the Syrian treat-

ment effect is not. However, the confidence intervals around the coefficients overlap greatly. Table

9 gives regression results for all three outcome variables. Figure A1 shows the expected values for

empathy across all antipathy levels. Figure A2 shows the expected rates of support across all antipathy levels.
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Table 9: Linear regression of national treatment effects on Empathy,
Opinion, and Political Behavior
Behavior Outcomes
VARIABLES

Empathy

Opinion

Action to Oppose

Action to Support

Antipathy

0.111
(0.0701)

-0.833***
(0.0742)

5.032***
(1.190)

-3.527***
(0.875)

Syrian

0.561***
(0.0421)

0.123***
(0.0445)

0.00956
(0.876)

0.659
(0.443)

Sudanese

0.549***
(0.0417)

0.118***
(0.0441)

0.283
(0.878)

1.325***
(0.450)

Syrian × Antipathy

-0.617***
(0.0826)

-0.0965
(0.0874)

-0.719
(1.390)

-1.445
(1.057)

Sudanese ×
Antipathy

-0.608***
(0.0827)

-0.0953
(0.0875)

-1.003
(1.404)

-2.541**
(1.076)

Constant

0.194***
(0.0354)

0.808***
(0.0374)

-3.991***
(0.743)

0.665*
(0.362)

Observations

1,418

1,418

R-squared

0.266

0.401
0.153

0.153

Pseudo R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Empathy and Opinion results come from OLS regressions. Behavior results come from a single
multinomial logistic regression with “no action” as the baseline.
Figure A1: Expected Values of Empathy by Refugee Nationality
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Figure A2: Expected Rates of Supportive Action by Refugee Nationality

Results from analysis with antipathy as a continuous variable mirror the conditional analysis

reported in the main body of the paper. Table 10 gives regression results for all outcomes. Treat-

ment increases empathy, but to a decreasing degree as antipathy increases. Treatment also moves
opinions toward supporting greater refugee admission, although anti-Muslim bias is less evident

than in the conditional results. Null treatment effects are observed for opposing action to the refugee

bill, but significant effects from the Muslim and no religion treatments are visible for supporting
action. A negative interaction effect between the Muslim treatment and prior antipathy suggests

that, when considering Muslim refugees, low-antipathy individuals are the most likely to actively
support refugee admission, while high-antipathy individuals are especially likely to actively oppose

it. Figures A3, A4, and A5 show the expected values for empathy, opinions, and supportive behavior,
respectively.
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Table 10: Linear Regression of Religion Treatment Effects on Empathy,
Opinion, and Political Behavior
VARIABLES

Empathy

Opinion

Action to Oppose

Antipathy

0.111
(0.0701)

-0.833***
(0.0739)

5.032***
(1.190)

-3.527***
(0.875)

Christian

0.530***
(0.0451)

0.146***
(0.0476)

-0.439
(0.954)

0.713
(0.484)

Muslim

0.573***
(0.0444)

0.116**
(0.0468)

0.728
(0.925)

1.177**
(0.479)

No Religion

0.558***
(0.0447)

0.101**
(0.0472)

0.164
(0.932)

1.106**
(0.485)

Christian × Antipathy

-0.551***
(0.0886)

-0.131
(0.0935)

-0.0967
(1.504)

-1.726
(1.160)

Muslim × Antipathy

-0.685***
(0.0876)

-0.147
(0.0924)

-1.847
(1.483)

-2.560**
(1.149)

No Religion × Antipathy

-0.595***
(0.0881)

-0.0100
(0.0930)

-0.688
(1.481)

-1.753
(1.143)

Constant

0.194***
(0.0353)

0.808***
(0.0373)

-3.991***
(0.743)

0.665*
(0.362)

1,420

1,420

0.155

0.155

Observations

1,418

1,418

R-squared

0.269

0.406

Pseudo R-squared

Action to Support

Figure A3: Expected Values of Empathy by Refugee Religion
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Figure A4: Expected Values of Opinions by Refugee Religion

Figure A5: Expected Rates of Supportive Action by Refugee Nationality
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APPENDIX 2
Question Wording and Treatments
Outgroup Antipathy Measure

The following three questions were interspersed with distractor questions on other issues and

then used to compose the outgroup antipathy scale. Respondents could answer using a Seven-point
Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree.”

Below are a number of statements that you may or may not agree with. Please indicate to what

degree you agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or wrong answers to these
questions. We’re simply interested in your honest responses.

● Refugees are more prone to violence than other groups

● Providing increased opportunities (jobs, education) for refugees in the UK means decreasing
opportunities for other residents.

● Refugees have moral values and customs from which UK residents could learn.
Treatment Articles

The following article was shown to individuals in the Syrian Christian treatment. In Suda-

nese treatments, all instances of “Syria,” “Syrian,” and “Homs” were replaced with “Sudan,”
“Sudanese,” and “Karmuk,” respectively. In Muslim treatments, all instances of “Christian,” were

replaced with “Muslim,” or, in the eighth paragraph, “Islamic.” All instances of “Jesus,” “church,”

and “Bible” were replaced with “Allah,” “mosque,” and “Quran,” respectively. In the no religion
treatments, all religious vocabulary, along with the two sentences in the eighth paragraph that

detail the family’s worship practices, were omitted. Names varied in all treatments in order to
realistically match names common within each religion and national community.

Please carefully read the following news article. You will be asked questions later about its

contents:

“How one Christian refugee family from Syria is starting over in London”
Susanna Assali, a recently arrived Christian refugee, talks about what happened to her

brother in Homs, Syria. He was pulled over at a military checkpoint, accused of being an antigovernment activist, she says. He was tortured and nearly killed.

Her husband, Yakob Olikara also has his reasons — what happened to his brothers. One was

killed by a landmine. Another brother went missing.

“We were looking in the hospitals and police stations,” he says. “All of a sudden, a friend of

ours called and he said, ‘There’s someone on the street who looks like your brother.’” It was. His

brother had been tossed on the street dead, bound by his hands and feet. He worked at a sugar
factory when Syrian soldiers — arbitrarily, Olikara says — rounded him and others up, suspecting

them of being on the wrong side of the civil war. Olikara says his brother stayed clear of politics,
but the violence is indiscriminate.

The next day, the couple fled with their young children.

Now, everything’s different. In February, they arrived in London. Their journey was long,

three years in all, after living in a refugee camp in Jordan. There were numerous interviews and
security checks until, finally, they got word that they would be resettled in the United Kingdom.
171

SIGMA
“It’s utter and pure luck,” says Karen Thompson, executive director of the International Rescue
Committee (IRC) in London.

Olikara says he and his family would have been happy anywhere they felt safe. “Sweden,

the United States, Britain, wherever. We are so thankful to be here,” he says. The couple says they
believe Jesus has helped them to make this new life possible.

The family’s only material possessions from Syria are a few photos. The couple’s 9-year-

old daughter, Sara, keeps them tidy in a small album. Pictures show the relatives left behind:
Assali’s mom and her two brothers, who are disabled and can’t make the journey out of Syria.

It’s a reality that weighs on the parents, but, like other Syrian Christian refugees,

they’re trying to focus on building a life here. They attend services regularly at their local
church, and this has helped them make friends who share their Christian faith. They also
enjoy studying the Bible once a week with other members of their community.

Olikara, who was a farmer and truck driver before, got a job fast as a cook at a local

restaurant. The family also wants to meet people, and people here want to meet them. Their

neighbor, Jared Park, who stopped by their flat on a recent afternoon, remembers seeing the

family when they first moved in. “They’re lonely,” says Park “They don’t know anybody
around here. They don’t have the language. Nothing, nothing.”

But both parents say they want to return to Syria one day, when it’s stable. Where they will

live, though, is another question. They just got bad news about their home. “I received some
pictures. Destroyed,” says Olikara.

So they’re focused on being here, and exploring the countryside in the family’s first big

purchase: a mini-van. A friend at their Christian church gave them a deal.

Tomorrow, Olikara takes the driver’s test. It’ll be a challenge for him, but nothing com-

pared to what he and his family have survived.
Placebo Control Article

The following article was shown to all individuals in the control condition.
Please carefully read the following news article:
“Will 100% fruit juice make your child gain weight?”
Sugar can easily sneak into the diet, both for you and for your child, even through 100% fruit

juices.

Many health experts have even expressed concerns that the content of naturally occurring sug-

ars in such juices can have negative health effects on children, such as increasing the risk for obesity.

The relationship between 100% fruit juice consumption and weight gain has been analyzed in

a study published in the journal Pediatrics on Thursday.

The study suggests that drinking 100% fruit juice is associated with a slight amount of weight

gain in children 6 and younger who have one serving a day, but no association was found for children 7 and older who have one serving a day.

Yet the study has some limitations, and it recommends drinking 100% fruit juice only in

moderation.
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“I think caution is definitely in order and that when possible, parents should give whole fruit

to kids, instead of fruit juice,” said Dr. Brandon Auerbach, a primary care physician and instructor
at the University of Washington’s Division of General Internal Medicine in Seattle. “Water or low-fat
unsweetened milk are other good alternatives to 100% fruit juice.”

Auerbach, lead author of the new study, said he is the parent of a 7-month-old boy who soon

may be offered fruit juices in day care and at school.

“I share the concern that 100% fruit juices have a lot of sugar, even though it’s naturally occur-

ring sugar,” he said. “There are other health concerns about drinking 100% fruit juice, besides weight
gain, especially related to risk of cavities and risk of future metabolic syndrome or diabetes.”

The study was a systemic review and meta-analysis of eight previous observational studies on

100% fruit juice consumption and weight gain among children, based on their body mass indexes
or BMI.

The analysis showed that consuming 100% fruit juice was slightly associated with weight gain

in children 1 to 6 years old, but not enough to potentially harm health, Auerbach said.

The researchers found that in children ages 1 to 6, consumption of one daily serving was associ-

ated with a weight gain of 0.3 pounds or less over one year. In children 7 and older, 100% fruit juice
was not independently associated with any weight gain.

“I was somewhat surprised by the results, given that some types of 100% fruit juice have com-

parable amounts of sugar as regular soda,” Auerbach said.

He added, however, that the study certainly had some limitations.

“Although we combined evidence from the best available research, the studies were not ran-

domized controlled trials,” Auerbach said. “We did not examine other important health outcomes
besides weight gain, such as diabetes risk, because too few studies exist on this topic in children.”

The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that children ages 1 to 6 drink no more than

4 to 6 ounces of 100% fruit juice a day. For children 7 to 18, juice intake should be limited to 8 to 12
ounces, or 2 servings, per day.

It’s not recommended to give fruit juices to infants, Auerbach said. He concluded, “Our study

findings support the current guidelines of the American Academy of Pediatrics on 100% fruit juice
consumption.”

As for adults, the US Dietary Guidelines for Americans recommend drinking no more than one

cup, or 8 ounces, of 100% fruit juice a day.
Behavior Measures

The procedures section of this paper details the administration of the emotion and opinion

outcomes. The following gives the exact wording of the behavior question:

There is currently a bill proposed before Parliament that would allow family members of refugees to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. The bill would also make available legal aid for

these family reunion cases. Would you like us to send an email message to members of Parliament indicating either your support or opposition to this reform?
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The text of the e-mail would read:
Dear MP,
It has come to my attention that a bill, the Refugees (Family Reunion) (No. 2) Bill, has been

proposed that will allow refugees’ family members to enter or remain in the UK. I (oppose/
support) this bill and urge you to do the same.
Sincerely,
Your constituent
● Yes, please send a notice indicating my support for admitting the family members of refugees.

● Yes, please send a notice indicating my opposition to admitting the family members of
refugees.

● No, please do not send a notice on my behalf.
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The Price of Scottish Independence:
Why Remaining a Part of the UK
Still Makes Sense in the Wake of
Brexit
Lincoln Wilcox

Introduction

On 23 June 2016, the citizens of the UK voted to leave the EU in a historic referendum. The “Leave” camp obtained a mostly unexpected victory by a narrow margin of
52 percent to 48 percent. The results shocked the EU, since the UK was one of its most
powerful member states. Analysts began providing various explanations as to how the
“Brexit” would occur and what it would mean for the UK and the European community.
Although Great Britain as a whole voted to leave, a regional breakdown of the voting revealed a more complicated story. Majorities voted to leave the EU in both England
and Wales—but Northern Ireland, and especially Scotland, voted strongly in support of
remaining. Scotland in particular had a 62 percent majority vote to stay, suggesting the
Scot’s interests diverged from those of their southern neighbors.
These results are particularly significant given the recent independence referendum
held in Scotland in September 2014 to decide whether Scotland should become an independent country, which resulted in a victory for the proponents of staying a part of the
UK. The margin of victory, though clear, was not high, with 55 percent voting to stay and
nearly 45 percent advocating Scotland’s exit from Great Britain. The high voter turnout of
84 percent of the population signaled that people broadly and passionately cared about
the consequences.
The results of the Brexit referendum may have changed the game for many Scottish
voters. In the previous Scottish independence referendum, Scots decided whether the
benefits of independence outweighed the costs of leaving the UK; however, they made
this decision under the assumption of remaining a part of the EU in either case. Scottish
voters have demonstrated their desire to remain a part of the EU, and Brexit forces them
to weigh this desire against the costs of leaving the UK. Scottish politicians have, there177

SIGMA
fore, declared that Scotland ought to have a right to another referendum. Scotland’s secession from the UK has the potential to cripple or perhaps dissolve the entity altogether.
On the other hand, a second defeat in an independence referendum would likely put the
debate surrounding independence to rest for a long period into the future.
A number of issues have dominated Scottish political discussion surrounding the
possibility of leaving the UK. If Scotland wishes to become independent in hopes of
rejoining the EU, it must consider the implications of separating from the UK. Issues to
consider include economics, defense, energy, international relations, healthcare, nationalism, family and cultural ties, and the timing of a new independence referendum. In this
paper, I analyze each of these issues in turn. Altogether, the optimal present solution is for
Scotland to focus on maintaining unity with its UK neighbors until the Brexit negotiations
take place and policy implications become clearer.

The Evolution of Scotland’s Independence Movement

The original events that precipitated the current manifestation of Scottish nationalism and independence reform have roots that stretch back for centuries in British history
(Broun 2007, p. 1). While these events will become more relevant in the discussion of
nationalism later in the paper, this section’s outline of relevant events will focus only on
the more recent period leading up to the call by Nicola Sturgeon, the current first minister
of Scotland and the leader of the pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP), for a
second Scottish independence referendum. This period began in 1997, when a successful
devolution referendum won a significant victory for the Scottish independence movement. The referendum demonstrated wide support for the idea of increased autonomy
for Scotland, and the British Parliament thereafter agreed to the 1998 Scotland Act, which
created the Scottish Parliament (Flamini 2013, p. 61).
A push for independence grew in popularity in the following decade. The SNP,
which promised an independence referendum as part of its electoral platform, became
the largest party in the Scottish Parliament after the 2007 elections and won an overall
majority in 2011. At that time, First Minister Alex Salmond negotiated with the British Parliament to hold an independence referendum, which London agreed to authorize. The referendum caused a sharp divide along a number of issues and ultimately
amounted to the previously mentioned result of 55 percent to 45 percent in favor of
remaining part of the UK.
The nature and dimensions of the Scottish push for independence have evolved over
time. According to Mikesell and Murphy, the political aspirations of minority groups
within a state can fall anywhere along a spectrum ranging from recognition, access, and
participation to separation, autonomy, and independence (1991, p. 582). Within the context of this framework, one can observe how Scottish ambitions have developed. As full
UK citizens, Scots have always enjoyed participation and access to British government
and resources. Scotland’s main aspirations during the 1990s fall under the categories of
representation and autonomy, as it pushed for and successfully created a Scottish parliament that operated to direct some domestic affairs, albeit under the jurisdiction of the UK.
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During the most recent years, however, Scottish sentiments have escalated to a large-scale
push for separation and independence.
Mikesell and Murphy’s model suggests that Scottish notions of self-determination
have become extreme over time, but it remains to be seen if these sentiments will continue
their upward trend or whether future Scots will look back on the recent calls for independence as a passing fad of the early twenty-first century. The trend of nationalism faces a
defining moment in which it must decide whether its desire for autonomy will push it
into a new era of independence or whether the price of such a move will ultimately make
separation untenable.

The Issues Surrounding Scottish Independence

Without a doubt, the advent of Brexit has changed the political landscape for Scottish voters with regard to Scottish independence. A key issue during the debate leading
up to the referendum surrounded whether Scotland would gain EU membership if it
were to secede from the UK. The fact that the UK has voted to leave the EU means Scotland must leave, unless it can create a new option of gaining independence and then
reentering the EU. As will be discussed in the upcoming sections, it remains entirely
unclear whether or not such an option will ever become available. What is clear, however, is that Scotland no longer has the choice to retain membership in both the EU and
the UK, as it did during the last referendum. This would create a new dilemma for Scottish voters in a hypothetical second referendum.
Despite this new development, most of the issues surrounding Scottish independence have not changed since the most recent referendum. Just as before, pivotal and
divisive issues, such as defense, healthcare, citizenship, energy, culture, international status, and various economic concerns, will dominate discussion and ultimately determine
Scottish popular opinion. This section will outline the details of these issues that sit at the
center of the Scottish independence dilemma.
Defense
A clear issue involved in the creation of any new state is the management of its
defense. Scots wish to remain a part of the EU but cannot do so as part of the UK due to
Brexit. Scottish leaders must separate from the UK’s defense system if it hopes to rejoin
the EU. Scotland exists in a relatively safe neighborhood of states, but as a longstanding
part of the UK—one of the region’s most dominant military powers—it has to deal
with carryover from its military involvement as part of Great Britain (Dorman 2014,
p. 679). The primary defense issue that complicates a potential Scottish transition to independence is the location of the UK’s Trident nuclear submarine bases in Scottish waters.
Moving the bases would represent a large cost for the UK, but it seems unlikely that the
UK would allow a separated Scotland to continue to operate its naval shipyards. Furthermore, the possibility of the creation of a new European state with nuclear capability, or
the process of transferring or disarming nuclear weapons, invokes the participation of the
international community in what would otherwise be a simpler independence transition.
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The SNP’s vision argues that an independent Scotland would have no need for
nuclear weapons and advocates the removal of Trident. Scotland currently contributes tax revenue to the UK’s nuclear program, and the SNP government estimates
that Scotland would have to devote a further £100 billion in lifetime spending to
updating its nuclear weapons were Scotland to remain a nuclear state (Scottish Government 2013, p. 232). The SNP argues that Scotland could make much better use of
these funds were it to allocate them to other public needs, such as healthcare and
education. On a practical and moral level, too, Scottish politicians have pointed to
the example of a large number of European states—especially Nordic countries,
which operate peacefully and effectively in the international community without any
nuclear weapons (Bailes and Ingram 2013, p. 62).
One major complication with the SNP’s vision remains its conflicting desires to join
NATO while lowering its defense spending and military capability. The Government’s
White Paper report on Scotland’s future outlines Scotland’s membership in NATO as
a clear priority of its future defense plan (The Scottish Government 2013, p. 234). The
SNP highlights the savings an independent Scotland would accrue should it opt out
of its joint support in funding the UK’s defense spending. However, it overlooks the
fact that NATO will continue to obligate Scotland to spend heavily on defense if it
hopes to join (NATO 2016). Additionally, NATO would likely exert pressure to maintain the status quo of nuclear capability from the British Isles. Removal or disarmament
of nuclear capability in Scotland would undermine NATO’s priorities of maintaining a
stable nuclear community, since the UK and France are Europe’s only nuclear powers
(Bailes and Ingram 2013, p. 63). Due to these pressures, Scotland cannot completely
control its nuclear destiny.
Another consideration regarding the Trident nuclear program is the jobs it brings
to Scotland’s shipyards. While the government might save money in the long run by
removing the nuclear facilities, it has to think about the short-term political and economic
costs of removing jobs for thousands of Scottish workers (Good 2014). This reality may
help explain why—despite perceived long-run benefits in national savings—support for
Trident’s continued operation has remained as strong as the support for Scottish withdrawal in opinion polls during the last year, with both camps hovering around 40 percent
of respondents favoring the respective sides (ScotCen Social Research 2017). These polls
show that SNP would have to deal with a significant amount of political backlash were it
to move ahead with its plan to remove Trident. Overall, simply stating that an independent Scotland can and will quickly remove nuclear weapons overlooks both the feasibility of such a venture as well as the time frame involved, considering pressures from the
UK, NATO, and Scottish workers.
Economy
Perhaps the most significant issues of Scottish independence, at least those that matter most in the minds of the Scottish voters, have been and will continue to be questions
involving the future state of the Scottish economy. The SNP and other pro-independence
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campaigners argue that UK headquarters in London has shortchanged Scotland on
public spending, Scotland will benefit from increased economic autonomy, and it will
maintain the British pound as its currency, ensuring stability and continuity. Upon closer
analysis, however, economic uncertainty seems a more likely result than these supposed
positive outcomes.
The border will likely prove one of the most obvious complications of Scottish separation from the UK. For businesses on both the north and south side of the dividing line,
increased border security will raise the costs of transactions with businesses that serve
customers in another country (Good 2014). The disruption the border will likely cause
will simultaneously decrease Scottish support for independence in these regions while
increasing the UK’s political resolve not to allow a referendum. If Scotland wishes to
avoid these issues it will need to negotiate an opt-out of the Schengen Area while applying for EU membership. This outcome seems possible, but since this agreement remains
a fundamental value of the EU project, it still provides yet another complication on the
pathway to membership (Banks 2014, p. 1).
One argument of the pro-independence camp has relied on the idea that the
UK, centered in London and removed from Scottish interests, has inevitably led to
unequal treatment in terms of public spending. In reality, Scotland actually benefits
from spending arrangements that favor a smaller population spread over a larger
geographic territory, as is the case of Scotland in comparison with its English neighbor. This has led to public spending in Scotland outdistancing England by £1,200 per
capita annually (Martin 2014, p. 2). The supposed unequal spending by the UK has
actually benefited Scots: If the North Sea oil and gas reserves turn out to be incapable of sufficiently supplementing government revenues, increasing public spending
could become complicated.
A critical economic question for the future of an independent Scotland lies with
the future of its currency. SNP leaders have often repeated the assurance that Scotland
will continue using the British pound in the event of independence (Scottish Government 2013, p. 7). This continuity will bind interest and inflation rates to the rest of the
UK and provide stability, while also ensuring continued ease of transaction between
Scotland and the rest of Great Britain. However, this assumption of continued use of
the British pound seems somewhat cavalier, given the reactions of leaders in Westminster and the potential restriction involved with joining the EU. Only a small handful of countries were allowed to join the EU without switching to the euro currency,
suggesting that Scotland may at least run into difficulty negotiating this deal if it reapplies for membership (Flamini 2013, p. 62). British officials, such as Bank of England
Governor Mark Carney, have used the example of Europe’s troubled currency union
to argue that a potential UK currency union with Scotland would be “incompatible
with sovereignty” (Inman and Wintour 2014). Without extremely tight restrictions in
place, forming a currency union with another country that makes its own financial
decisions would put the UK at risk of Scotland undermining its economic stability.
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Should the Scottish economy take a downturn upon gaining independence, the pound
sterling, used throughout the rest of the UK, would suffer.
Other UK leaders have echoed Carney’s concerns, making Scotland’s future
use of the pound very unlikely in the event of independence (Martin 2014). Without
it, Scotland will undergo much greater risk of uncertainty and instability. Besides,
polls show that only a small minority of Scottish voters would be willing to support
the use of a currency besides the pound, while an even smaller number would be
willing to use the euro, suggesting that the SNP will face a major uphill political
battle in persuading Scot’s to accept an alternative arrangement (ScotCen Social
Research 2017). The SNP’s oversight with regard to a proper plan for a stable
currency was a major weak point leading up to the 2014 referendum and would
assumedly receive a similar response in any forthcoming referendum.
The reaction of banks and financial institutions was another of the largest concerns
that sank the possibilities of Scottish independence in 2014. During the last decade, Scotland has seen success in attracting large companies and banking institutions. In 2011,
Scotland welcomed the entry of more foreign businesses than any other region in the UK,
according to a report from Ernst and Young (Flamini 2013, p. 63). In the weeks leading
up to the independence referendum, however, several large banks, including the Royal
Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group, threatened to move their headquarters to
London should the referendum succeed in producing an independent Scotland (Collinson, Treanor, and Jones 2014). The public statements of the banks’ intentions to leave not
only transmitted financial insiders’ pessimistic opinions of Scottish independence to the
public, but it also demonstrated the risk of a potential landslide of capital flight that could
occur in a nascent Scottish state. Many wanted independence but fewer seemed willing
to undergo the possibility of an economic recession to achieve it.
A case study comparison with Quebec during its 1995 independence referendum
confirms that a violent and negative economic response is endemic to independencerelated uncertainty. The fears of Scottish voters reflect the lessons learned by Quebec
two decades earlier. Quebec, like Scotland, is a region within a larger country that
enjoys semi-autonomous control over things like healthcare, education, and welfare.
The referendum resulted in a very narrow (50.6 percent to 49.4 percent) defeat for
proponents of independence. Despite its failure, it had reverberating economic consequences (Ibid., p. 1).
The build-up to the referendum in Quebec produced different kinds of uncertainty.
First, people were unsure of the outcome. Second, people were unsure of what independence would mean should it obtain a victory in the referendum. This uncertainty produced a powerful economic response. Interest rates, exchange rates, and bond market
ratings suffered for Canada as a whole, while Quebec-based businesses’ performance
decreased on the Toronto Stock Exchange. In fact, during the 1995 referendum campaign,
the Toronto Stock Exchange suffered the sixth-largest drop in its history up until that
point (Sayers 2014, p. 2).
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The uncertainty created by Scotland’s independence bid, as well as its potential
success, could mirror the economic consequences of uncertainty that followed Quebec’s
independence referendum. These consequences will potentially cost Scotland in terms of
financial instability and capital flight. Because of questions surrounding public spending, currency, and uncertainty, it seems clear that, at least economically, Scotland will
remain in a better place if it maintains the status quo, rather than seeking for another
independence referendum.
Energy
The critical components of the energy debate as it relates to Scottish independence
fall into two categories: the production of renewable energy and the use of oil and natural
gas. In both cases, pro-independence politicians have advocated separation from the rest
of the UK as the best step forward in achieving maximum productivity and efficiency in
these categories. Critics, however, have pointed out that independence may not provide
the simple and immediate answers that the SNP and others have promised.
Scotland has emphasized its energy future as a key component of its independence
bid, arguing that it has much more to gain than to lose in terms of energy production
were it to become an independent country. The SNP government has stated that years of
underinvestment in the field of renewable energy has harmed the UK’s prospects going
forward, and Scotland has an opportunity to become a regional leader in the industry.
The long-term goal put forward by the SNP is to grow capacity in renewable energy
production until Scotland can become an energy exporter, providing a boost for government revenue, jobs, and the economy as a whole, following the example of its North Sea
neighbor Norway (The Scottish Government 2013, p. 296).
While the outcomes from renewable energy development described by the SNP
government would likely produce excellent results for the Scottish economy, the
SNP overlooks the possibility for increasing Scotland’s energy productivity while
remaining within the UK. The only real changes that need to take place in order for
it to achieve its renewable energy goals are increased autonomy on energy policy
and decreased regulations from London. Scotland could likely achieve both through
negotiations with London without needing to obtain complete independence (Ibid.,
p. 295).
The second and more significant energy concern involved with Scottish independence is the future of the UK’s oil and natural reserves in the North Sea. If Scotland separates from the rest of the UK, initial estimates suggest that upward of 19 percent of the oil
and natural gas fields fall in offshore Scottish waters (Flamini 2013, p. 63). Although Scotland plans to rely heavily on its renewable energy in the future, these natural resources
would provide an important source of energy security and, more importantly, revenue
for the government, with which it could supplement tax revenue and make up the losses
involved with leaving the much larger UK tax pool.
Scotland’s rights to the North Sea’s natural resources have provided one of the most
convincing arguments for Scottish independence. Currently, the reserves belong to all of
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the UK, meaning Scotland has to share resources that fall almost entirely within Scottish
territory. Some estimate the offshore resources amount to as much as twenty-four billion
barrels of oil, which could go a long way in subsidizing the government’s expenditures in
Scotland’s transition to independence (Martin 2014, p. 3). It seems only fair for Scotland to
receive a greater share of the resources that lie within its territory.
Some experts have cautioned that the estimates of pro-independence politicians may
be over-optimistic. Sir Ian Wood of the Wood Group, which works in the North Sea oil
industry, warned that he would place estimates of the reserves closer to fifteen or sixteen
billion barrels, an estimate that has since been backed by British Petroleum and Royal
Dutch Shell (Martin 2014, p. 3). While still a significant amount, the smaller estimate
would force the SNP and others to work out far more austere measures for government
spending without the additional income from oil and gas revenue. Others have gone on
to point out that the North Sea oil fields have been harvested of their resources for many
years, and the oil left, while still a large amount, will become increasingly difficult and
more expensive to extract than it was previously (Good 2014).
Beyond the issues surrounding the SNP’s overestimates of the North Sea oil and
gas reserves, other critics have cited international law as another potential barrier to
Scotland’s unrestricted access to the resources. Estimations for Scotland’s share of the
oil and gas reserves are based on current administrative boundaries, but John Paterson,
chair of law at the University of Aberdeen, has counseled the Scottish government to
be wary of using estimates as the given reality of what will be the case after a Scottish
separation. International law surrounding claims to the North Sea reserves, he says,
will remain a matter of negotiation between countries, and the UK may well make a
larger claim on the oil than it has previously. Because the conversation concerning the
UK’s natural resources will take place within the context of a much broader discussion
concerning the division of debts and assets throughout the country, deciding who has
the rights to the North Sea oil may not be as straightforward as some have imagined
(Good 2014). Should Scotland attempt to retain complete possession of what have been
the entire UK’s oil reserves, the UK will argue that simply dividing resources based on
geographic lines overlooks historical claims to the resources. British leaders can maintain that, just like two states would divide national debt equitably between them in the
event of referendum, the UK and Scotland ought to divide its energy resources proportionally as well (Armstrong 2014, p. 299).
International Relations
A highly significant concern of a newly independent Scotland will be its relationship
with both its neighbors and the international community as a whole. Scotland may have
the highest stakes in play if it bids for independence, but its actions will interact with vital
interests for the UK, the EU, and even the U.S., which would prefer not to see the strength
of its close political and military ally undermined (Flamini 2013, p. 63). Scotland will have
to decide the role it wishes to play, as well as plan strategically for the reactions other
actors will have, should it separate from Great Britain.
184

WILCOX
Scotland will have to tread carefully to ensure that it does not permanently damage its relationship with England and the rest of the UK, since it will have to maintain
important economic and cultural ties with its neighbors going forward. As previously
mentioned, Prime Minister Theresa May has repeated her opinion that Scotland needs
to focus, along with the rest of the UK, on unity as they negotiate with the EU, and any
referendum on independence should occur after the negotiations with the EU take place.
Sturgeon and other leaders will have to decide how far they can push London officials
on the Scottish independence issue without alienating them, since a UK without Scotland
will still maintain a stronger economic and political bargaining position compared to its
new northern neighbor (Bailes and Ingram 2013, p. 42).
One of the biggest issues to decide with regard to the rest of the UK will be that of
citizenship, as a large number of those born in Scotland now live elsewhere in the UK,
and many from the UK now live in Scotland. Families extend across potential future borders. Scotland will face a tricky situation in deciding how to handle the citizenship of
these people. It will likely end up having to let people decide for themselves but many
will not be satisfied choosing to be only Scottish or only British (Flamini 2013, p. 62). The
two countries could attempt to reach some kind of compromise that would allow citizens
of each country to retain dual citizenship, but it seems unlikely that London will feel
overly generous in doling out the benefits of citizenship to Scottish nationals very soon
after they declare independence.
Scots will also have to decide their potential political relationship with the British
royal family and whether they will follow the path of countries like Canada and Australia, who still maintain the British monarchy as the head of state (Martin 2014, p. 4). While
the role of the monarchy would remain symbolic, the issue has divided Scots. Some wish
to continue the traditional tie to Great Britain, while others think the British monarchy
undermines Scottish nationalism (ScotCen Social Research 2017).
Arguably, the most pivotal outside actor in relation to Scotland’s potential independence bid is the EU. The UK’s vote to leave the EU remains the primary catalyst in
the SNP’s renewed call for independence so close on the heels of the 2014 referendum. The SNP has suggested that entry into the EU will prove a relatively simple
process. Scotland will simply tweak a few treaties and reenter in the place that the
UK will vacate. Some European officials, such as Guy Verhofstadt, the European Parliament’s chief Brexit negotiator, have expressed sympathy for Scotland’s cause, saying
that it should not have to leave the EU when it voted strongly in favor of staying (Carrell
2017). Most, however, have maintained that a clear standard for application to the EU is
set out under Article 49 of the European Treaties, and Scotland would have to join the
queue of other applicant states, such as Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro. While Scotland
would likely move through the process of application more quickly than some of these
other states due to its ability to meet EU member criteria more easily, it would most likely
still have to start in the same place and complete the same steps as any other applicant.
Scotland would also have to apply as a new member to join the UN (Flamini 2013, p. 60).
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While it seems unlikely that Scotland would achieve a simple and immediate entry
into the EU as SNP leaders have suggested, the bigger problem it faces remains the question of whether the EU member states will be willing to let it enter at all. The EU requires
unanimous approval of all member states in order for a new state to join. Both Spain, with
Catalonia, and Belgium, with Flanders, combated secessionist movements within their
territories and would rather not allow a precedent for successful secession to take place
within the EU, which might encourage their respective separatist populations. These
states could easily use their veto power to prevent Scotland from achieving EU membership (Flamini 2013, p. 60). After Sturgeon and May’s meeting in late March 2017 to discuss
a second Scottish referendum, Spanish Foreign Minister Alfonso Dastis made a public
statement that “Spain supports the territorial integrity of the UK and doesn’t encourage
secessions or divisions in any of the member states” (Torres 2017). The Spanish government in Madrid moved quickly and decisively to repress the recent attempt of Catalonian
leaders to declare independence by dissolving the regional government headquartered
in Barcelona. Were Scotland to rejoin the EU, it would encourage Catalonia’s hopes of
doing the same. While Spain has yet to make any outright statements affirming it will
veto a Scottish entry into the EU, its behavior toward Catalonia signals that it will not take
lightly a move for Scottish independence.
In summary, Scotland faces, at best, a large degree of uncertainty regarding if or
when it would join the EU. In the best-case scenario, it may well achieve membership,
but it could only come after a long process of negotiations and will likely hinge on the
status of secessionist movements elsewhere in Europe. If reentry into the EU remains
one of the primary objectives of a second Scottish independence referendum, Scotland
can only hope to find a way of placating the secessionist concerns of Spain and Belgium. This negotiation process will remain difficult as long as secessionist movements
remain a concern for these countries, which seems unlikely to change in the near future.
Scotland faces a long battle to become a member of the EU, if membership is indeed
attainable at all.
Healthcare
A primary debate regarding Scottish independence in 2014 involved Scotland’s
National Healthcare System (NHS), and this debate will remain just as relevant in
light of a new independence bid post-Brexit. Scotland gained independent control of
its healthcare system and policy in 1999, during the same devolution agreements that
saw the creation of a Scottish Parliament. The UK, however, still exerts some command over the system because it maintains control over the budget and spending on
healthcare in all of Great Britain, including Scotland (Mathieson 2014). The healthcare
debate, consequently, concentrates mainly on finances.
The argument of those supporting independence suggests that Scotland and the rest
of the UK have begun to pursue increasingly divergent paths when it comes to healthcare. The British Parliament’s policies have begun to focus more on privatization and
competition within the industry, while the Scottish Parliament remains a strong propo186
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nent of public healthcare. Leaders of the SNP and other pro-independence-minded politicians have warned that Scotland could face budget cuts for its healthcare in the future due
to financial decisions and austerity measures made exclusively in London. They suggest
that Scotland ought to have the ability to dictate its future with regard to both its healthcare policy and its budget (The Scottish Government 2013, p. 172). Without this power,
Scotland’s healthcare priorities will suffer from underfunding, and the country will have
to adopt policy measures against its values.
This line of reasoning, however, remains subject to many critiques. To begin with,
Scotland enjoys significantly higher spending per capita on healthcare by the UK government than England. According to a report during 2012–13, English residents were the
recipients of £1,912 in annual government spending on health care on average, compared
to £2,115 per person in Scotland, making it difficult to argue that Scotland is getting as
bad of a deal as some politicians would like it to appear (Mathieson 2014, p. 3). More
significantly, an independent Scotland would plan to obtain most of its tax revenue from
North Sea oil (see section on Energy and resources). Between the depletion of these natural resources going forward, as well as a small population and an aging demographic,
Scotland’s ability to support its own healthcare system in the long run seems far less
viable than its possibilities were it to stay connected to the tax revenue of all of Great
Britain (Ibid., p. 4).
This argument not only undermines the SNP’s logic for healthcare gains from
independence but also provides a strong argument for the benefits of remaining a
part of a larger, wealthier country. The climate among those involved in the healthcare industry prior to the 2014 referendum was one of pessimism and skepticism.
A study surveyed 311 doctors, finding that 60 percent planned to vote against independence, with only 33 percent supporting independence (Rimmer 2014, p. 1). The
doctors cited concerns over an economic downturn that would prevent an independent
Scotland from recruiting enough medical professionals, while encouraging many to
move south of the border to practice.
Others have raised concerns over waiting lists for operations or organ transplants.
If Scotland must rely solely on its own healthcare system and a smaller population to
sustain it, the logistics involved could increase wait times for life-saving surgeries and
organ donations. Since EU health cards ensure access to healthcare in any EU member
country, some pro-independence politicians have concluded worries about access to such
emergency operations would not be a real concern were Scotland to rejoin the EU and
regain access to the medical resources of other EU members. They argue that Scottish
citizens have no need to rely on British healthcare (Good 2014). This argument provides
little certainty for a country that may not rejoin the EU; the loss of access to the medical
resources of its closest neighbor would certainly cause logistical problems for Scotland
when it comes to issues like organ donations and emergency transplant operations. The
country will take on more risk in this area if it chooses independence.
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Nationalism
Scotland will evidently undergo heavy costs if it wishes to obtain independence.
History, however, shows that this may not be entirely surprising. The bloody American
Revolution, among others, demonstrates that nations seeking for independence sometimes value freedom even at high costs. Even though economics and political liberties
matter to voters, it is possible that people might still view independence as more valuable
than the sacrifices it will entail because of nationalism (Van Evera 1994, p. 5). If the feeling
of nationalism remains strong enough within Scotland, its voters may continue to support independence, even at a high cost.
The roots of Scottish nationalism in relation to its southern neighbors stretch back
centuries into British history. In a.d. 128, the Roman emperor Hadrian built a wall to keep
out northern marauders, while the Scottish Wars of Independence in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries gave rise to legends in Scottish national lore, like William Wallace
(Broun 2007, p. 24). Unlike these wars in past centuries, the modern manifestations of
Scottish nationalism have remained peaceful, but Scots clearly still feel nationalist sentiments. Still, Scotland would theoretically have to experience a widespread notion of
nationalist Scottish identity in order to be willing, together as a nation, to sacrifice in order
to obtain statehood (Nietschmann 1994, p. 241).
The trouble with Scotland, in terms of generating enough sentiment to become independent, remains that it faces division in the degree to which people feel strongly about
Scottish identity throughout the country. According to census data, over a third of the
country claimed to identify primarily as something other than “Scottish only,” indicating the complexity of identity politics in Scotland (Scotland’s Census 2011). As discussed
previously, people who live close to the border between England and Scotland tend to see
themselves as a kind of in-between people who identify with both nationalities, since the
border has not been a true cultural barrier for a very long time. Furthermore, people in
the border regions will be among those most hurt by Scottish independence and, therefore, will likely oppose nationalist sentiments to a greater degree. People who live far
to the north of Edinburgh, in the Shetland Isles, also experience an identity crisis; when
interviewed, some felt a greater connection to Norway than Britain, and most claimed
to identify first as Shetlanders and second as British (Good 2014). Overall, it currently
appears that Scottish nationalism remains too fractured to produce the cohesion necessary for achieving widespread support for independence.
Although Scotland remains characterized by a diversity of sentiments regarding
independence at this time, proponents of Scottish independence ought to consider the
role of age in identity politics. Data from 1999 to 2010 show that young people are more
likely than older generations to support Scottish independence. Over this span, those
between eighteen and twenty-four were 10 to 15 percent more likely to support independence as the best form of ruling Scotland (Schneider 2014, p. 56). While one cannot be
certain about the causation of the support for independence among Scottish youth, this
finding could be evidence of a generational shift that has begun to take place in Scotland
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and provides a strong argument in favor of the SNP waiting a few years to carry out a
second Scottish referendum, rather than doing so immediately.
Cultural and Familial Ties
Scotland has operated together with its southern neighbors as a single country
since the Treaty of Union in 1707, which created the country of Great Britain. Their
coexistence has led to the crossover one might expect to happen between neighboring
regions of a single country during the past three hundred years, and the delineation
between what it means to be Scottish and what it means to be English has become
blurred over time.
At the time of the 2011 Scottish census, approximately 500,000 people, over 10
percent of Scotland’s population, were born in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland,
while approximately 700,000 Scots resided in other parts of the UK (Scotland’s Census 2011). This overlap on a massive scale requires pro-independence politicians to
account for the difficulty of deciding how to handle immigration and border rights
with the rest of the UK were it to seek independence.
The issue of the border will also prove to be a difficult problem for politicians to
resolve, primarily because it has not operated as a real border since the distant past. Most
people who live in the border region have developed familial and business relationships
on both sides of it, and many view themselves as neither English nor Scottish but as simply British (Good 2014). In fact, according to census data, only 62 percent of Scots viewed
themselves as “Scottish only,” with 18 percent of the population identifying with both
“Scottish and British identities,” and 8 percent choosing “British only” as their national
identity (Scotland’s Census 2011).
Furthermore, border-dwellers will have a tremendously difficult time adjusting
to the realities of a real border, were Scotland to put it in place, as their livelihoods
often require them or their clients to cross borders. Were Scotland to rejoin the EU
and the Schengen Agreement, it seems impossible to imagine that Great Britain, which
left the EU in large part due to populist opinion against free migration of immigrants
into their country from elsewhere in Europe, would leave an open border with Scotland
across which immigrants could travel (Good 2014).
The Timing of a Second Referendum
One of the most basic questions involved in proposing a second Scottish referendum
lies in its timing. Nicola Sturgeon has announced her intentions to seek a second Scottish
independence referendum, which she hopes will take place between the fall of 2018 and
the spring of 2019 (Stone 2017). While the Scottish Parliament in Holyrood will back Sturgeon’s appeal, British Prime Minister Theresa May and the UK Parliament in London
have the final say in authorizing the referendum. May has repeatedly stated her objection to a second Scottish referendum. She insists that the process of Brexit negotiations
call for national unity and that a Scottish referendum would undermine the negotiations’
outcomes, creating a less favorable deal for Scotland and the rest of the UK (Taylor 2017).
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Inherent to the timing dilemma is an element of risk for the pro-independence
advocates. Should Sturgeon somehow succeed in bringing about a second referendum,
the results must be final in one direction or another. If she fails in leading Scotland to
independence, it becomes difficult to imagine she or any other politician will remain
capable of mustering enough political will to push a third independence bid for years to
come. This raises the stakes of holding a referendum and prioritizes the need to launch
it at the right time.
The following line graph represents the data obtained by asking the question: “When
do you think another Scottish independence referendum should be held?” Researchers
compiled the data collected during the last nine months.

Table 1

Although a brief moment existed immediately following the Brexit referendum in
which Scots narrowly supported holding another referendum before the Brexit negotiations finish, the most dominant group in the polling clearly support not having a referendum in the next several years. Since February 2017, there appears to be some convergence,
with those supporting a referendum after the negotiations declining, and those supporting a referendum during negotiations on the rise. Whether this trend will continue, and
whether support for no referendum at all will decline, remains to be seen. Still, it seems
clear that most Scots oppose Sturgeon’s idea of an immediate referendum.
The data may confirm that Sturgeon’s calculus is not entirely off. The strongest
support for a new independence referendum has centered on the time of the Brexit
referendum and the build-up to May’s triggering of Article 50 to begin Brexit negotiations, suggesting that perhaps proponents of independence will have the best chance at
earning popular support while Brexit remains fresh on voters’ minds. However, even if
this proves to be the case, the opportune moment of independence support may have
already passed.

Conclusions and Policy Suggestions

The issues that have dominated discussion surrounding Scottish independence
will ultimately determine when or if a second Scottish referendum will take place. Even
though Scotland now faces the cost of leaving the EU in the wake of Brexit, the cost of
leaving the UK is still higher. In the aggregate, the best solution for Scotland remains
to wait patiently, and as Prime Minister Theresa May suggested, focus on unity with
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the rest of the UK during the Brexit negotiations. While Scotland may well continue to
feel that Brexit has changed the nature of its relationship with Great Britain, after the
negotiations take place, Scotland will have a better idea of the situation in which it will
exist going forward. This will enable voters to make decisions with more certainty than
currently possible.
The takeaways from the discussion of most of the issues discussed in this paper—
familial and cultural ties, healthcare, defense, energy, and economics—indicate that separation will prove difficult at any point, whether now or in the future. Those living near the
border will be worse off in any situation that implements enforced separation between
the states. Scotland can achieve its proposed healthcare and renewable energy reforms
through negotiations to decrease London’s central authority and increase Scottish autonomy, without needing to go as far as full independence. North Sea oil will remain a point
of friction no matter what path Scotland chooses to take and will likely not provide a
universal solution to government revenues should Scotland obtain independence. While
it would be difficult to imagine London removing its nuclear submarine bases from Scottish waters without Scotland leaving the UK, the Trident nuclear problem will not gain
a simple solution through independence either. Finally, all signs suggest that Scotland
stands to lose in economic terms if it chooses independence.
Although perhaps less pessimistic in their outcomes than the other issues, the
conclusions concerning nationalism, the timing of the referendum, and international
relations suggest that the SNP would be wise to wait rather than immediately hurrying into a second independence referendum. Sturgeon does not currently hold the
political support necessary, but age demographics and a spike in interest with Brexit
events demonstrate that the most likely time for a referendum to find success would
come in a few years. If the realities of Brexit’s effects on Scotland are as unfortunate as
predicted, then support for independence will only increase. Scotland’s bid to join the
EU will necessarily depend on the status of Belgium’s and Spain’s secessionist movements, while negotiations involving nuclear weapons and membership in NATO and
the UN will also require a longer timeline. In general, Scotland’s independence bid will
likely benefit in these areas if it waits. If Sturgeon gets a referendum approved now,
and then it fails, the SNP may take years or decades to build enough political capital to
attempt another independence bid.
As a common trend throughout most of these issues, uncertainty remains the biggest
issue in the current state of Scottish independence reform. Voters simply do not have the
information necessary to make a comfortable decision regarding the future of their country. This information will only become available once the UK and the EU complete Brexit
negotiations and the new status quo becomes known.
Scotland’s best option, as things stand, will be to begin by negotiating with London for increased autonomy in its healthcare and energy objectives, especially in
terms of budget and financing. Officials in London may be willing to give concessions
to Scotland if it agrees to wait on an independence referendum until after the Brexit
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negotiations. The time that passes will prove beneficial for Scotland, since more information will become available to voters as Brexit takes place, and Scots will grow more
capable of making the decisions necessary to determine the future status of their country.
Scottish patience will help the UK maintain stability as it negotiates Brexit, and this in
turn will help Scotland maintain a better working relationship with the UK, allowing
the SNP to move into a better position to negotiate and attempt a successful referendum.
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